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Abstract
Why did British politicians initiate, and why did civil servants facilitate, the 
complete disposal of the government’s oil assets, a vital national resource? Public 
choice theory has traditionally found it difficult to explain the retreat of the state, not 
because the theory is flawed, but because insufficient attention has been given to the 
parameters that actors face at both the domestic and international level. Four sets of 
parameters are particularly relevant to this case: international, industry, bureaucratic 
and political, which I review in sequence.
First, though international factors are rarely incorporated into domestic policy­
making analyses, they do have an impact. Realists’ issue-specific models can be 
adapted to these analyses and help explain why Britain was forced to bow to 
international financial pressures and to work within the international oil structure. A 
balance of payments crisis in 1976 forced Britain’s first asset sale while the 
development of a free market for oil (not dominated by a monopoly or cartel) made 
further sales more feasible, but not inevitable.
Second, state-owned companies were often obstacles to privatization. A closer 
examination of the companies’ structures explains the differing reactions of the 
managers of British National Oil Company (BNOC), British Gas Corporation (BGC) 
and British Petroleum (BP) and their abilities to achieve their preferences. The 
management of BP favoured privatization while the managers of BNOC and BGC 
opposed the sales of their oil assets. Though they could not prevent the fulfilment of 
the government’s plans, they were able to cause delays and affect the form which 
privatization took.
Third, contrary to budget-maximizing models, the British civil servants did not 
impede privatization. As members of a generalist bureaucracy, they were more 
concerned with their immediate work tasks and future career prospects across the civil 
service as a whole, than the long term future of the division or department where they 
were immediately located. In addition, because the Department of Energy was a 
relatively weak agency, individual level and career-maximizing strategies 
predominated rather than collective action strategies.
Finally, because political demands for privatization were weak, other supply- 
side factors dominated politicians’ decision to select privatization. These included 
party political pressures to cut public spending by means of asset sales and personal 
political advantage, which encouraged policy entrepreneurs to bear the initial costs 
of a potentially hazardous innovation.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Privatization in Britain has been heralded by British politicians, the press and 
political observers alike as a radical break in government policy - not only for the 
British government, but for any government. Yet the sale of Britain’s oil assets, vital 
resources in an oil dependent world, passed without much opposition or even much 
notice. The assets, Britoil, Enterprise Oil and Wytch Farm, and a majority 
shareholding in British Petroleum, were sold within a 10 year period, 1977 to 1987, 
reversing a policy which had lasted 73 years. In this dissertation I seek to explain 
why the government pursued this seemingly irrational policy and why there was so 
little opposition. This first chapter establishes the theoretical argument and approach. 
I first review the realists’ understanding of state power and the control of natural 
resources, and then examine previous attempts to explain the retrenchment of 
government. Building on these insights, I present an alternative approach. Next, I 
review the methodology and finally outline the rest of the dissertation.
1.1. State Power and Natural Resources
Ever since Thucydides wrote The History o f  the Peloponnesian War, scholars 
have asserted that states seek to maximize their power and that natural resources are 
an essential component of that power.1 Modem political realists have added evidence 
and analysis to support this view. The three main points of realism are that the state
1 Robert Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,’ in Robert Keohane, 
ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.308-9; and 
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations, Second Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 114-29.
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is the key unit of analysis, that states seek power, and that states behave rationally.2 
Realists and neo-realists contend that states try to enhance the power and material 
well-being o f their inhabitants and therefore, as Stephen Krasner asserts, ‘states want 
power and control as much as wealth.’3 One of the primary means to power is 
control of material resources. Robert Keohane, in his seminal work After Hegemony, 
argues that power is based on the control of material resources; similarly, G. John 
Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan assert: ‘Power is directly related to the command 
of material resources. ’4
Of all a state’s resources, most scholars agree that raw materials are among 
the most important. Keohane lists raw materials ahead of other sources including 
capital, markets and competitive advantage in the production o f highly valued goods.5 
Similarly, Krasner argues that raw materials are intimately connected with the 
effective functioning of the economy, the well-being of individual citizens and the
2 Robert Keohane, ‘Realists, Neorealists and the Study of World Politics,’ in Keohane, 
ed., Neorealism and its Critics, p. 7.
3 John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, The State (Milton Keynes: Open University Press,
1989), pp. 10-11; and Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: Third World Against Global 
Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p.3.
Neo-realists contest that states seek always and only to maximize power. Hans 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 118; and Robert Keohane, 
‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,’ in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and 
its Critics, p. 194.
4 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.32; and G. John Ikenberry and 
Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power,’ International Organization, 
Vol.44, No.3, Summer 1990, p.3.
5 Keohane, After Hegemony, p.32.
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(national defence.6 Of the raw resources, energy is often cited as the most important
for a state to control. Thucydides even mentioned the importance of energy resources,
though he was referring to wheat for fuelling soldiers’ bodies.7 More recently, Susan
Strange explained energy’s economic importance:
For all developed economies, whether planned, mixed or market- 
oriented, energy is a vital factor of production. The basic industries in 
every modem economy...all need large inputs of energy, whether this 
comes from oil, coal, gas or nuclear power. Nor can any modem 
economy function without transport. Road, rail, sea and air 
transportation are all heavy users o f energy. And when there is a 
breakdown in the supply of power to homes and factories, a modem 
society comes almost to a standstill.8
Henry Kissinger highlighted the political and military as well as the economic
importance of oil specific to the United States:
The [1973-74] energy crisis has placed at risk all o f this nation’s 
objectives in the world. It has mortgaged our economy and made our 
foreign policy vulnerable to unprecedented pressures...it has also 
profoundly affected our national security by triggering a policy crisis 
o f global dimensions.9
A states’ natural response to a threat to those resources is to increase direct control,
as Susan Strange points out for oil:
After the first OPEC price rise, other states’ concern with this new 
problematique of security - how to secure supplies of energy for the 
country’s industry and transportation systems - led, as we saw, to 
greater state intervention in markets and to much greater diversity of
6 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p.52; also see Robert 
Rothstein, The Weak in the World of the Strong (New York: Columbia University Press,
1977), p.21; and John Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, Eighth Edition (New York: 
Random House, 1986), p. 15.
7 Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,’ pp.308-9.
8 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), p. 186.
9 As quoted in Strange, States and Markets, p.201.
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state policies towards energy sources other than o il.10 
Yair Aharoni suggests that the best form of control is state ownership. He 
argues that state-owned companies allow governments to exert more control over 
resources as well as to provide invisible methods to pay largesse to different 
constituents. State-owned industries also permit politicians to dispense political 
patronage and to carry out projects which might not otherwise win legislative 
approval. As state owned companies also have a degree o f autonomy, politicians can 
claim that they are free of blame if a project fails, while they are well positioned to 
take credit for any successes.11 Aharoni also points out that oil ownership, in 
particular, enables governments to reduce dependence on multinational companies, 
to develop the understanding necessary to check multinational companies’ activities, 
and to ensure inexpensive and reliable crude oil supplies.12
Historical evidence also supports this view. Over half of the world’s state- 
owned oil companies existing today were created between 1970 and 1982, while states 
without oil (such as Japan and Germany) became more directly involved by 
negotiating long-term oil contracts directly with oil producing countries.13 Britain 
conformed to this pattern until 1977, even creating its own state oil company in 1976. 
In 1977, however, Britain began to sell its oil assets, first with a tranche of British
10 Strange, States and Markets, p.202.
11 Yair Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises (Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1986), p.38.
12 Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises, p. 103; also see 
Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury, ‘Introduction: Analysing Privatization in Industrial 
and Developing Countries,’ in Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury, eds., The Political 
Economy of Public Sector Reform and. Privatization (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p. 18.
13 As calculated from the Financial Times International Yearbook, Oil and Gas, 1992 
(Harlow: Longman, 1992 and 1993).
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Petroleum (BP) shares reducing the governments holding from 68 per cent to 51 per 
cent.
By 1987, the British government had sold the production portion o f the British 
National Oil Company (BNOC), now known as Britoil, and abolished BNOC’s 
trading operations; it had forced the British Gas Corporation (BGC) to sell all its oil 
assets (now known as Enterprise Oil and Wytch Farm) and had completely divested 
its holding in BP. In so doing, scholars and critics haVe argued, the British state 
reduced its control over a vital resource and a essential means to power. David Heald 
asserts: ‘Through privatization measures, the government is reducing its leverage over 
the oil sector.’14 Similarly, Michael Webb argues: ‘The privatization of energy 
industries reduces the scope for the direct involvement o f government in their 
decision taking.’15
1.2. Paradox of Explaining State Retrenchment
As defined by John Vickers and Vincent Wright, privatization is ‘that wide 
range of policies designed to reduce the scope, limit the functions and generally 
weaken the influence of the public sector.’16 Since the early 1980s, plans have been 
made for privatizations in industrialized and developing countries and by liberal as 
well as conservative governments, including Turkey, Nigeria, Argentina, Mexico,
14 David Heald, ‘UK Energy Policy: Economic and Financial Control of the Nationalized 
Energy Industries,’ Energy Policy, June 1981, p. 107.
15 Michael Webb, ‘Energy Policy and the Privatization of the UK Energy Industries,’ 
Energy Policy, February 1985, p.31.
16 John Vickers and Vincent Wright, ‘The Politics of Industrial Privatisation in Western 
Europe,’ in John Vickers and Vincent Wright, ed., The Politics of Privatisation in Western 
Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p.3.
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Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Cuba, Mozambique, New Zealand, Belgium, Austria,
Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Eastern Europe.17 In
fact, according to an article in the Economist in 1975, ‘Everybody’s Doing It.’18
Not only does the development of privatization challenge the realists’ view of
the state; it challenges most academics’ view of the state as well. For example,
Joseph Schumpeter declared in 1952 that the further expansion of public bureaucracies
was ‘the one certain thing about our future.’19 Many theorists have been unable to
plausibly explain the retrenchment of the state at all, as Paul Starr points out:
Whether or not the current turn towards privatization discloses a 
general failure of government, it certainly discloses a general failure 
of social theory. From the 1950s through the 1970s, theorists of the 
most diverse persuasions assumed that growing welfare and regulatory 
states in the West and entrenched communist states in the East were 
accomplished facts, unlikely to be reversed or undone.20
Whether despite these problems, or possibly because of them, there have been
17 Paul Starr, ‘The New Life of the Liberal State: Privatization and the Restructuring of 
State-Society Relations,’ in Suleiman and Waterbury, eds., The Political Economy of Public 
Sector Reform and Privatization, p.35; Fariborz Ghadar, ‘Oil: The Power of an Industry,’ 
in Raymond Vernon, ed., The Promise of Privatization: A Challenge for U.S. Policy (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations 1988), pp.231-2; William P. Glade, ‘Sources and Forms 
of Privatization,’ in Glade, ed., State Shrinking: A Comparative Inquiry into Privatization 
(Austin,TX: Institute of Latin American Studies, the University of Texas at Austin, 1986), 
pp.vii-ix and Chapter 1; G. John Ikenberry, ‘The International Spread of Privatization 
Policies: Inducements, Learning and "Policy Band wagoning",’ in Suleiman and Waterbury, 
eds., The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization, pp. 88-110; and Oliver 
Letwin, Privatizing the World: A Study of International Privatization in Theory and Practice 
(London: Cassell Education, 1988), p.30; Suleiman and Waterbury, ‘Introduction: Analysing 
Privatization in Industrial and Developing Countries,’ pp.3-7; Colin Chapman, Selling the 
Family Silver: Has Privatization Worked? (London: Hutchinson Business Books, 1990), 
pp. 128-30; Vickers and Wright, ‘The Politics of Industrial Privatisation in Western Europe,’ 
p.4; and search of ’privatization’ in the Financial Times using FT profile.
18 As quoted in Suleiman and Waterbury, ‘Introduction: Analysing Privatization in 
Industrial and Developing Countries,’ p.3.
19 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1952), p.294.
20 Starr, ‘The New Life of the Liberal State,’ p.22.
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numerous attempts to explain privatization. Realists maintain that states will always 
prefer to control vital resources. So the only explanation for the adoption o f a policy 
not in the states’ interest is the success of ‘powerful’ private actors in influencing an 
‘uncohesive state’.21 States with regimes that allow private actors access to the 
policy making process are forced to give larger shares of both sovereign largesse and 
entrepreneurial concessions to interest groups.22 Merrie Gilbert Klapp analyses 
British oil policy from a realist perspective and argues that the British state 
succumbed to shipping and fishing groups as well as multinational oil companies and 
international banks by selling its oil assets.23 But the evidence on privatization shows 
that the initiative for the sales came from political leaders themselves, and not from 
strong interest groups. In fact, most current accounts of privatization, from Europe 
to Africa, describe the obstacles leaders must overcome to implement their 
privatization goals rather than interest group persuading the government.24 But 
realists cannot explain why a state would choose to sell and give up control of a
21 Eric Nordlinger, ‘The Retreat of the State: Critiques,’ American Political Science 
Review, Vol.82, No.3, September 1988, pp.881-3; also see Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Approaches 
to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,’ Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, 
No.2, 1984; and Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981).
22 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises 
(New York: Basic Books, 1971); Theodore Moran, Multinational Corporations and the 
Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brent 
Nelsen, The State Offshore Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention on the British and 
Norwegian Continental Shelves (London: Praeger Publishers, 1991); and Hall and Ikenberry, 
The State, pp. 12-14.
23 Merrie Gilbert Klapp, The Sovereign Entrepreneur: Oil Policies in Advanced and Less 
Developed Capitalist Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
24 Alice Rawsthorn, ‘Survey of France: So Far the Omens Are Not Ideal: Review of the 
Privatisation Programme,’ Financial Times, 24 June 1993, p.III; and Tony Hawkins, ‘Survey 
of Africa - A Continent at State: Reformers Lose Their Way - Public Sector and 
Privatization,’ Financial Times, 1 September 1993, p.XI.
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natural resource.
Many theories try to explain the overall retrenchment of growth with systems 
level solutions. Most o f these type of theories identify one independent variable, such 
as technology, economic growth, the demands of interest groups or voters, or 
financial capacity. They suggest that a reversal of one or another of such external 
influences will cause a change in the trend of government growth.25 While 
parsimonious, systems approaches do not explain why the government retrenches in 
some sectors and not others. More sophisticated systems approaches, such as a ‘super 
auto reversible’ model which has the benefit o f incorporating several levels of 
variables, still cannot explain why privatization occurs in both industrial and 
developing countries.26
Elite theory explains why privatization originates from a government despite 
little popular demand for the policy. Elite theorists argue that the top governmental 
positions and therefore the national agenda are controlled by a homogenous elite, and 
that privatization was proposed because it meets elite goals of greater technological 
efficiency and was consistent with their ideological beliefs.27 Elite theorists have 
trouble though explaining why the state ever nationalized industries in the first place, 
or why they were sold at one specific point in time.
The ideological aspect of the elites’ argument has emerged as the conventional 
wisdom. While troublesome to scholars, the ‘man on the street’ in Britain easily
25 Christopher Hood, ‘Stabilization and Cutbacks: A Catastrophe for Government Growth 
Theory?’ Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.3, N o.l, 1991, pp.43-56.
26 Hood, ‘Stabilization and Cutbacks,’ pp.56-59.
27 Ian McAlister and Donley Studlar, ‘Popular Versus Elite Views of Privatization: The 
Case of Britain,’ Journal of Public Policy, Vol.9, No.2, 1989, p. 160, Table I; Aharoni, The 
Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises, p.393.
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explains privatization as an ideological and party driven policy: the Labour Party with 
their socialist ideology nationalized Britain’s industries, and the Conservatives under 
Margaret Thatcher, with their belief in free-markets and private enterprise, privatized 
Britain’s industries.28 More sophisticated accounts similarly claim that change in 
ideology is linked to change in state-ownership. In separate studies, Nikolaos 
Zahariadis and Joel Wolfe measured the correlation between the change in state- 
ownership and the ideology of the government in power, and postulate a strong 
relationship.29 On close examination, however, this theory does not hold, even in 
this case of Britain where privatization is strongly associated with Thatcher’s 
conservative ideology. In fact, both Conservative and Labour governments undertook 
nationalization at various points in this century, primarily to aid industries which were 
in real financial trouble.30 The rationale and higher correlation, therefore, seems to 
have been between economic need and financial assistance rather than ideology/A s  
regards privatization o f the oil assets, a Labour government was actually the first to 
privatize, with the sale o f BP shares in 1977. The evidence shows a pragmatic
28 Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises, p.317; Leo 
Pliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. Thatcher (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 107; and 
John Moore, ‘Why Privatise?’ (Speech by the Financial Secretary at the Treasury and the 
government minister responsible for co-ordinating the programme), November 1, 1983, in 
‘Privatization in the United Kingdom: Background Briefing’ (London: HM Treasury, 1990), 
p.2; newspaper reports also add to this view, such as: Alice Rawsthorn, ‘Survey of France: 
So Far the Omens Are Not Ideal: Review of the Privatisation Programme,’ Financial Times, 
24 June 1993, p.m.
29 Nikolaos Zahariadis, ‘Explaining Privatizations in Britain and France: A New 
Institutionalist Perspective,’ paper presented at the American Political Science Association 
meeting in Washington, D.C., 30 August-1 September 1991; and Joel Wolfe, ‘State Power 
and Ideology in Britain: Mrs Thatcher’s Privatization Programme,’ Political Studies, 
Vol.XXXIX, 1991.
30 Heidrun Abromeit, ‘British Privatization Policy,’ Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.41, 1988, 
p.69.
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evolution of a privatization programme under the Conservative government after 
1979.
Pluralists argue that the form which state-owned companies take and, 
ultimately, their very existence is the product of struggles between state bureaucracies 
<ind interest groups (including the managers of the state-owned companies) vying for 
control and benefits. In this view, shifts in institutional links and relative power or 
political interests affect the performance or role o f the state-owned companies, and 
relegate the role of the politician to that of merely a by-stander or referee. In the case 
of the oil asset sales, however, only the oil companies were passively interested in 
privatization. The management of BNOC and BGC were actively opposed, and the 
civil servants neither initiated nor opposed the sales. The primary promoters of 
privatization were, in fact, the politicians. Though the pluralist view that the 
managers of state-owned industries are a force in their own right is useful, it ignores 
the major source of privatization in this case - the politicians.
In conventional public choice models political leaders, bureaucrats and voter 
coalitions are typically characterized as having self-interested reasons for favouring 
expanded government,31 yet governments do shrink as well as grow and departments 
expand and contract.32 While the budget-maximizing model, for example, provides 
a strong explanation for the growth of government, it has traditionally been unable
31 William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine- 
Atherton, 1971); Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 154-61; and Starr, ‘The New Life of the Liberal State,’ 
p.35.
32 Richard Rose, Understanding Big Government: The Programme Approach (London: 
Sage Publications, 1984), p.44.
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to explain state retrenchment.33 Paul Starr sums up the problem:
If there are self-interested reasons for political leaders, bureaucrats, 
and voter coalitions to favour expanded government, we need to 
understand how privatization ever arrived on the political agenda at 
all.34
Traditional demand side public choice explanations, such as the median voter 
model, fail to explain the adoption of a policy which continued to be supported only 
by the minority o f the electorate, as privatization was. Using a supply-side public 
choice approach, Mariusz Mark Dobek argues in his Political Studies article that 
privatization was a politically motivated vote-maximizing policy aimed at expanding 
the pro-Conservative constituency. Rather than following public opinion as the 
traditional median-voter model predicts, Dobek’s theory turns the model around and 
suggests that the Conservatives were attempting to lead or influence public opinion.35 
While there is some evidence that privatization provided modest electoral gains over 
time, there were initially no direct electoral gains, primarily because those who 
benefitted were already Conservative supporters.36
Some theorists, however, have challenged the conventional public choice 
orthodoxy.37 For example, Patrick Dunleavy argues that because bureaucrats’ utility
33 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 
1957); and Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government.
34 Starr, ‘The New Life of the Liberal State,’ p.35.
35 Mariusz Mark Dobek, ‘Privatization as a Political Priority: The British Experience,’ 
Political Studies, Vol.XLI, N o.l, March 1993, p.27.
36 McAlister and Studlar, ‘Popular Versus Elite Views of Privatization,’ pp. 170-74.
37 Ronald Johnson and Gary Libecap, ‘Agency Growth, Salaries and the Protected 
Bureaucrat,’ Economic Inquiry, Vol.XXVII, July 1989; Colin Campbell and Donald Naulls, 
‘The Limits of the Budget-Maximizing Theory: Some Evidence from Officials’ Views of 
Their Roles and Careers,’ in Andr£ Blais and St6phane Dion, eds., The Budget-Maximizing 
Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence, (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 1991);
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is not always increased with governmental growth that there are situations where 
bureaucrats are actually better off when governments contract.38 By re-examining 
the motivations of bureaucrats, at different levels and in different types of 
bureaucracies, he finds that there are many situations in which bureaucrats find it in 
their interest not to seek increased budgets, but instead to pursue load-shedding, 
hiving-off and contracting-out strategies.39 This type of flexibility suggests that the 
basic tene.ts of public choice theory are useful yet, at the same time, some o f the 
existing assumptions need to be re-considered in light of changing circumstances. 
Having proved resilient to such testing so far, it is the most likely to offer scope for 
developing an articulated explanation for privatization.
1.3. Structure of the Thesis
This dissertation examines the British government’s sale of its oil assets, some 
of the most important early privatizations. Instead of focusing on oil across countries, 
or on all privatizations within one country, I have chosen a single-sector focus, with 
the aim of understanding all the details and gaining the full flavour which is often lost 
in larger studies. My challenge, therefore, is to make sure that the conclusions here 
are not so specific that they pertain only to this case, but rather are transferable to 
other countries or other policy sectors.
Robert A. Young, ‘Budget Size and Bureaucratic Careers,’ in Blais and Dion, eds., The 
Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat.
38 Patrick Dunleavy, ‘The Architecture of the British Central State, Part I: Frame Work 
for Analysis,’ Public Administration, Vol. 67, Autumn 1989; Dunleavy, ‘The Architecture 
of the British Central State, Part II: Empirical Findings,’ Public Administration, Vol. 67, 
Winter 1989; and Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, pp. 174-209.
39 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, pp. 174-209.
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Developing a Finer Grain Approach
To explain government retrenchment even in one sector, it is necessary to 
examine separately each factor that contributes to the ultimate decision. While the 
broad outcome may appear at first to be irrational (or at least difficult to explain), by 
examining the individual parts so that each can be understood in rational terms, the 
whole can also be understood. While macro level (and first principles) public choice 
theory proposes one explanation and uses sweeping assumptions to explain policy 
change, it cannot be used to explain sectoral differences. Institutional public choice 
models, in contrast, give a detailed account of one group of actors or one aspect of 
decision making and are therefore a useful tool with which to analyze each of the 
pieces which make up this case. Though there are many strands of public choice 
theory, its fundamental principles are that the individual is the central unit o f analysis 
and that individuals are rational actors who therefore act to maximize their own utility 
according to the constraints they face.40 The focus of public choice theory is the 
political individual: the voter, the member of an interest group, the politician and the 
bureaucrat. No institutional public choice theories fit this case precisely, however, so 
I offer variations of existing models or suggest new ones to help explain the 
privatization of oil in Britain. And then, though there is little precedent, I re-assemble 
these individual analyses into the whole.
One of the pieces often excluded from analyses of domestic policy making is 
the international level. Privatization, though, cannot be disconnected from the
40 Bruno S. Frey, ‘The Public Choice View of International Political Economy,’ 
International Organization, Vol.38, N o.l, Winter 1984, pp.201-2. For a discussion on the 
role of the individual see Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, p.6.
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international environment. This point is highlighted with the case o f oil which, as an 
internationally traded commodity and the basis of a country’s economic and military 
security, is also undisputedly a matter of high politics. But as academics in 
international relations know, these factors are crucial: In fact, there is a genre of 
international relations literature called the ‘second-image reversed’ which examines 
the impact of international level independent variables upon domestic political 
processes.41 The focus of this literature, however, has been on foreign policy issues, 
primarily trade.42 Public choice theories fit into the category of domestic policy 
making analyses and tend to ignore the international arena or at best consider
41 Term was coined by Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed: the International 
Sources of Domestic Politics,’ International Organization, Vol.32, No.4, Autumn 1978.
42 Focus on general foreign policy: James Rosenau, ‘Towards the Study of National- 
International Linkages,’ in James Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 
1969); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Jeffrey A. Frieden, ‘Invested Interests: The Politics of 
National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,’ International Organization, 
Vol.45, No.4, Autumn 1991; Christopher Hill, ed., National Foreign Policies and European 
Political Cooperation (London: Allen & Unwin, for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1983); Hill, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy: The British Experience, October 
1938-June 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Robert D. Putnam, 
‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,’ International 
Organization, Vol.42, No.3, Summer 1988.
Focus on trade: David Lake, Power, Protection and Free Trade: International Sources 
of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); 
William Avery, ‘U.S. Agriculture and Two-Level Bargaining in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement,’ presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 
25 March 1993; Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics 
of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Ronald Rogowski, 
Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990); Peter Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty, Foreign 
Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin,
1978); and Benjamin Cohen, ‘European Financial Integration and National Banking Interests,’ 
in Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, eds., The Political Economy of European 
Integration, States, Markets and Institutions (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989).
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international factors as secondary or contextual.43 There are however a few notable 
exceptions which suggest that public choice theory can incorporate factors as wide 
ranging as international and domestic.44
A drawback to incorporating international level factors, as well as the 
domestic, is that it makes data collection and analysis unwieldy. While not exclusive 
to public choice theory, no effort to construct a general theoretical model has 
produced a parsimonious or even useful construct.45 Simpler models, primarily two- 
level games, treat the state as a unitary actor and thereby ignore some o f the most 
important domestic variables.46 The insight of quite modest attempts to include 
additional factors, such as Vicki Golich’s analysis of United States and European 
collaboration in the aircraft industry, suggest that further efforts will be
43 Frey, ‘Public Choice View of International Political Economy,’ p.200; for of 
international variables contextually see H. Wayne Moyer and Timothy Josling, Agricultural 
Policy Reform: Politics and Process in the EC and USA (Hampstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1990).
44 John Odell and Thomas Willett, eds., International Trade Policies: Gains from 
Exchange Between Economics and Political Science (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1990); and Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, ‘Lessons in the Lobbying for Free Trade in 
Nineteenth Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not,’ American Political Science Review, 
Vol.85, N o.l, March 1991.
45 Rosenau, ‘Towards the Study of National-International Linkages’; and Ronen Palan, 
‘The Political Process in International Relations: Domestic and Global Structures,’ paper 
presented at the British International Studies Association annual conference, Newcastle, 17-19 
December 1990.
46 Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics’; Avery, ‘U.S. Agriculture and Two-Level 
Bargaining in the North American Free Trade Agreement’; Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo 
Padoan, ‘Two Level Games and Structural Adjustment: The Italian Case,’ paper presented 
at the international conference on global and domestic factors in international cooperation, 
Trento 3-4 April 1989; and Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic- 
International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations,’ International 
Organization, Vol.47, No.4, Autumn 1993.
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productive.47 The need to extend the range of analysis beyond that of the national 
government or the domestic economy has been recognized,48 and there have been 
many attempts to combine levels of analysis.49 None so far, however, have 
accomplished the task with parsimony and accuracy.
Policy Parameters, Time T.
Figure 1.2.
Policy Parameters, Time Tt
Figure 1.1.
Illustrating the approach, the various influences on policy choices can be seen 
as circles in a Venn diagram (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). These influences are 
primarily actors’ motivations and goals and the structures within which they work. 
On each level, these influences intersect in such a way so as to set limits to the
47 Vicki L. Golich, ‘From Competition to Collaboration: The Challenge of Commercial- 
Class Aircraft Manufacturing,’ International Organization, Vol.46, No.4, Autumn 1992; also 
see Frieden, ‘Invested Interests.’
48 Robert Keohane, ‘The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded 
Liberalism,’ in John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 15; Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed,’ pp.906-7; 
and Allison, Essence of Decision.
49 Rosenau, ‘Towards the Study of National-International Linkages’; Putnam, ‘Diplomacy 
and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games’; Palan, ‘The Political Process in 
International Relations: Domestic and Global Structures’; G.John Ikenberry, David A. Lake 
and Michael Mastanduno, ‘Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign 
Economic Policy,’ International Organization, Vol.42, No.4, Autumn 1988; Helen V. 
Milner, ‘Domestic and International Sources of Cooperation: Oil Politics in the 1940s and 
1970s,’ paper given at the Ford Foundation conference on the domestic and international 
sources of international economic cooperation, Milan, 3-4 April 1989; and Cohen, ‘European 
Financial Integration and National Banking Interests.’
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government’s policy options. Because these influences can change over time, they 
change the options available to policy makers, increasing the possibilities as well as 
restricting them. The area of overlap of these parameters, therefore, illustrate which 
policies are possible.
In the Venn diagram, an infinite number of policies exist on a plane: three are 
represented here by points A, B and C. The circles 1, 2 and 3 each represent 
parameters within which a given set of policy options is possible, and which move 
and change over time. Only the area in which the parameters all overlap is a given 
policy option possible: the points in the overlap are the possible combinations of 
policies which could be implemented for that given level of analysis. As shown in
Figure 1.1, at one point in time T,, circles 1, 2, and 3 overlap so that policies A, B
and C are all possible. As shown in Figure 1.2, at time T2 in the future, however, the 
circles have moved so that of these three options, only policy B is now possible.
This examination of 
i n f l u e n c e s  w i l l  be 
conducted on four levels, 
starting first
with the international 
environment, followed by 
the nat ional ized oil 
companies, then the civil 
service (or governmental 
bureaucracy) and finally 
the British political system. To illustrate the connection between levels, imagine a
Figure 1.3.
L ayers o f C on stra in ts to Policy Making
nternational
The Companies
The Bureaucracy
The Political Process
Figure 1.3.
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funnel, with the broadest set of options around the ring at the top, and in which the 
options are narrowed as progressive sets of constraints are added (see Figure 1.3).50
Methodology
To explore the four levels outlined above, I relied primarily on first hand 
interviews, but also memoirs, newspaper accounts, public opinion polls and secondary 
sources for background information. Compilation of this information was facilitated 
by the use of a qualitative research programme. Using predictions o f existing 
theories, focused on the relevant level, as a point of departure, I weighed the 
evidence and in most cases found them unsatisfactory. Using the basic premises of 
public choice theory and my findings, I suggest alternative explanations. Before 
outlining the structure of the thesis, I briefly describe the sources used in this study 
(for an in depth explanation see Appendix III: Research Methods).
Of the 70 people I approached, 54 agreed to meet with me, including many 
of the key actors involved in the sales of the government oil assets. Of those who 
declined, Margaret Thatcher, Geoffrey Howe and Tony Benn were the most 
disappointing. Thatcher, in particular, would have been an important addition but she 
declined despite two attempts to get her on record.
In addition to the interviews, I used a number of other sources including 
company annual reports, government publications, and the memoirs of some of the 
key figures, as well as systematic searches for relevant articles in the Times, the
30 The image, but not the interpretation, comes from Charles Kegley and Eugene 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, Fourth Edition (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Education, 1991), p. 13 - Figure 2.1: The Sources of American Foreign Policy as 
a Funnel of Causality.
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Financial Times, the Economist, and the Petroleum Economist, as well as Hansard 
Parliamentary Debates. I used secondary sources primarily for background 
information on numerous aspects that I incorporate through the four levels.
To aid in the collation of this information and to cross check sources, I used 
the qualitative computer analysis programme, NUDIST.51 With each source of 
information, I labelled each paragraph or point made in the interview with key word, 
and then conducted searches using these key words in order to create a pool of 
interview information on particular topics. In this way I was able to gather together 
all the information on that topic and systematically compare facts and opinions. This 
was more useful than note cards because there was no limit to the amount of 
information which could be included on a point, nor to the number of categories 
under which a point could be listed.
The other types o f existing literature that I employed were public opinion 
polls. While they are used frequently by many academics, in this study I looked both 
at what was recorded and what was not recorded, specifically when and whether 
public opinion polls were held on privatization or state ownership and the intensity 
of that opinion. This entailed searching methodically through MORI and Gallup Polls 
of British Public Opinion from 1976 to 1988. I also recorded general public opinion 
trends on issues, leaders and parties every six months from 1976 to 1988. By looking 
systematically through these polls, I realized that privatization seldom merited a single 
question or a mention on the list of most important issues - creating a very different
31 ‘NUDIST,’ which stands for Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and 
Theorising, was developed by Thomas Richards, Lyn Richards, Joan McGalliard and Boyd 
Sharrock at La Trobe University, Burndoora, Australia. References: NUDIST 2.3 User 
Manual; and NUDIST 2.3 Reference Manual, 1992.
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impression than the responses to the occasional poll revealed.
Outline of the Dissertation
After developing the theoretical perspective and outlining the general case in 
this first chapter, I give a brief historical overview of the British government’s 
involvement in the oil industry in Chapter Two. I examine the four phases o f British 
government involvement in the oil industry, beginning in 1914 with its initial 
investment in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, as British Petroleum was then known. 
The first period ends with the expansion in the use of oil from military to economic 
following World War II. The second phase is highlighted by oil crises, Britain’s 
withdrawal from the Middle East and the increase in domestic demand for oil. The 
third phase is dominated by the discovery of oil in the North Sea and the British 
government’s initial efforts to encourage investment there in response to the rise of 
the threat from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
vulnerability abroad. The last phase is marked by Britain’s concern for control of the 
North Sea and for capturing all possible economic rents, and is marked by the lack 
of major supply crises.
Turning to the specifics of this case, in Chapter Three I examine the details 
of the sale o f Britain’s oil assets; how they evolved from the first sale of BP shares 
in 1977 to three further tranches as well as the sales of Britoil, Enterprise Oil and 
Wytch Farm. The sales were completed between 1977 and 1987 and were 9 in 
number, raising £8.5 billion for the Treasury at a cost o f over £224 million.
In Chapter Four I adapt variables from realists’ systems models in order to 
identify areas where the British government was susceptible to international pressures.
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This chapter examines three factors, two suggested by Britain’s position in the 
international system, the international economy and the structure of the oil industry; 
and the other suggested by neo-liberalist literature, Britain’s membership in 
international organizations. The focus of the investigation is on whether and how 
these factors affected the British government’s decision to sell its oil assets.
In Chapter Five I analyze a group of public sector employees, the managers 
of state-owned companies. Though often listed in the literature on privatization as a 
possible obstacle to privatization, little work has been done to explain why or how 
these managers opposed privatization. Using the different reactions of the managers 
of BP, BNOC and BGC, I compare their structural features, and then explore how 
organizational autonomy, financial independence and success in achieving the 
company’s mission affected the managers response to privatization proposals.
In Chapter Six I explore alternatives to budget-maximizing theories to explain 
why civil servants in the Department of Energy did not resist privatization 
collectively, but rather accepted or aided it at the individual level. I focus on the 
importance of work tasks, career-maximizing strategies, the flexibility o f the British 
bureaucratic structure and the strength of the departments to explain their actions.
Next, in Chapter Seven, after establishing that public demand for 
privatization was weak, I examine the supply-side of the British political process. The 
two primary factors I identify are the role of policy entrepreneurs and strategies for 
party political advantage. I examine the calculation politicians made, both personally 
as policy entrepreneurs of privatization, and also in party political terms, including 
the distribution of costs and benefits to opponents and supporters over the short and 
long-term, and the position and intensity of party members towards privatization.
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In Chapter Eight, I re-consider the basic question: why would a government 
(or anyone) sell an asset. I review the implications of the findings for the international 
level and the domestic level, and the calculus of the three sets of actors - the state- 
owned companies, the civil service and the political process. Next I consider the 
broader ramifications of the empirical findings for other privatizations and for better 
government. Finally I conclude with a discussion on the findings of this case as a 
whole.
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Chapter Two: The Build Up of the British Government’s
Involvement in Oil
The sale of the British government’s oil assets occurred at the end o f a long 
history of government involvement in the oil industry. This chapter provides an 
overview of how the government came to own oil assets and sets the stage for the 
government’s decision to sell them. The British government’s involvement in the oil 
industry can be divided into four phases:
•  The first phase, 1900 through World War II, includes the rise and then 
dominance of a few large international oil companies; it is marked by the 
government’s investment in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) which became 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1935 and finally British Petroleum (BP) 
in 1954.
•  The second phase, the 1950s and 1960s, includes the decline o f Britain’s 
influence in the Middle East at the same time demand for and reliance on oil in 
Britain continued to grow.
•  The third phase, which overlaps with the second, runs from the mid-1960s 
to the mid-1970s. It is dominated on the one hand by the rise of OPEC and the 
government’s recognition of Britain’s vulnerability in terms of oil and, on the other 
by the discovery of oil in the North Sea and the British government’s initial efforts 
to encourage investment there.
•  The last phase, from the mid-1970s through the 1980s, includes the increase 
in domestic production in the wake of price rises and corresponding increases in 
company profits and government tax revenue, and is marked by the lack of major
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supply problems in Britain.
2.1. The Beginnings of Anglo-Persian and the Majors
In the early 1900s oil became an issue for the British government, not for 
economic reasons (coal was still the dominant fuel for transportation and industry), 
but because oil had been proven to be the technically superior military fuel for the 
Navy. A faster and more powerful fleet was vital for the Navy as it entered an arms 
race with Germany.1 Reliance on oil presented risks because there were no 
established sources of oil either in the British Isles or the empire, unlike the abundant 
domestic supply of hard smokeless coal.2 Exacerbating the problem was the fact that 
most of the regions where oil was found were politically unstable.3
Britain’s First Investment in Oil
Ownership of an oil company was a desirable option for the government 
because Britain believed its largest suppliers, the American Standard Oil Company 
and Shell, had a virtual monopoly on the industry world-wide, the only other 
company being the British owned Burmah Oil operating in India. This opinion was 
reinforced by the ever increasing price of oil. The monopoly situation was doubly
1 Oil had three distinct advantages over coal in terms of military use. Oil had a higher 
thermal efficiency, it could be transferred for refuelling while at sea, and it was easier to 
store. Ian O. Lesser, Resources and Strategy (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), pp.25-6; also 
see Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1914 (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923), 
pp. 129 and p. 134; and Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 152-3.
2 Lesser, Resources and Strategy, p.25.
3 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 17 July 1913, col. 1519, and 17 June 1914, 
col. 1210; ‘Navy and Fuel Oil,’ The Statist, 30 May 1914, p.708; and Geoffrey Jones, The 
State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 12.
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feared because Shell was thought to be under the control of the Germans, although 
this later proved to be untrue.4 The Foreign Office was also interested in oil 
ownership as a means to help stabilize and control the politically sensitive and 
strategically important area of Persia then under threat from Russian intervention.5
The young, privately held Anglo-Persian Oil Company was eager to have 
government investment in exploration.6 In addition to direct financial investment, the 
government could guarantee to purchase APOC’s oil, thereby alleviating concern for 
sales channels for its production, which was a real problem at the time because of 
stiff competition from Standard Oil and Shell.7 In addition, the government could 
help protect APOC’s foreign operations.8 So in 1903 APOC applied for a loan from 
the British Admiralty, with the support of the Foreign Office. The problem, however, 
was that the government was wary of the financial commitment (foreshadowing 
problems to come), and the Chancellor of the Exchequer turned it down.9 A few 
years later, at the behest o f the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, an arrangement 
was made with Burmah Oil Company to finance APOC, whereby in April 1908,
4 Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry, p. 12; ‘Navy and Fuel 
Oil,’ The Statist, 30 May 1914, p.708; B.S. McBeth, British Oil Policy 1919-1939 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1985), p.8; and Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 17 June 1914, 
col. 1160 and col. 1216; and 7 July 1914, col. 1033.
5 Yergin, The Prize, pp. 136-41; ‘The Debate on Persian Oil,’ Economist, 20 June 1914, 
pp. 1484-5; and Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 29 June 1914, col.67.
6 His initial cost estimate was £10,000; within four years he had spent over £200,000. 
Yergin, The Prize, p. 138.
7 McBeth, British Oil Policy 1919-1939, p. 12.
8 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 17 June 1914, col. 1197.
9 Yergin, The Prize, pp. 136-41; ‘The Debate on Persian Oil,’ Economist, 20 June 1914, 
pp. 1484-5; and Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 29 June 1914, col.67.
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APOC became a public company, with Burmah Oil as the majority shareholder.10 
Oil was finally struck in Persia in May 1908, but due to increasing costs, APOC was 
again in serious financial trouble by 1913.
The government’s objectives remained to have a wide geographical distribution 
of sources o f oil, independent oil competition, and supplies from areas under British 
control.11 At the time of APOC’s new troubles, the government was re-considering 
its options, which included:
•  Purchase oil fields directly, though the government had no expertise in the 
oil business nor any precedent for such involvement in the industry.
•  Secure a loan for APOC, despite the fact that its previous efforts had 
proved to be insufficient to ensure the independence of the company.
•  Find another oil company to support. But the only other British company 
was Burmah Oil, which had already invested in Anglo-Persian at the government’s 
request.
•  Continue to rely on the free market.12
The government finally acted when APOC’s worsening financial crisis caused 
it to consider merging with Shell. The government agreed in May 1914 to become 
a partner in APOC. While over 50 per cent o f APOC’s shares remained in private 
hands, the company’s Articles of Association limited the government’s role to
10 Yergin, The Prize, pp. 141-8; P.A. Stockil, ‘A Brief History of the British Petroleum 
Company Limited,’ Our Industry Petroleum (London: British Petroleum Company, 1970), 
p.474; and McBeth, British Oil Policy 1919-1939, p.6.
11 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 17 July 1913, col. 1572.
12 R.W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Developing Years 
1901-1932 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 180-1; and J.R.L. Anderson, 
East of Suez: A Study of Britain’s Greatest Trading Enterprise (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1969), pp.39-42.
32
appointing two directors to the board and a veto power. In the next few years, as
APOC’s financial demands rose, the government’s shareholding increased to two-
thirds but their role remained the same as confirmed in a letter from the Treasury
signed by John Bradbury in May 1914 (see Appendix I).13
The government’s decision was not reached without controversy. Winston
Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, was one of the strongest advocates. He
argued that the government’s investment in APOC
has not only secured to the Navy a very substantial proportion of its 
oil supply, but has led to the acquisition by the government o f a 
controlling share in oil properties and interests which are at present 
valued at scores of millions sterling, and also to very considerable 
economies, which are still continuing, in the purchase price o f 
Admiralty o il.14
The opposition included economists deprecating naval expenditure, members 
of mining constituencies and oil executives objecting to a national inroad upon their 
monopolies, Conservatives disapproving of state trading, and partisan opponents 
denouncing the project as an unwarranted gamble with public money.15 There were 
also those who objected to the reallocation of a Naval budget surplus to finance the 
investment, and the avoidance of proper Parliamentary debate.16 Interestingly, many 
of the arguments against the government’s plan were restated in the 1970s when the
13 Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, p. 191 and p. 199; and McBeth, 
British Oil Policy 1919-1939, p.8.
14 Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1914, p. 134.
15 Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1914, p. 172; also see Ferrier, The History of the 
British Petroleum Company, pp. 169-70. For examples of such arguments see Hansard 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 17 July 1913, 17 June 1914, 26 June 1914; 7 July 1914; 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5 August 1913; and Economist, 26 July 1913, 
pp. 159-60, and 13 May 1914, p. 1315.
16 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 17 June 1914, col. 1178, col. 1191, 
col. 1208, col. 1224-5, and col. 1243.
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government established the British National Oil Company. Opposition was not 
intense, however, not even from the coal industry, which felt that the oil industry in 
general and APOC in particular were small and did not represent a substantial threat 
to their interests.17
The First Sale?
While the Navy received preferential prices for its oil, there is no evidence of 
government interference with the company’s operations, except in its reluctance to 
provide additional capital.18 This, however, was a major point o f contention between 
APOC and the government throughout their relationship and APOC’s continual 
pressure on the Treasury for more capital helped to bring the matter o f government 
ownership of APOC to the fore in the early 1920s and again in the mid-1950s.
The issue was brought to a head by APOC itself when they proposed in July 
1921 that they merge with Royal Dutch/Shell. APOC argued that Britain would
17 The reasons were threefold: total oil consumption was less than one percent of coal 
consumption in 1913, the industry was maintaining a 10% rate of profit, and the position of 
individual miners continued to improve, both in terms of pay and safety regulations. Political 
and Economic Policy Industry Group (PEPIG), Report on the British Coal Industry (London: 
Political and Economic Policy, February 1936), pp. 115-6; B.R. Mitchell, Economic 
Development of the British Coal Industry 1800-1914 (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), p.304; Neal Buxtem, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry 
(London: Batsford Academy, 1978), p. 155 and pp. 162-3; Roy Gregory, The Miners and 
British Politics, 1906-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.97-177; and H. 
Stanley Jevons, The British Coal Trade (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1969), 
pp.694-5.
18 The only possible exception was Anglo-Persian’s acquisition of the dying Scottish shale 
oil industry, though it is possible Anglo-Persian would have done so anyway because though 
the small independent operators were not profitable on their own, they were collectively with 
additional crude from Persia. The company was able to run the refineries at full capacity and 
therefore at a small profit until 1964. British Petroleum Company Ltd., Our Industry 
Petroleum, (London: British Petroleum Company, 1970), p.23; and Hansard Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), 19 November 1925, vol. 188, col.576-7, and 4 December 1925, vol. 188, 
col.2713.
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benefit because for the first time a majority of Shell (50.2 per cent) would be British 
held, and the Treasury would save money at a time when cash demands on the 
Treasury were heavy.19 The idea was rejected in a Cabinet meeting that year. 
Stanley Baldwin, the President of the Board of Trade, told APOC and Shell that the 
Cabinet had decided on purely political grounds. The government simply could not 
face a lobby of those opposed to monopolies; it was asking for trouble.20
Shell and Burmah Oil continued to push the idea, which was given a brief 
reprieve with the enlistment of Winston Churchill, then out o f government, to lobby 
for them. Churchill was persuasive with the Prime Minister on the financial side: 
APOC’s profits had declined by a third since 1920-21 and the dividend was halved, 
so a sale would bring the hard-pressed Treasury a welcome windfall of £20 million. 
When an election was announced, however, Churchill withdrew from the 
negotiations. With opposition from the Admiralty (because 40 per cent o f naval fuel 
was supplied by APOC) and the Labour Party, the idea was again defeated in Cabinet 
at the beginning of 1924.21 Figure 2.1 illustrates the attention the issue received in 
the House of Commons.
A second set of deliberations occurred in the 1950s. Though the government 
had just reconfirmed its existing arrangement with AIOC (which APOC became in 
1935) in a letter from the Treasury on 12 April 1951, signed by Edward Bridges (see
19 T.A.B. Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company, Vol.II, 1924-1966 (London: 
William Heineman, 1988), pp.291-6.
20 Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company, p.297; also see Ferrier, The History 
of the British Petroleum Company, p.250.
21 Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company, pp.298-306; and diary entry, 29 
September 1923 as recorded in John Barnes and David Nicholson, eds., The Leo Amery 
Diaries: Vol.11986-1929 (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp.346-7.
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Appendix II), there were rumours in 1953 that they wanted to sell their 56 per cent 
shareholding. Though a buyer - an insurance company - was even specified, nothing 
happened. The rumours re-emerged in 1957 and five questions were asked in the 
House of Commons about the government’s holding in AIOC (see Figure 2.1). But 
when Burmah Oil, who thought they had a verbal agreement for the right of first 
refusal on BP shares, asked the Chancellor, he denied that the government was
36
considering a sale.22 Nothing further transpired.
2.2. Decline in Britain’s Control of Oil, the Rise in Domestic Demand
The second phase, which coincided with Britain’s withdrawal from the Middle 
East and its declining position as a great power, is marked by the government’s 
reduced ability to protect BP’s interests in the Middle East. The limits to British 
government assistance were first realized in the Iranian crisis in 1950 and were made 
more evident by the Suez crisis in 1956. At the same time, demand for oil in Britain 
was growing.
The First Iranian Crisis
As a symbol of imperialism and a valuable national asset, AIOC became the 
focus o f the Iranians’ wrath following a coup by the nationalists led by Mohammed 
Mossadegh in 1950. The first directive of the new leader was to nationalize AIOC.23 
Britain and the United States, as the home governments of the oil companies based 
in the Middle East and the largest consumers of Middle East oil, actively worked to 
install a more sympathetic government in Teheran.24 The first step against Iran was 
to immediately implement an oil embargo against Iranian oil exports. In order not to
22 Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company, p.284.
23 K.A.D.Inglis (senior economic advisor at BP), ‘The International Oil Industry - 
Government Involvement Through Regulation and Participation,’ in Maurice Scarlett, ed., 
Consequences of Offshore Oil and Gas - Norway, Scotland and Newfoundland (St.Johns, 
Nfld: Institute of Social and Economic Research) 1977, pp.34-6; Anderson, East of Suez, 
pp.46-8; and Pierre Terzian, (translated by Michael Pallis), OPEC: The Inside Story, (Zed 
Books, 1973).
24 William Hall, ‘FT Report of BP: A Colourful World Player,’ Financial Times, 19 
October 1987, p. 16; Yergin, The Prize, pp.458-70; Terzian, OPEC: The Inside Story, p. 13; 
and interview with BP executive.
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hurt themselves, the British and United States created a voluntary committee of oil 
companies and consumer countries to coordinate supply so that the vital supplies for 
the Korean War were not interrupted. Iranian output dropped from 660,000 barrels 
per day (b/d) in 1950 to 20,000 b/d in 1952. World production, however, actually 
increased over the same time period from 10.9 million b/d to 13.0 million b/d, so that 
only Iran’s oil revenues were affected, in the end.25
Although AIOC received extensive assistance, there was a limit to what the 
British government could do to help AIOC regain its previous dominant position in 
Iran after Mossadegh was overthrown in 1953. Reflecting Britain’s decreasing power 
and the United States and Middle East countries’ increasing role, an agreement was 
finally reached where Iranian oil assets remained in the possession of the National 
Iranian Oil Company, and the management of the oil operations was contracted out 
to an international consortium of which AIOC received 40 per cent, the Aramco 
partners - Jersey, Socony, Texaco and Standard of California - plus Gulf received 8 
per cent each, Shell received 14 per cent, and the French company CFP received 6 
per cent.26 Although the Iranians rejected any compensation to the British, the other 
members of the consortium paid AIOC $90 million for the 60 per cent rights the 
company was said to be giving up.27 Thereafter, AIOC began to set up its own 
marketing network and soon developed into a fully integrated oil company, but it 
continued to produce more oil than it could market itself and sold the excess through
25 Yergin, The Prize, p.464.
26 Anderson, East of Suez, pp.58-9.
27 Yergin, The Prize, p.478.
long-term contracts.28
The Suez Crisis
The decline of Britain’s role in the Middle East and the rise o f the United 
States and the Middle East countries’ role was further marked by the Suez crisis of 
1956. The canal was British owned and vital to Europe (in 1955, for example, two- 
thirds of Europe’s oil passed through the Canal). On 26 July 1955, Colonel Gamal 
Abdel Nasser o f Egypt announced its expropriation. The implications were later 
spelled out by the Foreign Minister Anthony Eden: ‘We could not live without oil 
and... we had no intention of being strangled to death.’ Nor could Britain’s fragile 
balance of payments position afford the loss o f foreign earnings from the Canal. In 
addition, a defeat would have had a demoralizing effect on Britain’s already eroding 
international prestige.29 Britain could not defend the Suez Canal, however, even with 
the help of European partners, and the United States was not prepared to take over 
control of the canal or to aid in its defense.30 The British, French and Israelis felt 
they were left with no option but to attack Egypt on their own. Without the backing 
of the United States, even in the form of additional oil supplies, Europe was left on 
the verge of an energy crisis. A full-scale war was averted, however, when the 
United States negotiated British and French withdrawal in exchange for desperately
28 Interview with BP executive.
29 Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p.401; and Yergin, The Prize, 
p.485.
30 Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil: A Study of Private Power and Democratic Direction 
(New York: Macmillan, 1961), p.261.
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needed supplies o f oil and financial backing.31
In response to the changing world political hierarchy and oil industry 
structure, the British government was forced to employ new strategies. The crises, 
and most importantly their associated costs, initiated the withdrawal of British forces 
from the Middle East which was to be completed by 1971. In terms o f AIOC’s 
relationship with the government, Britain’s impotence, demonstrated during the Suez 
crisis, marked a change in what the government was able to offer AIOC, namely the 
protection of AIOC’s Middle East operations.32
A False Sense of Security
The government continued to rely on the private oil industry and the AIOC 
through the post World War II period. Though the government responded to the 
increasing importance of oil by forming governmental committees and bureaus, these 
were uncoordinated and located in various departments.33 Despite the changes of 
government and corresponding political ideologies, government relations with BP (as 
AIOC had become in 1954) remained virtually the same. As part o f a post-war 
reconstruction programme, the government embarked on a series of nationalizations, 
but ministers did not seek to increase their control over AIOC.34 In addition, the 
government protected both the domestic coal industry and the oil companies until
31 Yergin, The Prize, pp.489-90.
32 Edward Chester, United States Oil Policy and Diplomacy (London: Greenwood Press, 
1983), pp.98-9; and Engler, The Politics of Oil, pp.260-4.
33 Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, p.223 and p.247.
34 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 22 December 1920, vol. 136, col. 1757-8.
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I960.35 Thereafter, the government continued to allow the major oil companies to 
command the best terminal and storage facilities and to maintain their exclusive 
contracts with most filling stations.36 Remarkably, the growth of the oil industry and 
the fall of oil prices during the 1950s and 1960s, overshadowed the crises and lulled 
oil consumers into a dependence on oil.
With prices falling and new oil discoveries being made, there was a new sense 
of consumer confidence, minimizing the need for governments to take security 
measures. The British government’s confidence was illustrated by its lack o f concern 
in 1969 when its holding in BP dropped below 50 per cent to 48.2 per cent for the 
first time since mid-1910s. In a business transaction, BP had issued new shares to the 
Distillers Company in exchange for Distillers’ chemicals and plastics interests.37 
Though the Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan was informed, as he put 
it, ‘nobody made a row.’38 It went virtually unnoticed in the House of Commons, 
as evidenced by the lack of questions (see Figure 2.1), nor was the percentage decline 
raised in the Cabinet or in public.39
35 J.E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments, An Account of the International Oil 
Industry in its Political Environment (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), pp.236-7; A.M. 
Newman, Economic Organization of the British Coal Industry (London: George Routledge, 
1934), pp.439-40; and PEPIG, Report on the British Coal Industry, p. 116.
36 Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments, p.236.
37 BP, Annual Reports and Accounts, 1969; Robert Fraser and Michael Wilson, 
Privatization: The UK Experience and International Trends (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1988), 
p.51; and Anderson, East of Suez, p.20.
38 As quoted in Tony Benn, Against the Tide: Diaries 1973-76 (London: Hutchinson, 
1989), p.647.
39 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 24 October 1967, vol.751, col.428. 
Although the Treasury stated that they would not take any steps to restore the national holding 
in BP to over 50%, there were no further questions about the government’s holding until 
1971 and then not again until 1974.
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2.3. Britain’s Vulnerability and Subsequent Search for Oil Independence
Though realizing its vulnerability in terms of oil after the Suez crisis, the
1973-74 oil embargo was an even larger shock. In response, the British government 
sought new means to address security of supply. In so doing, the government was 
greatly aided by the discovery of oil in the North Sea and the increase in the price of 
oil which made production there financially feasible.
The 1973-74 Oil Crisis
When AOPEC, the Arab members of OPEC, enforced an oil embargo against 
the United States and the Netherlands, the effect on Britain was a dramatic increase 
in oil prices in the 1970s (see Figure 2.2) causing severe economic damage and 
political disruption, 
exacerbated by a coal 
miners strike in 1974.
The 1973 oil crisis was 
a test of its long 
established mechanisms 
to ensure security of 
supply though reliance 
on BP and the private 
oil companies.
In December 1973, Prime Minister Edward Heath asked Shell and BP to 
supply more oil to Britain. Eric Drake, then chairman of BP, refused the Prime 
Minister even though the government was its largest shareholder. Drake argued that
P r i c e  o f  C r u d e  Oi
U .S . d o l l a r  p e r  b a r r e l
4 0
as
as
15
10
5
0
Source: HP f t a t f f t t l c f t l  Review o T W l d  B w r fly . m i .
Figure 2.2.
42
to favour Britain could cause retaliation from other governments, and possibly even
nationalization of BP operations in those countries. Therefore, as a director of the
company entrusted with the welfare of all stockholders, Drake could not comply with
the government’s request. If the government were to pass the appropriate laws, Drake
said, BP would, of course, comply. Heath, however, did not take that route and BP’s
directors were left to make decisions in the company’s best interest.40 Shell also
refused, although 40 per cent British owned, citing the interests o f its Dutch
shareholders who comprised the other 60 per cent of the company 41 At the time,
as one Conservative remarked, ‘Heath and half the government were amazed with
BP’s response.’42 A Department of Energy minister remarked:
Heath was horrified in 1974 to have no control over the company 
during the oil crisis. I inherited that cannon. The resulting feeling was 
that the country had to have control over its own oil.43
The crisis also forced Britain to decide whether to show solidarity with the EC
which it had just joined, or to keep its status as a friendly country in the eyes of the
Arabs. The decision was neatly taken care of by the oil companies. The British and
the French decided not to put the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Oil Committee oil-sharing system into action. The oil
companies were the ones who provided the mechanism for oil sharing and ostensibly
40 Interview with BP executive; also see Guy Arnold, Britain’s Oil (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1978), p.36; and Hans Maull, ‘Oil and Influence: The Oil Weapon Examined,’ in 
Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, KA: 
Regents Press, 1977), p.272.
41 Yergin, The Prize, pp.261-4; Arnold, Britain’s Oil, p.36; and interview with Treasury 
civil servant.
42 Interview with Department of Energy minister.
43 Interview with Department of Energy minister.
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by refusing to favour one country over another but also benefitting from the high oil 
prices.44
In the wake o f these higher oil prices, the discovery of oil in the North Sea 
took on a new importance, as it was now desirable and economically feasible to 
overcome the harsh environmental conditions of the North Sea to further explore and 
develop oil in Britain’s politically stable region.45 The desirability is evident by the 
fact that more than 150 companies had invested in the North Sea by 1980, 82 of 
which were British.46 In terms of security, Britain benefitted from the North Sea oil 
in two ways - it developed its own domestic oil supplies, and no longer relied on 
imports from the Middle East.
Britain’s Initial North Sea Strategy
The first commercial gas discovery in the North Sea was made in 1965, and 
oil was discovered in November 1969.47 Further discoveries, advances in offshore 
technology and vast amounts of investment made it possible for the first oil to reach 
the British shore on 18 June, 1975. The price rises caused by OPEC beginning in 
1973 made the development of North Sea oil fields commercially viable. These 
advances fundamentally changed Britain’s energy situation. In the space o f ten years,
44 Maull, ‘Oil and Influence,’ p.271.
45 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1990 and July 1989, p.4.
46 Department of Energy, Development of the Oil and Gas Resources of the United 
Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1984); and ‘UK North Sea Seventh Round,’ Petroleum 
Economist, April 1981, p. 164.
47 BP made the first gas discovery. The first oil discovery was made on the Norwegian 
side; in December 1970 BP discovered oil in Britain in what has become the largest field, 
known as the Forties field.
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Britain shifted from being a major oil importer to being a net oil exporter (see Figure 
2.3), and from being dependent on the Middle East to being self sufficient in oil from 
in its own backyard.48
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By 1983 Britain was the sixth largest oil producer in the world, ahead of 
countries like Kuwait and Libya. The gross value of oil and gas from the United 
Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS), the British portion of the North Sea rose from 
£6.3 billion in 1979 to £18.8 billion in 1983, and as a proportion of GNP from 2.5 
per cent to 5.3 per cent. Tax revenues from companies operating in the North Sea 
rose from £562 million in 1978-79 to £8.9 billion in 1983-84.49 In perspective, the 
contribution to GDP was always less than that of the construction industry or
48 Because industrial economies use several kinds of crude oil, imports were still 
necessary, but the high quality of the North Sea oil made it profitable to export. BP, 
Statistical Review o f  the World Oil Industry 1980, 1989 and 1990.
49 Includes Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), royalties and corporation tax. ‘The North 
Sea’s Second Wind,’ Economist, 12 May 1984.
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agriculture, and the 
North Sea’s direct 
effect on jobs was 
small because oil and 
gas were highly capital 
intensive industries. 
However, much of the 
capital invested in the 
North Sea came from 
abroad and thus was an 
addition to Britain’s economy.50 The overall UK energy supply situation also 
improved with North Sea oil production and the change in energy demand after the 
1973 oil crisis. There was an overall energy surplus by 1980, with the decrease in the 
demand for oil and coal accounting for the majority of the decline, while demand for 
gas actually increased slightly and nuclear stayed the same (see Figure 2.4).51
The Establishment of the Department of Energy
In 1973 the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) issued a 
report which criticized the government for giving away too many benefits associated 
with North Sea oil. With pressure mounting during the coal miners strike and the
50 ‘Mixed Blessings from the North Sea,’ Economist, 23 January 1982.
51 International Energy Agency, Energy Balances o f  OECD Countries 1970-1985 (Paris: 
IEA/OECD, 1987); Martin Quinlan, ‘Mounting Energy Surplus,’ Petroleum Economist, May 
1984, pp. 186-7; and Martin Quinlan, ‘Coming Upheavals in Energy Supply,’ Petroleum 
Economist, November 1989, p.335.
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1973 oil crisis, the Conservative government created the Department of Energy (DEn) 
in January 1974, consolidating divisions and bureaus spread across at least three 
departments previously managing energy matters.52 The new department was given 
a high profile with the appointment of Lord Carrington, the Tory party chairman, as 
Secretary of State.53
The DEn was an agency which spent a low proportion of its total budget on 
salaries, because its primary task was to channel funds to other public sector 
organizations, namely the nationalized energy industries.54 The DEn also raised large 
amounts of finance. In 1983, for example, the receipts from royalties in the North 
Sea were almost £2 billion, dwarfing the department’s total budget, which for the 
same year was £50 million.55 As a new department with a small staff, the DEn had 
difficulty establishing its position versus the Treasury and the Central Policy Review 
Staff (CPRS) who had already established their credibility in energy matters. The 
DEn’s public reputation was also tarnished by mistakes such as the £44 million 
overpayment in grants to oil companies in 1979 and the poor administrative handling
52 Inglis, ‘The International Oil Industry.’ p.49.
53 ‘The Chance to Work up a Little Heat about Energy,’ Economist, 12 January 1974, 
p.83; Patrick Cosgrave, Carrington, A Life and a Policy (London: JM Dent, 1985); Peter 
Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1989), p.432 and pp.445-8; and 
interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
54 Dunleavy, ‘The Architecture of the British Central State, Part I ,’ pp.254-5; Dunleavy, 
‘The Architecture of the British Central State, Part II,’ p.400; also see David Mclnnes, 
‘Policy Networks within the Department of Energy and Energy Policy,’ Essex Papers in 
Politics and Government, No.82, July 1991, p.21.
55 Supply Estimates 1983-84: Class IV: Industry, Energy, Trade and Employment, British 
Parliamentary Papers, vol.26.
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of the coal miners strike in 1980.56 By the mid-1980s, the department was in better 
command of the energy control apparatus, including taxation, subsidies and grants, 
licenses, the nationalized industries, safety and shadow prices.57 The issue of the 
poor quality of the DEn staff, however, was raised again in November 1990 after the 
Piper Alpha disaster when the Cullen Report severely criticized the department for 
major safety failings. As a result, the DEn was stripped o f its responsibility for 
offshore safety to the benefit o f the Health and Safety Executive.58 In 1993, the DEn 
was amalgamated into the DTI.
The other notable feature about the department was its lack of consumer or 
environmental orientation. There were no divisions within the department with such 
responsibilities. Consumers and environmentalists, therefore, had no representation 
within the department, and such matters were only dealt with peripherally as they 
affected other aspects, such as oil production.59
The nationalized industries were the most important feature of the department. 
On the one hand they were the means to control the energy sectors, but on the other 
they were semi-independent organizations in competition with each other. They were
56 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 140- 
1; Adrian Ham, Treasury Rules, Recurrent Themes in British Economic Policy (London: 
Quartet Books, 1981), pp.40-1; Tessa Blackstone and William Plowden, Inside the Think 
Tank: Advising the Cabinet 1971-1983 (London: Mandarin, 1990), pp.80-3; and interview 
with Department of Energy civil servant.
57 Heald, ‘UK Energy Policy,’ pp. 106-9; and interviews with Department of Energy civil 
servants.
58 ‘DEn and Oxy Pilloried by Piper Alpha Report,’ Financial Times: North Sea Letter, 
14 November 1990, p.778/1.
59 Mclnnes, ‘Policy Networks,’ Figures 1-6; and interview with Conservative minister.
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so powerful that the DEn was unable to make them cooperate or coordinate 
strategies.60 For example, there was a committee of the planning directors for each 
industry, but as one executive who attended the only meeting between 1980 and 1982 
explained, ‘we couldn’t agree on any thing... no one wanted to reveal numbers or 
plans.’61 Only the coal and nuclear industries were largely dependent on the 
department for funds. Electricity and gas had been raising an increasing proportion 
of their revenue from customers and thus were able to repay government debt and 
make net contributions to government funds.62 The largest net earner under the 
control of the department, however, was the oil and gas industry. Therefore, despite 
the fact that one civil servant claimed the ‘touchstone’ of the department’s policy was 
security of supply,63 the department had few means of direct control over supply. 
Efforts to even articulate the DEn’s policy were hampered by the persistent change 
in factors such as the price of oil. In the end, one civil servant lamented, it was 
impossible to say anything except in generalities.64 As one nationalized industry 
executive said, ‘the department might have argued that there was a policy, but had 
no means to implement it.’65
The evolution o f policy was mirrored in the changing structure of the 
department’s Oil Division over time. The division began by focusing on offshore
60 Heald, ‘UK Energy Policy,’ p. 103.
61 Interview with BNOC executive.
62 Andrew Likierman, Public Expenditure: The Public Spending Process (London: 
Penguin Books, 1988), p.34; and interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
63 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
64 Interview with CPRS official.
65 Interview with BNOC executive.
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supplies, exploration and participation agreements. Broader policy decisions and 
community and international policy were added in the early 1980s, until finally in 
1990 responsibility for oil had become a streamlined operation of overseeing current 
operations and holding small licensing rounds.66
The Department of Energy’s Influence in the Oil Industry
The DEn’s primary means of controlling oil exploration and development in 
the North Sea were discretionary licenses and taxation. The DEn was also responsible 
for the offshore-supply industry, depletion policy and recording statistics. The 
discretionary system allowed the government to discriminate between applicants on 
the basis of their contributions to the North Sea development and Britain’s economy, 
as well as to favour British companies.67 The Treasury preferred an auction system 
to raise more money upfront, and an auction was tried in the fourth round in 1971 
where 15 blocks were sold for £37 million and again in the eighth round in 1983 
where seven blocks were sold for £33 million. With these exceptions, the 
discretionary system, prevailed because the government decided that the power to 
award licenses was more valuable than the extra cash an auction might raise.68 For 
example, the government used licences as a carrot in the participation negotiations.
66 Mclnnes, ‘Policy Networks within the Department of Energy and Energy Policy,’ 
Figure 1; and interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
67 Louis Turner, ‘State and Commercial Interests in North Sea Oil and Gas: Conflict and 
Correspondence,’ in Martin Sacter and Ian Smart, eds., The Political Implications of North 
Sea Oil and Gas (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1975), p.98; and Colin Robinson, ‘The Errors 
of North Sea Policy,’ Lloyds Bank Review, No.141, July 1981, pp.20-1.
68 Turner, ‘State and Commercial Interests in North Sea Oil and Gas,’ p.95; ‘Eighth 
Round to Include Auction,’ Petroleum Economist, June 82, p.253; ‘License Auction Raises 
£37 Million,’ Petroleum Economist, March 1983, p. 100; and interviews with Department of 
Energy civil servants.
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When the threat o f withholding licenses from uncooperative companies was carried 
out in the fifth licensing round, in the words of one DEn civil servant, ‘the 
government’s negotiating position was boosted enormously.’69
Of all the government’s means, the tax regime affected the oil companies the 
most; it was a major factor in their exploration and development calculations. In 1964 
the private oil companies were granted long concessions, low tax rates and few 
regulations to entice them to explore and develop the North Sea.70 Once oil was 
discovered, risk was reduced and the future gains became apparent, and the 
government began to raise taxes and increase the level of regulation. Over the years, 
ministers and the companies negotiated back and forth. The DEn was in a 
disadvantageous position in the early 1980s as the price o f oil began to fall, oil 
companies profits fell and North Sea production approached a natural decline. To 
induce private oil companies to develop smaller, marginal fields, the type o f fields 
thought to be remaining, the government made new tax concessions.71 Once the 
price of oil began to increase after the 1986 low, investment picked up slowly, and
69 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
70 Under the first licensing round the government charged 12.5 per cent in royalties and 
taxes at the corporate rate of 53.75 per cent; in 1975 the Oil Taxation Act was passed which 
limited tax loopholes and created a new Petroleum Revenue Tax of 45 per cent, raised to 75 
per cent by 1982. And in 1981, the Supplementary Petroleum Duty was introduced and was 
set at 20 per cent (later replaced by the Advance Petroleum Revenue Tax.) Nelsen, The State 
Offshore Petroleum, Politics, p.20, p.55, and p.91; Alexander Kemp and David Rose, ‘Tax 
Changes - A Lost Opportunity,’ Petroleum Economist, April 1982, p. 133; and Turner, ‘State 
and Commercial Interests in North Sea Oil and Gas,’ p.93.
71 ‘Tax Aid for Marginal Fields,’ Petroleum Economist, July 1982, p.296; ‘Distortions 
That Impede Recovery,’ Petroleum Economist, September 1982, p.350; ‘Budget Boost for 
North Sea,’ Petroleum Economist, April 1983, pp. 143-4; Alexander Kemp and David Rose, 
‘Tax Changes Give New Incentives,’ Petroleum Economist, May 1983, p. 163; ‘Implications 
of Cheaper Oil,’ Petroleum Economist, March 1983, pp.78-9; and Alexander Kemp and 
David Rose, ‘Dangers of Reliance on Oil Revenues,’ Petroleum Economist, March 1983,
p.81.
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the swing reversed.72
The Department of Energy also built up an expertise in taxation, which was 
utilized by the unusual practice o f advising the Treasury. Civil servants explained that 
the DEn was included in the oil taxation system because the Treasury needed their 
knowledge.73 The DEn was also responsible for calculating and collecting royalties, 
except for those paid in kind from 1977 to 1985 which BNOC then disposed o f under 
the direction of the DEn. The involvement of the Treasury and the DEn led to 
disagreements over the tax rates. The Treasury wanted higher tax revenues, while the 
DEn was concerned that higher taxes might discourage investment and cause 
consumer criticism.74
The DEn’s responsibilities for depletion policy, the offshore-supply industry 
and the maintenance of energy statistics were considered secondary functions 
compared to issuing licenses and taxation. Depletion policy was a highly contentious 
issue. The Treasury and the oil companies wanted oil produced as fast as possible to 
maintain revenues, while some in the DEn were concerned with security o f supply 
and wanted to spread the production of oil further into the future.75 Though options 
were discussed, no restrictions were placed on production. The Department of Energy 
took over the Offshore-Supplies Office (OSO), created by the DTI in 1973 to ensure 
Britain’s share of the off-shore oil supply industry (all the equipment and services 
needed for oil exploration and development). The DEn devoted much time and effort
72 Martin Quinlan, ‘1985 - Last of the Golden Years,’ Petroleum Economist, April 1986,
p .121.
73 Interviews with Department of Energy and Treasury civil servants.
74 Interviews with Department of Energy and Treasury civil servants.
75 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
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to the challenge and was proud of the results: 73 per cent of offshore-supply contracts 
(in terms of value) went to British companies compared with almost none in the mid- 
1970s.76 In addition, the DEn maintained sophisticated energy statistics, but found 
that few outside the department ever used them.77
The Role of the Private Oil Companies
Despite the plethora of companies involved in the North Sea, production was
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concentrated in the hands of the majors. As shown in Figure 2.5, the seven major oil
76 This figure may be misleadingly high because it includes British subsidiaries of 
American and French companies. ‘Bringing in the Catch,’ Economist, 12 May 1984; and 
Michael Jenkin, British Industry and the North Sea (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp.63-4, 
p .73 and p .82.
77 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
53
companies controlled at least 50 per cent of North Sea oil throughout its 
development.78 The DEn sought to include as many companies as were capable in 
the development o f the North Sea. As one civil servant explained, the rationale was 
‘the larger the array [of oil companies], the more ideas and thinking, the larger the 
pay-off.’79 The small companies, however, could not meet the capital costs of 
developing new finds, and thus, the majors were favoured.80 Initially, BP and Shell 
controlled 20 per cent and 15 per cent of the North Sea respectively, and the five 
American companies controlled much of the remainder. Over time, however, smaller 
companies increased their portion from 10 per cent in 1975 to 25 per cent by the 
early 1980s.81
The government had, in fact, always been dependent on the private oil
industry. According to one civil servant:
Despite upheavals going back to Suez, the oil industry always managed 
to deliver the oil - much more so than anyone gave them credit for in 
advance.82
Another pointed out that ‘the department tended to look after the interests of the oil 
companies; it was the tradition.’83 Through informal and formal channels at all
78 Department of Energy, Development of Oil and Gas Resources, 1984 and 1991.
79 Interview with Department of Energy civil servants.
80 Because Shell had a 50-50 exploration and production agreement with Esso (now 
Exxon) in the North Sea, the U.S. company Esso was also a beneficiary of the government’s 
policy.‘Making Waves: Attraction of Oil Investment in the North Sea,’ Economist, 18 March 
1989.
81 The other portion went to the large independents, including Amerada Hess and 
Occidental Petroleum. Department of Energy, Development of Oil and Gas Resources, 1984 
and 1991; and Arnold, Britain's Oil, p.42.
82 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
83 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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levels, DEn civil servants frequently spoke with the oil companies. As a result, most 
civil servants were sympathetic to or at least understood the private oil companies’ 
positions. The DEn civil servants were proud of these good relationships. The 
ultimate manifestation o f the DEn’s concern for oil companies was their strategy 
guarding against excessive governmental interference; it was thought that too much 
interference would force the companies to go elsewhere.84 According to one civil 
servant:
The government was continually turning the screw tighter to see what 
happened until finally in 1981 they went too far and there was a down 
turn [in development], and the policies were then reversed.’85
As another civil servant explained, ‘the department was too soft sometimes [on the
oil companies]...but in the end, we still had to work with them.86
There was also a healthy dose of scepticism about the oil companies evident
among civil servants in the DEn. One civil servant explained that the oil companies
‘could say they were mindful of the national interest, but they were also commercial
and couldn’t change that.’ The civil servant argued that the participation agreements
were therefore necessary to override those commercial obligations.87 Another simply
explained, ‘oil companies have different interests than the government and the
population.,88
The government devised two specific means of control, participation
84 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants
85 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
86 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
87 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
88 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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agreements and assurances, as well as BNOC. Participation, as originally planned by 
the Labour government, was a full partnership arrangement whereby a national oil 
company would participate in the exploration and development, contribute 51 per cent 
of the expenditure and then receive 51 per cent of the production and profits. The 
Treasury argued that it could not fund the 51 per cent investment,89 and the private 
oil companies argued that they had already invested a substantial amount of capital 
into the North Sea on the understanding that there would be no government 
interference.90 Taking into account these obstacles, another concept of participation 
was developed with a national oil company. The national company would have the 
right to take at market price up to 51 per cent of a company’s oil production, but the 
government assured the companies that they would be no better off and no worse off 
by the arrangement.91 In practice this meant that the national oil company could buy 
up to 51 per cent o f a company’s production at market price, thereby nominally 
controlling 51 per cent of UK oil, and then immediately re-sell it, sometimes back to 
the same company. One DEn civil servant described the arrangement: ‘On the surface 
it looked good, but it was really a bit of a w'angle ... and didn’t do
much.’92
Even though the concept proved to be relatively innocuous, long negotiations 
ensued during the 1970s in which the government used leverage over the companies
89 ‘New Moves to Still Fears on Oil Programme,’ Times, 12 August 1974, p .l; and 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 23 July 1975, vol.363, col.330.
90 Harold Wilson, The Final Term: The Labour Government 1974-76 (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nielson, and Michael Joseph, 1979), p.40.
91 A.W.Baker and G.H.Daniel, ‘BNOC and Privatization - The Past and the Future,’ 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resource Law, V ol.l, No.3, 1983, p. 149.
92 Interview with CPRS official.
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needing loan guarantees or other assistance. It took a year of negotiations before an 
agreement was reached with BP on 25 January 1976 at a meeting between the Prime 
Minister, the Secretary of State for Energy and the chairman of BP.93 Agreement 
with the other major international oil companies proved more difficult; the Chairmen 
of Exxon and Shell were vocally antagonistic, and agreements were only achieved 
after the government showed its willingness to withhold licenses from a company 
refusing to cooperate.94
Another means of control, company ’assurances’, was enacted in conjunction 
with the participation agreements. These assurances followed a similar arrangement 
to the one outlined in a letter from BP to the DEn obtained by the Financial Times. 
The letter stated that BP would cover any short-term gap which stopped short of a 
major international crisis (defined as a 7 per cent cut in supply) as long as there was 
‘no legal or governmental constraint on its ability to raise prices as a necessary means 
of recovering costs.’95 For a price all companies would guarantee supply, at least 
in a short-term crisis. According to DEn civil servants, these assurances were the 
government’s main means of securing energy supplies after BNOC was split and 
Britoil was sold in 1982.96
2.4. Direct Ownership in the North Sea
With the 1973 oil crisis, the government began to consider the idea of a
93 Harold Wilson, Final Term, p.42.
94 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; and a review of articles in Times,
1974-78.
95 ‘Bringing in the Catch,’ Economist, 12 May 1984.
96 Interview with Department of Energy civil servants.
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national oil company. The participation arrangements made a national oil company 
of some sort necessary. The thinking began under the Conservative government, but 
it was the Labour government elected in 1974 which debated more extreme options, 
including making BP into a fully national oil company and allowing only British 
companies into the North Sea.97
The British National Oil Company
After the 1973-74 oil crisis, Britain realized its vulnerability in terms of oil, 
and responded by seeking new ways to control its oil supply. The government briefly 
considered transforming BP into a fully government-owned company. This was made 
more plausible by happenstance. In January 1975, the government increased its stake 
in BP from 48 per cent to 68 per cent as part of a deal to aid the financially troubled 
Burmah Oil. An original shareholder in BP, Burmah Oil maintained a 20 per cent 
stake. Under the government’s scheme to help the financially troubled company, 
Burmah sold its holding to the Bank of England (while the Treasury held the original 
shares) for £179 million. By March 1976, the shares were valued at £447 million, and 
the Burmah shareholders sued the Bank of England for improper proceedings, but 
eventually nothing was proved.98 The increased holding also spurred questions in the 
House of Commons (see Figure 2.1), but the government responded that a decision 
had not yet been made, and implied that the government was at least considering the
97 Adrian Hamilton, North Sea Impact, Off-Shore Oil and the British Economy (London: 
International Institute for Economic Research, 1978) p. 16; and interviews with BNOC and 
BP executives.
98 ‘Crude Solution,’ Economist, 11 December 1976, p. 119; BP, Annual Report and 
Accounts, March 1976; Benn, Conflict of Interest, p.75; and interviews with Treasury civil 
servants and BP executives.
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sale of the shares."
Instead of nationalizing BP, a new entity was created, the British National Oil 
Company (BNOC), in 1976 by Labour Party ministers who had been debating the 
merits of a National Hydrocarbons Corporation inside the party since 1967.100 The 
arguments for and against BNOC were similar to those made about the government’s 
initial investment in APOC. Advocates argued that BNOC would defend against the 
tyranny of the existing large corporations, while others focused on the general 
benefits to Britain’s economy.101 The existence of national oil companies in other 
democracies including France, Canada and Italy diffused the accusations of extreme 
socialism.102 The opposition included the coal industry which feared that 
government support would divert their customers to oil, Conservatives against 
government involvement in industry and the oil companies who believed that BNOC 
would impede their development of the North Sea at a crucial time.103 Yet, as one 
BP director said:
We are in partnership with governments of all political complexions all 
over the world. We are unlikely to be frightened off by anything the 
Labour government has in mind. In any case our investment [in the
99 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 6-21 February 1975, 16 May 1975, 30 
June 1975, 17 October 1975, 12-26 January 1976, 20 February, and 24-5 March 1975.
100 D. Hann, ‘The Process of Government and UK Oil Participation Policy,’ Energy 
Policy, June 1986, p.254.
101 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 23 July 1975, vol.363, col.327-347; and 
interview with BNOC executive.
102 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
103 Inglis, ‘The International Oil Industry,’ p.52; Philip Shelbourne, ‘BNOC’s Growth and 
Prospects,’ Coal and Energy Quarterly, No.30, April 1981, p.3; also see articles from the 
Times on the creation of BNOC, including: 5 June 1975, p.22; 25 June 1975 Special Report, 
p.IV; 13 July 1975, p. 17; 10 August 1975, p. 15; 13 November 1975, p. 19; and 30 
November 1975, p.7.
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North Sea] is now too big. It would be too late to stop [producing] 
even if we wanted to.104
Opponents’ fears were highlighted because BNOC was created partly under the
direction of two Labour leaders who strongly believed in state-ownership - Tony
Benn, Secretary o f State for Energy from 1976-79, and Tommy Balogh, a former
Member of the Economic and Financial Committee of the Labour Party and Minister
of State in the DEn from 1974-75 who became deputy chairman of BNOC from 1976-
78.105
BNOC was created to serve two sometimes contradictory roles. First it was 
an information-gathering, monitoring and advisory agent.106 Second it was a 
commercial oil production and trading company. BNOC thus had the dual role of 
competing against private oil companies in the North Sea as well as advising their 
regulators, and many saw these functions as contradictory. One BNOC executive 
found that fear o f a ‘spy in the camp’ was second only to fear of technical 
incompetence as reasons why private companies did not want to work with 
BNOC.107 The management argued that BNOC was not a regulatory agency, only 
an advisor to the government, and a ‘Chinese Wall’ had been erected between the 
operations side and the rest.108
104 As quoted in Harold Wilson, Final Term, p.40.
105 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and BNOC executives.
106 John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1988), p.323.
107 Interviews with BNOC and BP executives.
108 Interviews with BNOC executives; Peter Rodgers, The Sunday Times, 21 May 1978, 
p.63; and House of Commons Nationalized Industries Select Committee (Sub-Committee B),
^Testimony by Frank Kearton, Chairman of BNOC,’ Seventh Report, Reports and Accounts 
I of Energy Industries, British Parliamentary Papers, 1977-78, Vol.XXXIX, p.43.
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The production side of BNOC started off with the oil assets o f the National 
Coal Board, and soon thereafter BNOC purchased 80 per cent of the Burmah Oil 
Company’s North Sea oil fields.109 The government also favoured BNOC by 
granting the company further substantial UKCS acreage in the fifth and sixth rounds 
(1976 and 1979). By 1982 BNOC had obtained production interests in nine North Sea 
oil fields and one gas field and was responsible for 7 per cent of all North Sea oil 
production.110
On the trading side, from the beginning BNOC activated the participation
agreements with the oil companies giving it access to over 51 per cent of North Sea
oil. This was unexpected by many; as one DEn civil servant explained:
There were some ministers and certainly a lot of officials who thought 
BNOC would never in a million years think of exercising the options.
They thought we would just have them there in case there was some 
crisis and then you could exercise the option... Whereas Kearton, 
backed by Tony Benn, was going to exercise the options right away 
and get in the oil industry and get some clout...Kearton is not just 
going to sit there and be a front man, he wanted a real job to do. At 
that time, ownership of oil, even if you paid market price for it, gave 
you clout. To have control of basically 50 per cent of UK oil was 
something.111
As another DEn civil servant simply stated: ‘The oil companies were 
surprised. The oil companies were always surprised though.’112 By 1981, with its 
own production, participation oil and royalty in kind, BNOC controlled up to 60 per 
cent of North Sea oil. Even after the production assets were sold in 1985, BNOC still
109 Vickers and Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, p.320; and Richard Bailey, 
‘Unequal Shares in the North Sea,’ Energy Policy, December 1978, p.328.
110 Webb, ‘Energy Policy and the Privatization of the UK Energy Industries,’ p.29.
111 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
112 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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controlled 30 per cent of North Sea oil.113 As one BNOC executive explained,
by 1979, BNOC was the largest crude oil wholesaler, a very important 
source for non-Arab refineries. We were making decisions about 
where oil should go, on our own or with the government.114
Like many nationalized companies, BNOC soon found the government’s
financial control a severe constraint to expansion. The financial provisions for BNOC
were established in the 1975 Oil and Pipelines Act. Through the National Oil Account
(NOA) BNOC received funds for business transactions, but at the same time was
obliged to submit, on a daily basis, all sums received. In June 1977, BNOC
completed arrangements to raise $825 million through advance oil sales. This money
was used to repay the loans from the National Loans Fund, thus significantly reducing
BNOC’s interest payments, and partly to finance new UKCS expansion. As one
executive described it:
The turning point for BNOC was when they convinced major bankers 
to loan us the $825 million, which was basically a forward sale o f oil.
Banks found BNOC had an entirely sensible business plan - went ahead 
and did the deal. The oil companies couldn’t understand. The Banks 
played a role in persuading the oil companies to stop whingeing and 
go on with the game in town. The loan enabled BNOC to pay its own 
way, and not take away from money spent on hospitals etc, and helped 
to reduce the PSBR.115
In addition, BNOC expanded outside of the United Kingdom for the first time, in
Dubai, Indonesia, the Republic of Ireland and France.116
113 Ian Hargreaves, ‘Oil Supply Crisis Accord Would Not Stop Price Rises,’ Financial 
Times, 15 July 1985, p.4; Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 15 July 1985, col. 80; 
Shelbourne, ‘BNOC’s Growth and Prospects,’ p.6; and Webb, ‘Energy Policy and the 
Privatization of the UK Energy Industries,’ p.29.
114 Interview with BNOC executive.
115 Interview with BNOC executive.
116 Britoil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ by S.W. Warburg & Co and N.M. Rothschild & Sons on 
behalf of the Secretary of State for Energy, November 1982, p.6.
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With so much oil under its control, BNOC grew into the position of being a
price setter for North Sea oil. The price BNOC paid for its North Sea participation
oil was set each quarter by BNOC with input from Energy and Treasury
ministers.117 Ultimately, however, BNOC was too small to be a world price leader.
With the development o f the spot market in the early 1980s and the drop in the price
of oil in 1984, it became apparent that BNOC could at best only effect short-term
prices.118 One DEn civil servant explained, the government’s aim was to smooth
the jagged price fluctuations, and according to a BNOC executive, the government’s
instructions were to avoid short-term fluctuations.119 The most serious costs of past
crises have been those imposed by rapid and significant changes in the price of oil
which have only been loosely linked to the scale of reductions in supply.120 Thus,
there were benefits to controlling the price, as explained in 1984 by the Minister of
State for Energy Alick Buchanan-Smith:
It is a small sum to pay in relation to the more general benefits and in 
relation to the higher cost to the economy which would be caused by 
the short term destabilization of prices.121
117 ‘Grease the Oil-Prices Slide,’ Economist, 5 January 1985; and Hansard Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), 18 December 1984, col.234.
118 See the debate in Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 18 December 1984.
119 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and BNOC executive.
120 Ian Smart, ‘European Energy Security in Focus,’ in Curt Gasteyger, ed., The Future 
for European Energy Security (London: Francis Pinter, 1985), p. 157; ‘Stocks for Crisis 
Management,’ Petroleum Economist, October 1982, p.398; International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1990; BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 
1990; and Department of Energy, Development of the Oil and Gas Resources, 1990.
121 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 18 December 1984, col.234.
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BGC as a Player in the North Sea
The government also owned the British Gas Corporation (BGC) which evolved 
into an active player in oil exploration and production in the North Sea. The 1948 
Gas Act nationalized over 1,000 town gas works and created the Gas Council. In the 
1950s, the Gas Council was an ailing business and there was even talk of winding it 
down.122 With the possibility o f finding gas in the North Sea in the 1960s, however, 
the Council’s prospects improved. Its functions were extended by the Gas Act o f 1965 
and the Council began to explore on and off-shore in order to gain some direct 
control of the primary resources on which they depended as well as to learn first hand 
the technology, the difficulties and the costs o f exploration and development 
work.123 Gas was discovered in 1966 and brought on-shore the following year. In 
1968 the Council’s first field became operational, and in 1969 it signed an industrial 
contract for the sale o f gas to ICI. Under the Conservative government, the 1972 Gas 
Act consolidated the Gas Council into the British Gas Corporation (BGC), and in 
1976 Denis Rooke became its chairman and a forceful defender o f the 
corporation.124
While the Labour government never considered giving BGC the role of 
national oil company, the corporation was able to remain active in the oil industry
122 Interview with BGC executives; and Bill Jewers, ‘We’re Not As Different as Private 
Industry Thinks,’ Accountancy Age, 23 June 1983.
123 House of Commons Energy Select Committee,‘Wytch Farm (Disposal of BGC Assets) 
Memorandum by British Gas Corporation,’ First Report, Disposal of the British Gas 
Corporation’s Interest in Wytch Farm Oilfield, British Parliamentary Papers, 1981-82, HC 
138, p.ix; and Lynn Pearson, Organization of the Energy Industry (London: Macmillan, 
1981), p.98.
124 Interviews with BGC executives; and British Gas Corporation, Annual Reports and 
Accounts, 1980-85.
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until 1982, building up a sizable portfolio which included interests in over 25 off­
shore fields and the Wytch Farm on-shore field. The government had numerous 
opportunities to limit BGC’s expansion into oil, but declined on each occasion. The 
first opportunity was when BNOC was created and the 1975 Petroleum and Pipelines 
Act specified that BNOC should receive the oil assets of the BGC.125 BGC argued 
that it was impossible to know beforehand which fields were going to yield oil or gas, 
and in many cases they were found together. Others pointed out that some distinction 
could be made initially because gas fields were predominantly located in the south 
North Sea while oil is found in the north.126 However, BGC’s arguments 
predominated, as a BNOC manager explained: ‘Rooke fought a rear guard action.. .He 
won the battle at the time because there was no one at BNOC yet to fight on the other 
side.’127 A second opportunity occurred when BGC’s petroleum production licence 
covering the Wytch Farm on-shore oil field came due in 1974. Instead o f cancelling 
the contract, the DEn re-approved the license for a further forty years.128 The 
Labour government, in fact, encouraged BGC’s exploration and development by 
favouring applications for North Sea licenses where BGC was a partner.
Did Ownership Make a Difference in the 1979 Oil Crisis?
In 1979 Britain had the benefit of North Sea oil for the first time during a
125 Bailey, ‘Unequal Shares in the North Sea,’ pp.328-9; and Hansard Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), 13 March 1984, col.343.
126 Interviews with BGC executives and Department of Energy civil servants.
127 Interview with BNOC executive.
128 House of Commons Energy Select Committee, ‘Wytch Farm (Disposal of BGC Assets) 
Memorandum by British Gas Corporation,’ p.xxiii.
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world oil crisis. Although the world-wide supply disruptions in the spring o f 1979 and 
then again in 1980 were not as great as during the 1973-74 crisis, the price o f oil rose 
quickly. With North Sea supplies, Britain did not have to worry about serious 
shortages of oil. While the price increase was harmful to industry, it made high cost 
North Sea oil exploration more profitable, thereby increasing Treasury revenues.
The crisis, however, caused a relative scarcity of petrol during the summer 
of 1979. The irony o f having North Sea oil production in full swing at the same time 
that apparent supply shortages were occurring at British garages was not lost on the 
British public, and caused Energy Secretary David Howell considerable political 
embarrassment.129 Howell’s emergency plan included taking North Sea oil royalties 
in kind rather than cash, increasing production incentives by suspending gas flaring 
restrictions, announcing a bigger licensing round, and ordering companies operating 
in the North Sea to cut exports from Britain - essentially using the participation 
agreements that the previous Labour government had enacted.130
These measures were not enough to abate the crisis. The problem was not a 
lack of oil, but the inability to shift supply destinations quickly because long-term 
supply contracts were the norm. Not even the state-owned BNOC could re-direct its 
short-term supply.131 The disruptions soon stopped and the problem of short-term 
flexibility was solved, not by BNOC, but by competition between suppliers, the
129 Hann, ‘The Process of Government and UK Oil Participation Policy,’ p.258; and 
interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
130 John Redwood, Going for Broke... Gambling with Taxpayers' Money (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984), p. 106.
131 Interviews with BNOC executives; Roland Gribben, ‘Oil Shortage Plans Revisited,’ 
Daily Telegraph, 22 May 1979, p.6; and ‘Howell Refuses to Impose Oil Controls,’ Daily 
Telegraph, 6 June 1979, p .l.
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development of a spot market in Rotterdam, and the subsequent shift from long-term 
to short-term contracts.132 Thus, the increasing competitiveness o f the oil industry, 
rather than BNOC and governmental directives, overcame the supply problem.
Conclusion
The two consistent factors in the government’s involvement in the oil industry 
from 1914 to the mid-1980s were its investment in BP and its reliance on private 
international oil companies. Since the government agreed in May 1914 to become 
APOC’s major shareholder, its role was limited to appointing two directors to the 
board and a veto power. Despite its holding in BP, the government relied primarily 
on private oil companies for supplies during World War I and World War II and to 
meet the increase in demand for oil in the post-war era, to develop the North Sea and 
to ensure oil supplies to Britain in a crisis.
Despite this consistency, there were many circumstances that changed. First, 
Britain’s dependence on oil expanded from purely military needs to economic needs 
and became a vital input into the country’s economy in the post World War II era. 
Second, the British government’s ability to protect BP’s interests in the Middle East 
decreased. And third, Britain’s oil sources changed from foreign to domestic which 
radically affected the government’s ability to influence the oil industry. With the 
discovery of oil in the North Sea and self-sufficiency by 1980, the government gained 
a new means of leverage over the oil industry.
To adapt to these changes, the British government created the Department of 
Energy in 1974 and the British National Oil Company in 1976 and allowed BGC to
132 Yergin, The Prize, pp.718-9 and pp.767-8.
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evolve into an active player in the North Sea. The DEn’s primary means of 
controlling the oil industry were discretionary licenses and taxation. The DEn was 
also responsible for the offshore-supply industry, depletion policy and recording 
statistics. BNOC was a production company, the recipient of the government’s 
participation oil and thus a major oil trader, as well as an advisory agent to the 
government. BGC with a monopoly over the British gas supply, also discovered, 
developed and produced oil in the North Sea. Ultimately, however, the government 
continued its reliance on the private oil companies for the development of the North 
Sea and for security of supply. The seven major oil companies, in fact, developed a 
majority of North Sea oil. Security was insured through participation agreements 
which gave the government the ability to control up to 51 % of all production, and 
assurances which guaranteed that the private companies would supply in a crisis, 
provided they could charge the necessary price to cover any costs.
The sale o f the government’s oil assets ended one o f the two consistent factors 
in the British government’s long involvement in the oil industry, investment in BP. 
The sales, however, forced a continued reliance on the second, the private oil 
companies. In the next chapter I examine the specific details of how the government 
executed these sales, and then I turn to why.
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Chapter Three: The Sequencing of the Oil Asset Sales in Britain
The sale o f Britain’s oil assets occurred during a ten year period, 1977-1987, 
and involved nine separate sales, with sizes ranging from just over £200 million for 
Wytch Farm to £5.5 billion for the last tranche of BP shares. The government 
received £8.5 billion in total for the sales, the biggest yield from any single industry 
sector in the privatization programme.1 The costs of the privatization, are 
conservatively estimated at £224 million.2 See summary in Table 3.1.
Though privatization is often described as a Conservative government 
phenomenon, the sales actually started in 1977 with the Labour government’s sale of 
shares in British Petroleum. Starting here is crucial for a full understanding o f the 
development of privatization in Britain. After reviewing the 1977 sale, I turn to the 
Conservative government’s sales, which began with two more share sales o f BP 
shares. In addition to BP, the government also sold the production operations of 
BNOC as Britoil and BGC’s oil assets as Wytch Farm and Enterprise Oil. Britoil was 
sold in two tranches, 51% in 1982 and the remainder, except for one ‘golden share,’ 
in 1985. The golden share was only later redrawn after being tested in 1988 when 
Britoil was the subject of a takeover bid.
The government sold British Gas’ on-shore oil field, Wytch Farm, and created 
Enterprise Oil with its off-shore oil fields and then sold the fields as a functioning 
entity. The sales were completed in 1987 when the government sold the remaining 
shares in BP. This last sale was complicated by the fact that not only was this sale
1 Vickers and Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, p.316.
2 Costs were calculated using the average of existing estimates.
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the biggest ever share offering at the time; it also coincided with the October 1987 
stock market crash.
Because many of the details of these sales have not previously been recorded 
in scholarly works on privatization, although they are often listed as part of the 
government’s privatization programme, much of the information in this explanatory 
chapter is based on first hand interviews. The review of these sales provides a useful 
prelude to the subsequent chapters.
Table 3.1. Proceeds and Costs from Oil Asset Sales
Proceeds 
(£ millions)
Costs
(£ millions)
Remaining 
Government 
Shareholding (%)
British Petroleum 68
June 1977 535 20 51
November 1979 290 9.6 46
July 1981 15 7 46
September 1983 565 9.4 31.5
October 1987 5,500 137.1 0
BNOC 100
November 1982 549 11.9 48.8
August 1985 450 15 0
British Gas’ oil assets
Wytch Farm 
May 1984
215 2.7 N.A.
Enterprise Oil 
June 1984
392 10 N .A.
Total: 8,511 223.7 0
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3.1. British Petroleum - The First Sale
Although privatization as a phenomenon is commonly attributed to Margaret 
Thatcher, it was a Labour Cabinet which made the first major sale in 1977 by selling 
part o f the government’s holding in BP, reducing its stake in the company from 68 
to 51 per cent. Pressure for the sale stemmed from the government’s financial 
difficulties in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis and mid-1970s’ global recession. The 
British government was twice forced to request a loan from the IMF, in November 
1975 and in the summer of 1976, in order to fund a severe balance of payments 
deficit.3 The IMF pressured the government to reduce its public sector borrowing 
requirement (PSBR), suggesting targets of between £6.5 and 7 billion for 1977-78 
compared with the government’s own estimate of £11.2 billion.4
The Chancellor Denis Healey lamented that the problem for all Cabinet 
members was that ‘almost all o f the spending cuts ran against the Labour Party’s 
principles, and many also ran against... campaign promises.’5 The Cabinet was split 
over how to proceed, and selling BP shares provided a ready solution.6 Joel Barnett, 
then the Chief Secretary of the Treasury, explained:
If the money could be found elsewhere, all the better...it was much
more sensible to raise £500 million [actually £535 million] in this non-
3 ‘When Will Old Consoles Reach 50?’ Economist, 6 December 1975, p.95; ‘One Debt 
Repaid, the Next One Still Not Fixed,’ Economist, 11 December 1976, p. 119; and Margaret 
Garritsen de Vries, The International Monetary Fund, 1972-1978: Cooperation on Trial. Vol.I 
Narrative and Analysis (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1985), pp.464-8.
4 de Vries, The International Monetary Fund, p.471; and Joel Barnett, Inside the Treasury 
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), p. 102.
3 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p.401.
6 ‘The Chancellor Proposes, the Cabinet Hopes it Disposes,’ Economist, 4 December 
1976, p. 15; James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), p.435; and Barnett, 
Inside the Treasury, p. 104.
71
deflationary way, rather than to have to cut the borrowing requirement 
with deflationary measures such as expenditure cuts or tax increases.7
Later, he explained: ‘We couldn’t worry about the future, it was the immediate cash
advantage that was essential, even though in the long run the revenues might have
been better.’8 Even Tony Benn, the staunchest advocate of retaining the full
shareholding, finally admitted that letting the sale go ahead was preferable to further
spending cuts.9
Instead of counting this sale as revenue, the British government established the 
accounting practice of recording asset sales as negative expenditure. Due to the 
accounting procedure, the sales enabled the British government to lower the PSBR 
£535 million more than they might otherwise have done without further domestic 
spending cuts.10 The decision to accept the accounting for the BP share sale as 
negative spending was not seen as very important; at the time no one foresaw the 
precedent that would be set. As one senior Treasury civil servant explained, it was 
a very pragmatic decision. The matter was discussed in the Treasury, and the solution 
adopted was based on the fact that the recently acquired BP shares from Burmah Oil 
were recorded as positive spending, and therefore the sale of BP shares should count 
as negative spending.11
The argument then became one of how much to sell and how much to cut.
7 Barnett, Inside the Treasury, p. 108.
8 Interview with Labour minister.
9 Benn, Against the Tide, p.647 and p.653; and Tony Benn, Conflict of Interest ,in Ruth 
Winstone, ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1990), p. 102 and p. 141.
10 Interviews with Treasury civil servants and ministers. This aspect is further developed 
in Chapter Seven.
11 Interview with Treasury civil servant and ministers.
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Without much disagreement, the Cabinet decided to retain a 51 per cent holding,
limiting potential charges from the left that they had relinquished control o f a major
state asset. Tony Benn was only minister who seemed to realize the political problems
the choice might cause Labour later on. After the sale he wrote in his diary:
We have handed some of the most valuable assets of this country to
the Shah [The National Iranian Oil Corporation was reported to be
trying to buy 1 per cent o f BP shares] to the Americans and to private 
shareholders, and I am ashamed to be a member of the Cabinet that 
has done this...W e have provided a blueprint for selling off public 
assets in the future and we will have no argument against it. It is an 
outrage.12
The logistics of the sale were complicated, however, by legal action from the Burmah 
Oil shareholders against the Bank of England. Although their claim was weak, the
government had to proceed with the possibility that they could lose the suit. As a
result they and could only sell the shares held by the Treasury, and not those of the 
Bank of England.13
Though the government did not consult BP before the announcement of the 
sale, they left BP to make the sale arrangements. Because it was at the time the 
biggest share sale ever, 25 per cent of the shares were offered in the United States 
in order to avoid flooding the British market. Expanding into the United States was 
also important to BP, who thought that it would reduce the United States 
government’s resistance to BP’s development plans in Alaska.14 In late June 1977, 
17 per cent of BP’s shares, 66.8 million ordinary stock units of £1 each, were offered
12 Benn, Conflict of Interest, p. 175.
13 ‘Crude Solution,’ Economist, 11 December 1976, p. 119; Benn, Conflict of Interest, 
p.75; and interview with BP executives.
14 Interview with BP executives.
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for sale at the price of 845p each. Because the offer was fully subscribed in Britain, 
the allocation to investors in the United States was in the end reduced from 25 per 
cent to 20 per cent. Preference was given to applications from occupational pension 
funds, BP employees and sub-underwriters. The government’s holding was reduced 
to 51 per cent, of which 30.87 per cent was held by the Treasury and 20.13 per cent 
by the Bank. The sale raised £535 million for the Exchequer. The costs for 
underwriters and advisors, for this first sale, were estimated at £20 million.15
In 1979, a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher was elected, 
and soon began further sales of oil assets. As Chancellor Geoffrey Howe stated, ‘the 
government was following the example set by the previous administration,’16 by 
selling a 5.17 per cent tranche of BP stock in November 1979, which reduced the 
government’s holding below the 50 per cent mark to 45.83 per cent. Just over 80 
million shares of 25p each were sold in November 1979 at a price o f 363p per share. 
The offer was again oversubscribed and considered a success, raising £290 million. 
The estimates for the costs of the sale ranged from the government’s estimate o f £5.2 
million to the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC’s) estimate o f £14 million.17
The government’s holding was further diluted in August 1980 to 44.61 per
15 Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, pp.51-2.
16 As quoted in Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, p.52; and interpreted by privatization 
scholars: George Yarrow, ‘Privatization and Economic Performance in Britain,* Carnegie- 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1989, p.309; Vickers and Yarrow, 
Privatization: An Economic Analysis, p.324; and Samuel Brittan, ‘The Politics and Economics 
of Privatisation,’ Political Quarterly, Vol.55, No.2, April/June 1984, p. 109.
17 C.P. Mayer and S.A. Meadowcroft, ‘Selling Public Assets: Techniques and Financial 
Implications,’ Fiscal Studies, Vol.6 No.4, 1985, p.48; and Trades Union Congress, Stripping 
Our Assets: The City’s Privatisation Killing (London: Trades Union Congress, May 1985), 
p .19.
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cent as the result of the purchase by BP of Selection Trust.18 The government’s 
holding was again reduced (to 39.04 per cent) in July 1981 when the government 
ministers opted not to subscribe to a BP rights issue. Instead, the government sold 
their entitlements to the 100 million shares to other shareholders at a 15p premium 
of 290p per share compared to the rights issue price of 275p. The sale overshadowed 
the British stock market for the month of July, and net proceeds for the government 
were £8 million; £15 million total for the sale minus BP’s expenses of £7 million.19
None of these sales required legislation because they involved a publicly 
traded company so they were not seen as a major policy departure either by the public 
or by the politicians who later became privatization advocates.20 BP receipts, though, 
were always included in what the Conservatives later referred to as their ‘privatization 
programme. ’ This programme received an enormous boost in September 1983 when 
the government sold a further 130 million ordinary shares of 25p each o f BP at a 
minimum tender price of 435p each. The sale was fully subscribed and raised £565 
million, with a government estimate of £9.4 million for the costs.21
3.2. The Britoil Saga - 1982-1988
Upon entering office, the Conservative government carefully considered what
18 Fraser and Wilson, Privatisation, p.53.
19 Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, pp.52-3; Ronald Pullen, ‘BP’s Rights Issue an 
Eleventh Hour Success,’ Times, 17 July 1981, p.21; and ‘Hope Grows for £600 million BP 
Issue,’ Times, 14 July 1981, p .19.
20 Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London: Bantam 
Press, 1992), p.200.
21 Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, p.53; and Mayer and Meadowcroft, ‘Selling Public 
Assets,’ p.48; and TUC, Stripping Our Assets, p. 19.
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to do with BNOC, by gathering information and gauging public opinion. The 
chairman of BNOC, Frank Kearton, meanwhile, had made it clear that he wanted to 
retire as soon as possible. He was replaced by an interim chairman, Ron Utiger, 
because, according to BNOC executives, the government had not yet decided what 
its policy was going to be.22 In May 1980, nine months later, Philip Shelboume, a 
merchant banker from Samuel Montague who had been working on privatization ideas 
with the Department of Energy (DEn), was appointed the chairman o f BNOC, 
marking the beginning of the government’s change in policy towards BNOC. Given 
his background, the new direction for the company was obvious - privatization in one 
form or another.23 In 1982, BNOC became the largest privatization yet undertaken 
in Britain.
The delay from the date of Shelboume’s appointment until the sale o f the first 
tranche of Britoil occurred because privatization was not a clear choice. Other issues 
demanded the government’s attention, including BNOC’s special privileges, and other 
options were presented as alternatives such as the forward sale of oil, a bond issue 
or an investment trust.24 As Sir Alistar Morton, then deputy chairman o f BNOC 
explained:
The ‘granny bonds,’ or certified certificate bonds would be sold 
through the post office. The post office called one day and said we 
can’t do this, it will take us two years to train our staff. The Treasury 
never understood this option, and it wasn’t much discussed...a second 
option was an investment trust which would be managed by BNOC in 
perpetuity, in which shares in the trust would be sold to investors and
22 Interview with BNOC executive; and Peter Hill and Richard Evans, ‘Top Executive 
Resigns form BNOC,’ Times, 31 May 1980, p. 19.
23 Interview with BNOC executives.
24 Redwood, Going for Broke, pp. 106-7; and interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 
October 1993.
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pay dividends based on the income of the trust...I had very bad 
relations with Howell, and he never seemed to understand these 
proposals.25
Privatization of BNOC was first set back in 1980 when a bill submitted by the 
Secretary of State for Energy, David Howell, giving the government the authority to 
sell BNOC was not given Parliamentary time. The following year, the new Secretary 
of State for Energy, Nigel Lawson, was almost thwarted, as Howell had been, by the 
lack of legislative time. Lawson had prepared two privatization bills, one for BNOC 
and one for BGC’s oil fields, but the Cabinet ruled that there was time only for one. 
Instead of choosing one or the other, Lawson combined both measures into a single 
bill.26 While the combination of the two bills meant presentational changes, it did 
not effect the timing or the outcome of either of the privatizations.
The question then became how to sell BNOC. The BNOC board, management 
and even Shelboume opposed splitting the company, which entailed selling the 
production portion and retaining the trading operations in government ownership. 
They argued that a whole company would be stronger, provided balance to the majors 
in the North Sea, and offered better value for the shareholders.27 One board member 
who strongly advocated keeping the company whole was Sir Denis Rooke, chairman 
of BGC, whose primary concern was the precedent such a split might create for the 
future treatment of BGC’s gas operations.28
Yet no one persuasively suggested how the government could regulate a
25 Interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 October 1993.
26 Webb, ‘Energy Policy,’ p.33; Lawson, The View from No, 11, p.212; and interview 
with Department of Energy civil servant.
27 Interview with Sir Philip Shelboume, 18 October 1991.
28 Interview with Sir Philip Shelboume, 18 October 1991; and BGC executive.
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private company trading state oil. Though there were plans for this function to be 
leased out to BNOC, they were not well developed.29 Thus, as one BNOC executive 
summed it up:
BNOC had been through the difficult times, had begun to gain the 
grudging respect of the industry, was making a lot o f money, had 
shown we could be useful, and had reconciled our different roles. We 
were just beginning to gain an identity. To be faced with going private 
was exciting and scary, but to be faced with splitting was very sad.
But I think if we were honest, we had to realize that it was quite 
difficult to put it [the trading side] in the hands of a private entity. So, 
in objecting to the split, in some senses we were objecting to 
privatization.30
Another reason the government wanted to retain the trading portion was to counter 
criticisms that it was relinquishing control of an important national asset.31 In the 
end, Shelboume convinced the board members that the government was the majority 
shareholder and it could do with the company what it wanted. Only three BNOC 
board members remained opposed, two trade unionists and Sir Denis Rooke.32 
BNOC was thus split; the production operations became Britoil and the trading 
operations remained BNOC.
Lawson agreed a minimum tender price with the consultation of Dundas 
Hamilton, a stockbroker whose firm had no connection with the issue, who was 
appointed the government’s independent adviser on pricing. This was the first time 
the government had used an independent adviser. Nigel Lawson explained:
29 Interview with BNOC executive.
30 Interview with BNOC executive.
31 William Keegan, Mr.Lawson’s Gamble (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989), p.96; 
Baker and Daniel, ‘BNOC and Privatisation,’ p. 153; and Hann, ‘The Process of 
Government,’ pp.258-9.
32 Interview with Sir Philip Shelboume, 18 October 1991.
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It was, quite simply, designed to provide an extra line of defence 
against a possible investigation by the parliamentary watchdog, the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the most powerful of all the Select 
Committees, which was by this time becoming restive at the apparent 
underpricing of privatization issues and consequent loss to the 
taxpayer.33
The government also responded to concerns over the future of Britoil - that
it remain British and independent - by creating a special share, which became known
as a ‘golden share. ’ In a letter to the chairman of Britoil, Nigel Lawson stated that
the government might
wish in the relevant circumstances to use its voting rights o f the 
Special Share to ensure that control of the Company remained in the 
hands of an independent Board of Directors.34
This sentiment was reinforced both in the Britoil prospectus and in Britoil’s Articles
of Association.35
The government then sold 51 per cent of Britoil in a share offering on 19 
November 1982. The share price was expensive for BNOC’s high debt/equity ratio 
compared to other large oil companies, and because the new corporation was unable 
to retain either the £219 million of profits or the £127 million remaining in the 
National Oil Account. Foreshadowing the events of the BP share offering five years 
later, the sale resulted in near disaster, as a sudden collapse in the price of oil just 
before the sale made Britoil even less attractive to investors. In addition, the sale was 
limited to Britain and was not offered in the largest stock market, the United
33 Lawson, The View from No.11, p.220.
34 Britoil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ pp. 16-7.
35 Britoil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ p. 16; Britoil Articles of Association, section (a) as printed in 
the Britoil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ pp.60-61.
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States.36 Of the 255 million shares of lOp each on offer at a price o f 219p, only 
69.7 million were taken up (27 per cent of the shares put up for sale), mostly by 
private investors and Britoil employees. The underwriters were forced to take up the 
remaining 73 per cent or 185.3 million shares. Because it was underwritten, the 
government received its guaranteed £549 million. The cost estimates ranged from £17 
million by the National Audit Office (NAO) to £12.5 by the Public Accounts 
Committee and £11.3 million by the government.37
The under-subscription of the Britoil offer served as a good lesson in many 
respects. First, it made the Public Accounts Committee realize that underwriting 
served an important purpose, and was not just a way to give money to friends in the 
City as Labour claimed; and second, it demonstrated that an independent price adviser 
was helpful in deferring blame for an under-subscribed sale.38 In fact, both practices 
were repeated in subsequent privatizations.
The government sold its remaining 48.8 per cent interest in Britoil in August 
1985, and retained only its golden share. In comparison with the first issue, the 1985 
sale was straightforward and was oversubscribed. Shelboume described it as simply 
‘marvellous’.39 The government reserved a portion of the 243 million shares at a 
price of 185p for the markets in the United States, Canada and Europe, but the
36 Britoil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ p.71.
37 Max Wilkinson and Richard Tomking, ‘Out of the Valley of Death But Only Just,’ 
Financial Times, 31 October 1987, p.6; Martin Quinlan, ‘Britoil Sale To Go Ahead,’ 
Petroleum Economist, November 1982, p.449; ‘City Shuns Britoil Offer,’ Petroleum 
Economist, December 1982, p.510; Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, pp.28-9; Mayer and 
Meadowcroft, ‘Selling Public Assets,’ p.48; and TUC, Stripping Our Assets, pp.22-3.
38 Lawson, The View from No. 11, p.221.
39 Interview with Sir Philip Shelboume, 18 October 1991.
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majority (over 40 per cent) was sold to British institutional investors. The
government’s gross proceeds were £450 million, and the Financial Times estimated
the costs at £15 million.40
While Britoil proved it could survive on its own, BNOC could not. Because
the government continued to insist that the company operate on the basis o f long-term
contracts in an effort to achieve the unstated policy of stabilizing oil prices, BNOC
was forced to sell on the spot market at a loss. With the decline in oil prices in 1984
and 1985 this practice quickly became both expensive and politically embarrassing.
As one Treasury civil servant complained:
It is obviously very painful for the Treasury to have a body in the 
public sector buying oil at $28.65 and selling at a lower price; it gives 
us very great pain, be assured of that.41
From the point of view of BNOC, the government made too much over these losses
because the price set by BNOC was the price the government used as a tax reference
point, the higher BNOC’s price in a declining market, the less the government lost
in terms of revenues. In fact, three-fourths of the losses were gained back through
taxes which were based on (this higher) price o f oil. A BNOC executive explained:
the sums involved were small compared to the total size, £12 million 
out of billions per year traded. BNOC had always made a small profit.
It must have been embarrassing though for politicians to ask 
Parliament for money to cover the losses.42
The costs were magnified because BNOC was required under the 1982 Oil and 
Gas (Enterprise) Act to submit a Supplementary Estimate to Parliament for funds to
40 Interview with Sir Philip Shelboume, 18 October 1991; Mayer and Meadowcroft, 
‘Selling Public Assets,’ p.48; and Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, pp.29-30.
41 As quoted in Yergin, The Prize, p.746.
42 Interview with BNOC executive; also see ‘Doubts About State Ownership - Editorial,’ 
Petroleum Economist, September 1985, p.311.
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cover any losses. The losses in 1984 meant the company had to submit a 
Supplementary Estimate, which led to an urgent enquiry by the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Energy. As conditions worsened, BNOC lost more money and 
had to repeat the process again later that year, thus making the loss o f money a public 
embarrassment to the government.43
Because there was no saleable entity, legislation was introduced in March 1985 
to abolish BNOC and replace it with a regulatory agency which would retain three 
of BNOC’s functions:
•  custody of participation agreements,
•  disposal of oil received as royalty in kind, and
•  management of the government’s pipeline system.44
The government’s reasons were summarized by then Minister o f State for Energy
Alick Buchanan-Smith:
We have made changes because circumstances have changed. The 
situation is not the same as it was in the early 1970s, either in relation 
to the oil market or to the structure of the oil industry. The Bill is a 
reflection of the changes. What might have been appropriate 10 years 
ago is not necessarily appropriate today.45
The Oil and Pipelines Bill was enacted on 30 October, and BNOC was formally
dissolved in March 1986. It was replaced by the Oil and Pipelines Agency (OPA),
43 Total losses for 1984 were £11 million. Lord Croham, Chairman of BNOC, 
‘Chairman’s Statement,’ Annual Report and Accounts, 1984, p.3-4; interview with BNOC 
executive; ‘Government Pricing Role Under Review,’ Petroleum Economist, January 1985, 
p.24; ‘Abolition of BNOC,’ Petroleum Economist, April 1985, p. 114; and Hansard 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 18 December 1984, 13 March 1985, 14 May 1985, 15 
July 1985.
44 Vickers and Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, pp.321-2.
45 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 15 July 1985, vol.83, col.87.
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newly created within the DEn.46
The story of Britoil and BNOC did not end in 1985. The government’s one 
remaining tie to Britoil, its golden share, again ensnared the government in the 
company’s affairs in late 1987 when BP initiated a takeover bid for Britoil. The 
government’s position fluctuated throughout. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
initially stated: ‘I understand that it is a commercial transaction, and it is not for us 
to interfere.’47 Complicating matters, however, it was revealed a few days later that 
Atlantic Richfield (Arco) had also begun acquiring stock in an effort to take over 
Britoil. The government reversed its position on the 18th o f December 1987, with a 
statement from the Treasury confirming that the government would use its golden 
share to prevent a takeover of Britoil.48
Ministers did not reveal how they would use the golden share, if  at all, even 
to the Britoil management. Thus neither Britoil nor the bidders knew whether or how 
the government would prevent a transaction.49 From the accounts given by Britoil 
executives, it appears that Arco was intimidated by the golden share while BP was 
not, which explains why Arco agreed to sell its shares in Britoil to BP in January 
1988. Then, with over 50 per cent of Britoil’s shares, BP made an offer for the 
outstanding shares at 500p per share. As Britoil chairman Philip Shelboume pointed 
out, this offer was attractive to Britoil shareholders as many had bought their shares
46 Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, p.31.
47 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 10 December 1987, vol. 124, col.582.
48 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 16 December 1987, vol. 124, col. 1107, 
and 11 January 1988, vol. 125, col. 13-6,73; and Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, p.30.
49 Interviews with Britoil and BNOC executives; and Britoil, ‘Reject BP’s Inadequate and 
Unwelcome Offer,’ 28 January 1988, p. 10.
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in the first issue at a price of 218p per share. In fact, the Britoil share price had never 
risen above its issue price until the takeover bid.50
According to some accounts, BP had acquired as much as 80 per cent of the 
Britoil stock. With such a high acceptance rate by the shareholders, the government 
had little choice but to allow the sale to proceed.51 On the 23 February 1988, the 
Chancellor announced that the government would not use its veto power in exchange 
for certain assurances from BP regarding employment, exploration and development 
of Britoil’s assets, Britoil’s Glasgow base, and the composition of the Britoil 
board.52
3.3. The Sale of British Gas’ Oil Assets
The government faced its toughest opposition from BGC. Like BP, BGC was 
a large well-established company with the advantage of having a natural monopoly 
on gas. BGC had the benefit of having a strong and politically well connected 
chairman, Denis Rooke, who was determined to maintain BGC’s operations intact. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the BGC sales were different from the others. The 
government’s tactic was to strip away oil assets, leaving BGC’s gas-related 
organization and staff intact. The on-shore oil assets of Wytch Farm were sold to 
another company in a trade sale, while the off-shore assets were transformed into a 
new company, Enterprise Oil, and sold in a tender offer. Together, the sale o f these
50 Interview with Sir Philip Shelboume, 18 October 1991.
51 Interview with Sir Philip Shelboume, 18 October 1991.
52 Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, p.30; and Hansard Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons), 8 February 1988, vol. 127 col.34; and 23 February 1988, vol. 128, col. 149-60.
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assets accounted for roughly 10 per cent of total British oil production.53 To 
minimize Rooke’s power, Lawson appointed three new board members. He recalled: 
‘These three eminent businessmen could not be pushed around by anyone. They also 
kept me better informed than my officials were usually able to do.,54
Wytch Farm
The management delayed the sale of Wytch Farm for two years and seven 
months after the issue of the first directive, and it was in fact the longest o f all 
privatizations to be completed. The first oil asset sale did not need new legislation as 
the field under consideration, Wytch Farm, was an on-shore oil field and was covered 
under the 1972 Gas Act. The Act allowed the Secretary of State to direct the 
corporation ‘to dispose of any part of their undertaking or o f any assets held by 
them.’55 As with the BP sale, it was left to BGC to make the arrangements for the 
disposal. BGC invited tenders in July 1982. The management o f BGC argued against 
the sale publicly and privately and was unhelpful in the government’s efforts to gain 
information and slow to act on decisions. BGC estimated that Wytch Farm was worth 
£450 million, while Wood Mackenzie and Company, a stockbroker firm, gave an 
independent valuation of £165.5 million. The bids received reflected Wood 
Mackenzie’s estimate and did not exceed £160 million. BGC nevertheless argued that
53 Webb, ‘Energy Policy,’ p.33.
54 Lawson, The View from No.ll,  p. 214.
55 Gas Act 1972, Section 7.(2)(a); British Gas Corporation, Annual Report and Accounts, 
1981-82, p. 18; Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 13 March 1984, vol.56, col.354.
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a great loss would occur if the assets were sold so cheaply.56
They also argued that the government’s directive was a punishment for 
success. Since BGC discovered Wytch Farm itself, and because it was one of their 
most successful finds, they could not perceive legislative reasons why the government 
was forcing them to sell one of their most significant achievements.57 They argued 
that the sale would harm the national interest; specifically, the sale would damage 
BGC’s standing as a free partner in exploration and development for hydrocarbons; 
it would endanger BGC’s ability to bring a sufficient level o f expertise and knowledge 
to the negotiation of gas contracts; it would cost the taxpayers money because a 
forced sale was unlikely to realise the full value of the assets; and it would threaten 
environmental disruption as the buyer would not necessarily have the same high level 
of commitment to solving environmental problems as BGC.58
Despite BGC’s protests, Secretary of State for Energy, Nigel Lawson, told 
BGC in March 1983 that it would be commercially justifiable and in the national 
interest to proceed.59 BGC was ordered to sell its 50 per cent share in Wytch Farm 
to the Dorset Group, a consortium of five independent British companies. Due to 
complications, the sale did not go through until over a year later, in May 1984. The 
Group agreed to pay £85 million up front, and an additional £130 million when
56 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 13 March 1984, vol.56, col.340, col.344- 
6 and col.355; House of Commons Energy Select Committee, ‘Wytch Farm (Disposal of 
BGC Assets) Memorandum by British Gas Corporation,’ p.v and p.xxvii.
57 Jewers, ‘We’re Not As Different as Private Industry Thinks’; and James Erlichman, 
‘British Gas Exceeds Targets,’ Guardian, 10 June 1983.
58 House of Commons Energy Select Committee, ‘Wytch Farm (Disposal of BGC Assets) 
Memorandum by British Gas Corporation,’ p.xxi-xxii.
59 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 13 March 1984, vol.56, col.346.
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production reached 20,000 b/d (production was then under 4,500 b/d, but was 
predicted to reach 40,000 b/d.)60 The government’s costs for the sale were £98,388, 
but the cost to BGC was about £1.75 million, which was met out of the proceeds of 
the sale.61
Enterprise Oil
Like with Wytch Farm, BGC was opposed to the sale of their off-shore oil 
assets. Their biggest complaint was the loss of revenue without compensation. In the 
1984 Annual Report and Accounts, the company complained that the sale had ‘an 
adverse effect on its [BGC’s] financial position which will continue to be felt into the 
future.’62 At the same time, however, BGC was earning huge profits by this time 
which the government was having difficulty getting out of the corporation.63
Some of the problems the government faced in the Wytch Farm sale were 
meant to be overcome by the specific legislation in the 1982 Oil and Gas (Enterprise) 
Act which gave the Secretary of State for Energy clear authority to sell BGC’s off­
shore oil assets, Enterprise Oil. While the idea of a straight trade sale was initially 
considered, the option was rejected for three reasons.64 First, based on the
60 ‘Wytch Farm Sale Finalised,’ Petroleum Economist, June 1984, p.232.
61 TUC, Stripping Our Assets, p. 13; and Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 8 
June 1984, vol.61, col.306.
62 BGC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1984, p.5.
63 BGC, Annual Reports and Accounts, 1982-88; and interviews with Treasury civil 
servant and BGC executive.
64 Dominic Lawson, ‘The Management Page: Enterprise Oil - Built from the Top Down,’ 
Financial Times, 18 June 1984, p. 10; ‘The Lex Column: A Test for Free Enterprise,’ 
Financial Times, 28 June 1984, p.48; ‘A Setback for Privatisation,’ Financial Times, 29 June 
1984, p.22; and interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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assumption that the private bidder would have been an American company, the 
government feared a political reaction to a transfer of oil assets overseas.65 Second, 
the DEn saw the opportunity to create an independent British oil company.66 And 
third, tax benefits afforded by the operations’ oil exploration activities would accrue 
to the purchaser and would have reduced the Treasury’s net gain.67 Therefore, 
though several international companies approached the government to buy the blocks, 
they were turned down.68
A directive from the Secretary of State for Energy in August 1982 required 
BGC to dispose of its interests in five UKCS Blocks. These blocks were incorporated 
on 26 November 1982 under the name British Gas North Sea Oil Holdings Limited, 
and started trading on 1 May 1983, while remaining a subsidiary of BGC. In 
September 1983, all the directors of British Gas North Sea Oil Holdings Limited 
resigned, and ownership was transferred to the Secretary of State, without 
compensation to BGC. The name was changed to Enterprise Oil Limited, and two 
managers, one from the DEn, were appointed to run the company and create an 
infrastructure. In late October 1983, a second batch of BGC oil assets, interests in 20 
UKCS Blocks, were incorporated under the name British Gas North Sea Oil 
Exploration Acreage Limited. On 20 December 1983, these assets were acquired by 
Enterprise Oil but remained under the control of the Secretary of State for Energy, 
again without compensation to BGC. Enterprise was re-registered as a public
65 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; and Peter Riddell, ‘UK News: 
Whitehall Unshaken by Criticism of Enterprise Oil Sale,’ Financial Times, 5 July 1984, p.6.
66 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
67 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
68 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servant and business executive.
company in April 1984.69
As a privatization candidate and a new company, Enterprise Oil faced three 
risks. First, as pointed out in the prospectus, the 1983 Labour Party Conference had 
passed a resolution to re-nationalize Enterprise Oil.70 Second, while the oil business 
in general was risky, Enterprise Oil was in particular handicapped by the mature stage 
of its fields which were set to decline after 1987, and could not guarantee new 
discoveries.71 Thirdly, as a newly created company, Enterprise Oil had no track 
record.
These difficulties were addressed in a number o f ways. The government made 
it clear that they would have no continuing involvement in Enterprise following the 
sale offer, except as the holder of the ‘special share’. In all other respects the 
government confirmed that Enterprise Oil would be treated in the same way as any 
other private sector oil company.72 The new team set out a business strategy for 
Enterprise Oil which took into consideration Enterprise’s mature asset base. To give 
further credibility to the company, the government agreed to contribute the earnings 
from the fields since they began trading as an entity in May 1983, giving the
69 Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ by Kleinwort Benson Limited on behalf of the 
Secretary of State for Energy, September 1984, p.l and p. 19; British Gas Company, Annual 
Report and Accounts, 1984, p.5; and BGC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1982-83, p.5; Ray 
Dafter, ‘UK News: Enterprise Oil packaged for Sale,’ Financial Times, 26 October 1983, 
p. 10; and Enterprise Oil, Annual Report and Accounts, 1984, p.8.
70 Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ p.2; also interpreted and reported by the Financial
Times as a potential risk; and ‘The Lex Column: Reward Before Enterprise,’ Financial Times,
20 June 1984, p.21.
71 Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ p.35.
72 Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ p.2.
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company a significant cash resourcing, £70 million, with which to proceed.73 Lastly, 
although the company did not have a history, the government had been able to attract 
some qualified oil professionals with individual track records who in turn were able 
to set up a respected team. Enterprise did not have much trouble finding qualified 
personnel. Recent takeover victims such as Gulf and Getty provided a large pool from 
which to choose.74 At the end of 1983 there were only 8 employees; in June 1984 
there were 48, and by the end of 1984 there were 90 staff.75 Having agreed to the 
government’s objectives, given up their previous jobs and put their names on the 
prospectus, the management as well as the government had a stake in the success of 
Enterprise Oil as an independent entity.76
In the end another measure was added, a special share, to ensure the continued 
independence of Enterprise for a limited period. The share was held by the Secretary 
of State for Energy and was scheduled to be redeemed on 31 December 1988. With 
this special share, the government had the ability to out-vote all shareholders in the 
event any person sought to exercise or to control the exercise of more than 50 per 
cent of the voting shares.77 The Enterprise management saw the special share as a 
necessary protection for an immature company. In order to give the government’s
73 Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ pp.2-3; Dominic Lawson, ‘The Management Page: 
Enterprise Oil - Built from the Top Down,’ Financial Times, 18 June 1984, p. 10; and Ian 
Hargreaves, ‘UK News: Enterprise Oil Sizes Up Takeover Targets,’ Financial Times, 13 
December 1983, p.8.
74 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
75 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; and Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale,’
p.12.
76 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
77 Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ p.2 and p.43.
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policy of creating a new independent oil company the chance to work, the company
needed some breathing space from predators.78
Although nine paragraphs were devoted to the provisions of the Special share,
the circumstances in which it would be used were not clear. In fact, the government’s
intentions were stated more clearly in the Financial Times:
the only circumstances where the government would exercise its 
Golden Share powers would be if undesirable interests declared their 
intention of taking control. A straightforward build-up of shares in the 
company would not be legitimate grounds for government 
intervention.79
The proposed sale was well received by the City; the consensus was that 
Enterprise was worth the £520 million being tendered. By addressing the problems, 
spelling out the details in the prospectus and starting a promotional campaign, the 
new Enterprise Oil team overcame the potential price discounting sometimes 
encountered in the flotation of new companies.80 The issue was offered only in the 
United Kingdom, as the government was again sensitive to nationalistic feeling 
towards the North Sea. Enterprise, on the other hand, saw limiting the sale to Britain 
as a way of gaining favour with lenders in the City who they were sure to need in the 
future as the company required funds. There was, therefore, no company push to 
expand the offering to Europe or the United States.81
The entire shareholding in Enterprise Oil was sold on 27 June 1984; until then
78 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
79 Ian Hargreaves, ‘UK News: Takeover Protection for Enterprise Oil Until 1988,’ 
Financial Times, 14 June 1984, p.8.
80 Peter Riddell, ‘UK News: Whitehall Unshaken by Criticism of Enterprise Oil Sale,’ 
Financial Times, 5 July 1984, p.6.
81 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; Enterprise Oil, ’Offer for Sale.’
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sales of on-going companies had always carried out in parts. Though the government 
had addressed many difficulties, it could not control the inherent fluctuations in the 
oil industry. In this case, the collapse of the spot market price for crude oil two days 
before the offering pushed the short-term value o f the stock down. There was some 
discussion of delaying the issue, but there were too many forces moving the issue to 
the set date, including buyers having the funds available, the timeliness o f the 
prospectus and the government’s privatization timetable. Since the issue had been 
underwritten, Enterprise was guaranteed to be sold and the government was 
guaranteed its money. Only the underwriters stood to lose.82 The government 
received its £392 million for the sale, while the cost estimates ranged from £9 million 
by the government to £11 million by the National Accounting Office (NAO).83
Though the Treasury received its money, there were many problems brought 
on by the decision to proceed with the sale. Due to the uncertainty in the oil market, 
investors were cautious and failed to fully subscribe the issue. Interested stock 
brokers waited to buy shares on the open market which was sure to be lower than the 
underwritten price. In fact, only 66 per cent o f the shares were subscribed in the end. 
This provided a prime opportunity for a takeover bid, and just hours before the 
bidding closed, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ, the British based international mining and 
industrial group) subscribed to 49 per cent of the shares.84
The dilemma for the government was whether to support the principles of free
82 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
83 Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, p.34; ‘The Blackballing of RTZ,’ Economist, 7 July 
1984, p. 16; Mayer and Meadowcroft, ‘Selling Public Assets,’ p.48; TUC, Stripping Our 
Assets, p.25.
84 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, 
p.34.
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enterprise or to support the strategy of creating an independent British oil company. 
RTZ had sought only 49 per cent of the shares for fear of invoking the government’s 
special share, though 50 per cent had not been identified as a trigger.85 Alistar 
Frame, the chairman of RTZ, personally informed the Secretary of State for Energy, 
Peter Walker, of his company’s intentions that day. As a major mining company, 
Frame decided that it was not worth ruining RTZ’s relationship with the government 
with the takeover of Enterprise Oil.86 According to the Enterprise Oil management, 
Walker was furious anyway. Walker believed that government intentions were sacred. 
He was determined that Enterprise should remain an independent company, with the 
full concordance of Enterprise Oil’s executives.87
On June 28th, Walker announced that in keeping with the government’s 
objective to make Enterprise Oil an independent British oil company, no bidder would 
be allotted more than 10 per cent of the shares in the offer. The City underwriters 
were thus left with 73 per cent of the 210 million Enterprise shares.88 RTZ tried yet 
again with a dawn raid on 2 July 1984, when trading began for Enterprise Oil shares 
on the London Stock Exchange and acquired another 5 per cent. Free trading in the 
market and little investor interest in the shares meant that by July 1984 RTZ was able 
to acquire 29.9 per cent of the shares (the maximum allowed by law) on the open 
market for lp above the original offer price. Yet because of the government’s golden
85 ‘A Setback for Privatisation,’ Financial Times, 29 June 1984, p.22.
86 Interview with business executive.
87 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
88 Peter Riddell, Dominic Lawson and Stefan Wagstyl, ‘Government Limit on RTZ’s 
Enterprise Stake Angers City,’ Financial Times, 29 June 1984.
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share, RTZ lacked full control.89
The government’s efforts to intervene in the market while simultaneously 
affirming its belief in free market operations made it look inept. There was a strong 
case that RTZ, a well-managed international company, would be an ideal vehicle for 
expanding Britain’s presence in the world oil industry.90 The oil assets of RTZ were 
estimated to be only one third the size of those of Enterprise. Even with the combined 
assets, the RTZ oil company would not have been a dominant force in the North Sea 
compared to the majors.91 Enterprise, however, would have been controlled by a 
corporation larger than BGC with international interests, and thus a mere transfer of 
assets from one large corporation to another could have occurred. A takeover by RTZ 
was not acceptable to a government determined to have an independent British oil 
company - even if that was not what the free market offered. With the government 
preventing any further acquisition of Enterprise shares, RTZ decided in December 
1985 to transfer its holdings in Enterprise Oil to London and Scottish Marine Oil 
(LASMO) in exchange for a 25 per cent holding in LASMO.92
3.4. The Government’s Final BP Sale
Though BP was not always considered a nationalized industry and therefore 
not truly part of the government’s privatization programme, it proved useful to the
89 Peter J. Curwen, Public Enterprise: A Modern Approach (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1986), pp. 184-5; and ‘The Blackballing of RTZ,’ Economist, 7 July 1984, p. 16.
90 ‘A Setback for Privatisation,’ Financial Times, 29 June 1984, p.22.
91 Dominic Lawson, ‘RTZ Bids to Lift Enterprise Oil Stake to 29.9%,’ Financial Times, 
3 July 1984, p. 1.
92 Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, p.34.
94
government in that context again in 1987. As Nigel Lawson explained:
The postponement of the water flotation in July 1986 had created a gap 
in the privatization timetable, and I had announced in March 1987 that 
it would be replaced with the sale of the government’s remaining 31.5 
per cent shareholding in BP.93
The last BP sale was publicly described as part of the government’s policy to sell its
minority shareholdings in companies as and when circumstances permitted.94 The
government offered BP a golden share, but was turned down, leaving BP as one of
the few privatized companies without one.95
On the crest of a booming stock market, the government decided to sell all of
its remaining shares, against the advice of BP, who argued that three tranches would
be more sensible, especially as the company needed to,raise more capital themselves
through a share issue. One BP executive explained:
We didn’t believe the market had the capacity easily to accept all those 
shares. I don’t think even they [ministers] would have tried to do it 
except that we had such a raging boom. BP shares were up to 440p.
We would have much preferred three tranches. We decided to offer a 
new issue, and ride the back of the government. We needed to do a 
rights issue; it was just tactics that we did it with the government. The 
banking advice at the time was if you want to do it, you need to wrap 
it all up and package it together. So we had to shift, being faced with 
a dead ‘no’ from the Lady - she was going to sell the whole lot. Then, 
if  they believe they can sell, and the bankers believe it, why not get 
our rights issue too.96
The combined shares made the £7 billion issue the largest ever attempted in the
93 Lawson, The View from N o.ll, p. 757.
94 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 18 March 1987, vol. 112, col. 1011; Peter 
Riddell and Max Wilkinson, ‘Government to Sell BP Stake,’ Financial Times, 19 March 
1987, p.l.
95 Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser, ‘Golden Shares: Industrial Policy By Stealth?’ 
Public Law, Autumn 1988, p.429.
96 Interview with BP executive.
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London market.97
Another early point of conflict between BP and the government over the sale 
was over the sale’s geographical allocation of shares. BP’s strategic plan included 
geographical diversification of share ownership, with the goal of having 10 per cent 
of the shares held outside Britain by the end of 1987. In contrast, the government’s 
policy objective was to maximize British equity ownership. The government also 
realized that the inclusion of the United States market would ensure the largest return 
for the Exchequer; and in the end the government allocated over 24 per cent to the 
United States market, 8 per cent to Japan, and 5 per cent each to Canada and 
Europe.98
The government sold 2,194 million BP shares in October 1987. Of these, 
1,850 million were the government’s remaining 31% stake in the company and the 
remaining 459 million were new share issues by BP. On 15 October, the government 
announced the fixed price of 330p per share, (to be paid in three instalments, the first 
being 120p), which was just before the October stock market crash. Between the 14th 
and 27th of October, the Financial Times ordinary share index fell by 28 per cent, 
and the BP share price dropped 26 per cent, from 35 lp to 259p. The final date for 
applications for the government’s offer was 28 October at which point only 70 million 
shares were applied for, 3 per cent of the total. Because the issue was underwritten, 
the government again received its full £5.5 billion; and because the government had
97 Lucy Kellaway, Philip Stephens and Max Wilkinson, ‘BP Seeks £1.5 Billion In Offer 
Linked to Privatisation,’ Financial Times, 22 July 1987, p.l; and Hansard Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), 21 July 1987, and 21-9 October 1987; Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, 
pp.53-5.
98 ‘The Lex Column: BP / Comment on Plans to Internationalise Shareholder Base,’ 
Financial Times, 30 January 1987, p.36.
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bought BP’s new issue shares outright, BP itself received £1.5 billion. The £114 
million fee to the underwriters, though large, was worthwhile in this case as virtually 
all (97 per cent) of the shares were held by underwriters: 1,179 million shares in 
Britain, 506 million shares in the United States, 160 million shares in Japan and 105 
million shares each in Canada and Europe. The £23.1 million spent on advertising, 
however, had virtually no effect in the wake of the market crash.99
The decision to sell shares in the United States caused an unforeseen problem. 
Underwriters in the United States do not normally spread the risk of an issue to sub­
underwriters, so for the BP issue four American underwriters bore the whole o f the 
disaster themselves. The Americans, therefore, were understandably the ones who put 
the most pressure on the British government to withdraw the issue.100 Bending to 
pressure from the underwriters, the government finally agreed via the Bank of 
England to provide a floor price of 70p for the partly paid shares (compared to the 
partly paid flotation price o f 120p per share.) The Bank only had to buy back 38 
million shares because the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) purchased most of the 
outstanding BP shares at a few pence above the floor price. By November 1987 KIO 
had accumulated a 10 per cent stake in BP (nearly 600 million shares), but the KIO 
gave the government assurances that it was buying the shares only as an investment, 
and that it had no ambitions to control BP. By May 1988, though, KIO’s stake had
99 Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, pp.53-5; Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
21 July 1987, and 21-9 October 1987; Clive Wolman, ‘Underwriting Change for State 
Industry Flotations,’ Financial Times, 8 September 1988, p.6; Gareth David, ‘City Floats 
Toward £1 Billion Sell-off Fees,’ Sunday Times, 4 December 1988; and Maurice Samuelson, 
‘Share Advertising Cost £23 Million,’ Financial Times, 22 January 1988, p.7.
100 Max Wilkinson and Richard Tomking, ‘Out of the Valley of Death But Only Just,’ 
Financial Times, 31 October 1987, p.6.
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risen to 22 per cent o f BP shares.101
The government faced a difficult problem: Should it allow the free-market to 
work or should it interfere and prevent a foreign entity from buying and controlling 
Britain’s largest oil company? Instead of legislating, the government chose a less 
public route of referring the issue to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC).102 On October 4, 1988 the MMC ordered KIO to reduce its holdings in BP 
from 21.69 per cent to 9.9 per cent. Kuwait responded with threats of retaliation 
against the British government both financially and diplomatically, and also against 
British individuals, banks and companies. The Kuwait government stated that it would 
‘take all necessary steps to protect Kuwait’s economic interests in Britain.’ Kuwait 
had investments of $85 billion (£50 billion) overseas, and one fifth o f that was in 
Britain.103
BP was particularly concerned over how KIO would dispose of the shares. 
Although the British government extended the deadline for the reduction from one 
year to three, there was still a fear that KIO would dump the shares on the market or 
worse, sell them to another company who might then vie for a takeover.101 In
101 Ivan Owen, ‘Parliament and Politics, Kinnock in Clash Over BP Holdings,’ Financial 
Times, 20 November 1987; Fraser and Wilson, Privatization, pp.55-6; and Hansard 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 27-9 October 1987, 3-26 November 1987, 12-26 January
1988, 5-8 February, 4-20 May 1988, 27 October 1988, 7 December 1988, and 1 February
1989.
102 Interview with BP executive.
103 Christopher Walker, ‘Kuwaiti Press Hits at BP Stake Order,’ Financial Times, 7 
October 1988, p.25; and ‘Kuwait "Astonished" over BP’ Financial Times, 10 October 1988, 
p.25.
104 ‘Two Extra Years for KIO to Cut BP Stake,’ Financial Times, 17 December 1988, 
p. 17; and Max Wilkinson and Richard Jones, ‘Kuwait Defies British Government By Lifting 
BP Stake Above 20%,’ Financial Times, 12 March 1988, p.l.
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January 1989, when KIO proposed a buy-back formula, BP was eager to accept. The 
government was kept informed, but was not a party to these negotiations. 
Nonetheless, in the final agreement, the government made a substantial contribution: 
BP agreed to buy back KIO’s 11.7 per cent stake for £1.95 billion, and the 
government provided a refund o f £458 million to KIO on Advance Corporation Tax 
payable on the sale of shares. KIO received 305p per share, 50p above the current 
BP share price, and made 16p per share profit at a time when other share holders 
were still suffering a loss from the 1987 sale.105
The sale was a boost to BP’s independence, one of the BP management’s 
primary objectives. Its chairman, Sir Peter Walters, told shareholders that the 
purchase of KIO’s shares would remove any fears amongst potential investors that BP 
could have been influenced by a major shareholder which was also a member of 
OPEC.106 Once through this crisis, the BP management sought to distance itself 
again from the British government and present itself as a truly international 
company.107
Conclusion
This chapter set out the specifics of how the British government sold its 
majority holding in BP, Britoil, Wytch Farm and Enterprise Oil in the space of 10 
years, raising £8.5 billion against a minimum cost o f £224 million. As the oil assets
105 ‘Big Kuwait Profit From BP Shares’, Financial Times, 4 January 1989, p.l; and ‘BP 
Pays Kuwait £1.95 Billion for Stake,’ Financial Times, 4 January 1989, p. 19.
106 ‘Shareholders Support BP Buy Back,’ Financial Times, 1 February 1989, p.25.
107 ‘BP to Give Investors Details of Revamp,’ Financial Times, 30 January 1989, p.21.
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were some of the government’s first privatizations, the process was a learning one, 
particularly regarding the extent to which the nationalized industry management would 
oppose the sales, the importance of safeguards such as independent pricing and 
underwriting, and the uncertainty of the markets. In the next four chapters, I examine 
the underlying reasons why the government sold these oil assets.
100
\Chapter Four; Constraints and Opportunities Presented by the
International System
Aggregate power-structure models developed by realists emphasize the 
importance of states’ interests and argue that these interests are determined by the 
state’s position in the international system. From these interests, the models predict 
the general behaviour of states.1 These models, however, are too crude to predict 
specific domestic policy decisions. To predict more particular national policies, some 
scholars have developed models that disaggregate by issues. For example, David Lake 
in Power, Protection and Free Trade argues that: ‘by examining the international 
economic structure, the position of a country within it, and the changes in the 
structure over time, it is possible to explain and predict trade strategies. *2 Rather than 
using the realists* premise that the state is a homogeneous rational actor with 
definable interests and seeing policy outcomes as the direct result of a state’s position 
in the international system, I view the state as a complex entity composed of 
individuals and institutions, and the state’s position as one that determines a set of 
parameters to policy decisions. From this perspective, international factors determine 
only a range o f policy options available to politicians. A  strong position increases the
1 Robert Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics,* in Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and 
Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 180-9; Waltz, The Theory of 
International Politics; and Joseph Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist 
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,* International Organization, Vol.42, No.3, 
Summer 1988.
2 Lake, Power, Protection and Free Trade, pp.29-40; also see Charles Kindleberger, 
‘Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods and 
Free Rides, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.25, June 1981, pp.249-51; Robert Gilpin, 
U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct 
Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975) p.22; and Stephen D. Krasner, ‘State Power and 
the Structure of International Trade,’ World Politics, Vol. 28, April 1976, p.323.
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options available to policy makers, while a weak position limits the alternatives 
politicians can feasibly pursue. Other intervening variables narrow that range in a way 
that cannot be predicted from international variables alone.
Borrowing from the aggregate and disaggregate models, I develop a two 
variable construct to illustrate this view of the international system (see Figure 4.1.).
Figure 4.1. A Country’s  International Position
International Issue Position
i L strong
International political position International factors do not
lim its policy options lim it policy options
0 4 Q 1
weak Q 3 Q 2 strong
International factors 
almost completely lim it 
policy options
International Issue position 
lim its policy options
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r
Overall
Power
Figure 4.1.
The first variable, a country’s overall power position, is an aggregate variable which 
measures the state’s overall power in the international arena. Though there are many 
definitions for power, in this case I use Susan Strange’s meaning where a state’s 
power is determined by its ability to set the agenda and design international rules and 
customs. It includes four aspects of control: security, production, credit and
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knowledge.3 These can be operationalized using indexes of country’s military 
expenditure, GNP per capita, allocation of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and 
rate o f literacy. In these graphs I use measures for 1978.4
The second dimension, a sector specific economic variable, measures a 
country’s position in a specific issue area. The key factor which determines a state’s 
international issue position is the state’s position in that sector relative to other 
countries.5 For oil, I suggest this can be measured by the country’s level of 
production as a percentage of world total.6 For finance, I propose this can be 
measured as the sum of a country’s total reserves and central government revenue.7
The stronger the country is in terms of the specific economic issue and the 
more powerful the state, the more options are available to the state’s policy makers 
and the less susceptible they are to international forces.8 In this case, domestic 
factors play a greater role in determining outcomes (quadrant 1). Conversely, the 
weaker the state’s position, the fewer policy options are available and the more its
3 Susan Strange, States and Markets, pp.25-7. The definition of power is highly 
contentious issue as there are many aspects, including short term and long term power as well 
as structural and relational power. Strange’s definition is meant to be used as a first 
approximation.
4 Charles Lewis Taylor and David Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators, Volume I , Third Edition (London: Yale University Press, 1983), Tables 1.6, 3.6, 
C-39 and 5.3.
5 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); and Lake, Power, Protection 
and Free Trade, pp.29-30.
6 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 1990.
7 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington, 
DC: IMF, 1986).
8 Edward Morse, Modernization and Transformation of International Relations as 
discussed in Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed,’ p.892.
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policy makers are constrained by international factors (quadrant 3). When a state’s 
position is weak either in overall power or on a specific economic issue, the policy 
options available are limited unless the strength o f the state’s stronger position 
compensates to provide additional options or alternatives (quadrants 2 and 4). 
Inevitably, economic and political issues are linked and reinforce each other, and 
OPEC serves as one such example of this. It is important to note, then, that Figure 
4.1 is used only as an analytical framework.
Examples for specific issues and countries from 1976 and 1980 help to 
illustrate the relative strengths and weaknesses o f different countries’ positions. On
the issue o f oil, Figure 4.2. A Country’s International Oil Position
Britain’s position was International Oil Position
strong in 1980 because * Saudi
1 strong
• us
its own oil production
• Mexico
was increasing and Q 4 • UK Overall
Q 1 r  PnwAr
would soon surpass 
domestic consumption.
weak Q 3 Q 2  strong Position
• Germany 
* Japan
With its substantial
* Bangladesh
weak
f
overall power position,
Britain was well placed in terms of sovereignty over its oil policy (quadrant 1). 
Britain’s options were limited only by the countries with a stronger international 
position, in this example, the United States. Saudi Arabia was also in a strong oil 
position as the world’s largest oil producer, but was not as strong overall power 
position as Britain (quadrant 2). Conversely, Germany had more overall power, but, 
as a major oil consumer with no domestic supplies, was weaker in terms o f oil and
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had few options in terms of oil policy and fewer means to influence other countries 
(quadrant 2). Mexico, Japan and Bangladesh were all weaker, both in overall power 
and in terms o f oil than Britain and therefore were virtually unable to influence 
Britain’s oil policy.
Turning to the 
international financial 
issue, due to severe 
balance of payments 
problem s Britain’s 
finance position in 1976 
was not as strong as its 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  
position (see Figure 
4.3). Britain’s overall power position remained the same but, its international finance 
position had deteriorated so that Britain was barely remained in quadrant l . 9 British 
policy makers were therefore more limited in their policy options in terms o f finance 
than oil. This difference is obvious when the positions of the world’s strongest 
financial countries are compared. Because of their strong position, Germany and the 
United States were the most able to influence British government policy decisions, 
with possibly some influence coming from Japan which was in a stronger financial 
situation but slightly weaker overall power position. Saudi Arabia, Mexico and
9 Because this label may raise the broader image of Britain as the home to one of the 
world’s financial capitals, the 6 ty  of London, it is important to note that the definition of 
financial position here refers only to the government’s reserves and revenues, not the size of 
the country’s private financial industry.
Figure 4.3. A Country
International Fin
Q 4
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*8 International Finance Position
ance Position 
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* Germany
* Japan
* UK Overall
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weak q 9 
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Bangladesh were not influences due to their relatively much weaker positions 
(quadrants 3 and 4).
From this view, we would expect the international financial situation and the 
structure o f the oil industry to have affected British politician’s decision to sell their 
country’s oil assets. One of the major criticism o f realists (and neo-realists) is that the 
importance o f international organizations is not taken into account. Neo-liberals argue 
that international organizations and regimes play a substantial role in shaping the 
international system and states’ options.10 Incorporating this view, I also explore the 
extent membership in international organizations influenced the British government’s 
decision to sell its oil assets.
4.1. International Financial Pressure on Britain
The importance o f the world economy on domestic policy making is generally 
recognized. Andrew Gamble stresses its impact on Britain in the late 1970s and 
1980s:
Of overriding importance in shaping domestic policy in recent years 
have been events in the world economy. From this perspective there 
have been so far two crucial phases in the life o f the Thatcher 
government, determined by the slump in the world economy between 
1979 and 1982, and then by the recovery between 1982 and 1987.11
Other scholars confirm the importance o f the world economic situation on British
policy making in this period,12 as did the civil servants and politicians I
10 Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1985).
11 Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics o f Thatcherism 
(London: Macmillan Education, 1988), p.98.
12 Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State: Vol. 3, End of the Postwar Era: 
Britain Since 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1991) p.6, pp.241-2 and pp.273-4.
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interviewed.13 The world recession was such an all encompassing factor, though, 
that it is difficult to determine whether it was the primary cause of different outcomes 
such as privatization. In general, it is agreed that the world recession was a 
contributing factor to countries’ deficits by increasing demands for public spending, 
as well as decreasing government tax revenue. This background pressure was one of 
the reasons why privatization emerged on national agendas throughout the world.14 
Its specific effect was apparent on Britain’s financial situation and the ensuing IMF 
crisis in 1976-77. As one Treasury civil servant stated: the impetus for the BP sales 
‘really started with the 1973-74 recession followed by the 1974-75 Labour 
spending.’15
The civil servants and politicians that I interviewed agreed that the government 
would not have sold a 17 per cent shareholding in BP in 1977 if  the IMF had not 
imposed strict conditions on its loan to Britain in 1976.16 So it is important to 
understand why the IMF became involved, why the IMF focused on the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and, critically, why an asset sale was accepted as 
negative spending. The details o f the 1976 IMF crisis in Britain have been well
13 Interview with Treasury civil servant; also see Lawson, The View from N o .ll, p.34, 
pp.89-93 and p.245.
14 Jeffrey Henig, Chris Hamnett and Harvey Feigenbaum, ‘The Politics of Privatization: 
A Comparative Perspective,’ Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration, 
Vol.l, No.4, October 1988, pp.445-7.
15 Interview with Treasury civil servant.
16 Interviews with Department of Energy and Treasury civil servants; and Nick Gardner, 
Decade of Discontent, The Changing British Economy Since 1973 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987), p.91.
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documented elsewhere,17 although I draw on first hand interviews to supplement 
these analyses.
Britain was forced to go to the IMF after experiencing large and successive 
balance of payments deficits and failing to repay a six month loan to the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS, the central bank of Central Banks). Both the BIS and 
the IMF were heavily influenced by their largest donors, the United States and 
Germany, who felt that Britain’s economic problems were deeper than a temporary 
insufficient cash flow. They therefore wanted the ‘excesses and lack o f scruples’ 
corrected and structured the IMF agreements to achieve that end.18 While it is 
generally accepted that Britain had no alternative to the IMF loan, many, including 
Prime Minister James Callaghan, initially thought that the government could persuade 
the IMF through its leading members to lessen the severity of the conditions imposed. 
Callaghan was initially bolstered by gestures o f support from Germany and the United 
States, but ultimately, both gave their full backing to the IMF plan.19
The United States and the other industrialized countries had a self-interest in
17 Kathleen Burk and Alec Caimcross, 'Goodbye Great Britain,’ The 1976 IMF Crisis 
(London: Yale University Press, 1992); Kendall W. Stiles, Negotiating Debt, The IMF 
Lending Process (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991); and de Vries, The International Monetary 
Fund. As well as individuals’ accounts: Barnett, Inside the Treasury; Benn, Conflict of 
Interest and Against the Tide; Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1974-76 (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989); Edmund Dell, A Hard Pounding: Politics and Economic 
Crisis 1974-76 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Healey, The Time of My Life; Leo 
Pliatsky, Getting and Spending: Public Expenditure, Employment and Inflation (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984); and Bernard Donoughue, Prime Minister, The Conduct of Policy Under 
Harold Wilson and James Callaghan (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1987).
18 Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, pp. 151-4; and Stiles, Negotiating Debt, 
pp. 140-1.
19 Burk and Caimcross, 'Goodbye Great Britain,’ p.62, p.80, p . I l l  and p. 115; 
Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, p. 154; ‘The Chancellor Proposes, the Cabinet 
Hopes it Disposes...But Markets Will Decide,* Economist, 4 December 1976, p. 16; and 
Stiles, Negotiating Debt, p. 130.
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their concern for Britain’s policies. There was a high degree o f interdependence 
linking the welfare of Britain with the other industrialized countries. These links were 
embodied in institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the European Community (EC). The international role o f sterling meant that a 
currency collapse would cause great financial instability which in turn could have 
been harmful to all the industrialized (and British Commonwealth) economies.20 The 
importance to the international community of improving Britain’s creditworthiness is 
therefore understandable, as is the pressure coming from those countries and 
organizations most able to influence Britain.
What is not as obvious, however, is why the level of the PSBR was seen as 
a crucial target in financial markets and the IMF boardroom when the actual problem 
was the balance of payments. The way that the PSBR dominated all other targets in 
discussions is illustrated in the letter o f intent from Chancellor Denis Healey to the 
IMF, in which he refers to the PSBR in eleven out o f twenty-five paragraphs. The 
next most discussed economic factor, mentioned in seven paragraphs, was public 
spending, a target closely related to the PSBR.21 Civil servants in the Treasury 
suggest that the PSBR was not a dominant policy variable until the IMF intervened 
in 1976.22
Why then did the IMF demand attention to the PSBR target? In part the 
answer lies in the practicalities of Britain’s situation, and in part in the IMF’s
20 Stiles, Negotiating Debt, pp. 143-44.
21 Denis Healey, Letter of Intent, as printed in Burk and Caimcross, 'Goodbye Great 
B r ita in Appendix, p.229.
22 Interviews with Treasury civil servants.
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monetarist approach. The common financial market and international political view  
of Britain’s economic problems was that they were the result o f inflation and 
continued deficit spending. Britain’s public spending was growing faster than in any 
other European country, and the rate of inflation was the highest in Europe, except 
for Italy.23 Britain’s creditors became reluctant to lend in sterling for fear that the 
value o f their loans would depreciate due to inflation.24 The excessive spending of 
the British government was obvious to the IMF team in 1976. The accounts of the 
crisis convey direct approaches and solutions; no one mentioned formal theory or 
doctrinaire solutions.25 Thus, the focus on the size of the PSBR can be justified as 
a visible indicator o f the government’s economic problems.
One problem with the interpretation that the IMF saw the PSBR as the cause 
of Britain’s problems is that it does not explain why the IMF allowed countries to 
adopt ‘easy* measures to decrease the PSBR. Jacques Polak o f the IMF defines easy 
measures as those that are not durable or have widely varying effects on the growth 
of the economy and the fiscal situation in the medium term.26 In addition to the sale 
of BP shares to offset spending, there are three other examples o f the British 
government choosing easy measures. First, the government altered the financing of 
the nationalized industries, for example by raising British Gas* prices and reducing
23 OECD statistics quoted in Burk and Caimcross, 'Goodbye Great Britain,' pp.223-4.
24 Donoughue, Prime Minister, p.66.
23 De Vries, The International Monetary Fund; Healey, The Time of My Life, p.412; 
Callaghan, Time and Chance, p.419 andp.436; Barnett, Inside the Treasury, pp.97-111; Dell, 
A Hard Pounding, pp.248-272; Bernard Donoughue, ‘The Conduct of Economic Policy, 
1974-79,’ in Anthony King, ed., The British Prime Minister, Second Edition (London: 
Macmillan, 1985), p.66; and interview with Treasury civil servant.
26 Jacques Polak, ‘The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality,* Essays in International 
Finance, No. 184, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, September 1991, p.39.
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the company’s capital expenditure by £100 million. Second, the capital expenditure 
for BNOC was excluded from the public expenditure totals because they were a 
‘special case’ according to the Secretary of State.27 Third, the Treasury made three 
major changes in the definition o f public expenditure in 1977 which reduced the ratio 
of public expenditure to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1975-76 from 60 per cent 
to 46 per cent.28
The IMF officials’ emphasis on the PSBR target may be better explained by 
their belief in monetarism which emphasizes achieving targets rather than how they 
are achieved. The IMF and most o f the international financial community turned to 
monetary policy when the United States abandoned the gold standard in 1971 which 
caused the global system of fixed exchange rates to deteriorate, giving governments 
more discretion over monetary policy. Because monetary policy works primarily 
through exchange rates and current accounts, it tends to become the more powerful 
instrument for demand management in a free float system.29
The IMF was particularly receptive to the use of monetary policy because it 
had found that in many countries monetary data had proved the most accurate and 
most readily available of all economic data.30 The evidence from other cases o f IMF 
intervention suggests that the IMF did indeed emphasize this visible indicator in
27 Interviews with BGC executives; and Pliatsky, Getting and Spending, p. 146.
28 Peter Browning, The Treasury and Economic Policy 1964-1985 (London: Longman,
1986), pp.232-3.
29 N.F.R.Crafts and N.W.C.Woodward, ‘Introduction and Overview,* in N.F.R.Crafts 
and N.W.C.Woodward, eds., The British Economy Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), p. 14; Michael Burda and Charles Wyplosz, Macroeconomics, A European Text 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.219 and pp.223-4; and Burk and 
Caimcross, *Good-bye Great Britain, ' p. 143.
30 Polak, ‘The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality,* p.34.
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general. In a survey of 105 IMF programs from 1969 to 1978, nearly four-fifths 
included specific clauses in the agreements to limit the national government’s 
borrowing, mostly by limiting their use o f bank credit. Even the countries without 
specific clauses made policy statements citing their intentions, all o f which included 
deficit levels and deficit financing targets.31 The IMF has consistently focused on 
borrowing as a means of control across countries since 1969. In addition, in previous 
cases o f IMF intervention in Britain, controlling public spending was always 
emphasized.32
Because monetary policy was accepted in the markets, there was an aspect of 
a self-fulfilling prophecy in reaching an agreement with the IMF using monetary 
targets. If world financial markets believed that the British economy was stronger by 
achieving certain targets, creditors would be more willing to lend to the government 
and the immediate balance o f payments crisis would be solved. The IMF itself 
acknowledges the impact of its ‘seal of approval.*33 This is in fact what happened 
in Britain’s case: once the IMF loan and conditions were put in place, there was a 
quick restoration of the pound’s value. The ease with which Britain attracted foreign
31 Only a few of the clauses though incorporated specific targets for the government’s 
budget deficit or borrowing requirement. The survey did not include the 1976 British case. 
W. A. Beveridge and Margaret Kelly, ‘Fiscal Content of Financial Programs Supported by 
Stand-By Arrangements in the Upper Credit Tranches, 1969-78,’ IMF Staff Papers, Vol.27, 
No.2, June 1980, pp.220-1.
32 See letters of intent from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Managing Director 
of the IMF: 23 November 1967, para 10, and measures announced 18 November 1967; 22 
June 1969, para 5, 6 and 7. As quoted in Susan Strange, International Monetary Relations 
as Vol.2 of Andrew Shonfield, ed., International Economic Relations of the Western World, 
1959-1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 166-172.
33 Polak, ‘The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality,* p.22.
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exchange in 1977 indicates that much o f the original problem was one of 
perception.34
It was IMF policy to let governments decide how specific targets should be 
met.35 When the Cabinet decided to sell a portion of its BP shares, the Treasury 
decided to treat the sale receipts not as revenue, but as negative public expenditure. 
(For further description of the Cabinet’s deliberations, see Chapter Three.) Treasury 
ministers confirmed that the IMF did not query this accounting practice.36 One 
Treasury civil servant pointed out that the IMF officials ‘were the ones so concerned 
about the targets that they didn’t have much room to argue.’37 The IMF has since 
changed its practice o f non-interference in the detail, Jacques Polak explains, because 
governments tend to choose easy remedies, the outcomes can be ‘ineffective and 
indeed counterproductive.’38 As the IMF became more supportive o f privatization, 
it narrowed the range of acceptable accounting practices. Sale proceeds are now 
required to be considered as loan repayments, whereas previously asset sales could 
also be used to off-set spending.39
Taken in isolation, the 1977 sale o f BP shares is neither complicated nor
34 Stiles, Negotiating Debt, p. 142; and de Vries, The International Monetary Fund, p.463 
and p.476.
35 Beveridge and Kelly, ‘Fiscal Content of Financial Programs,* p.205; Polak, ‘The 
Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality,* p.39; Pliatsky, Getting and Spending, p. 148; and 
interviews with Treasury civil servants.
36 Interviews with Treasury civil servant and ministers.
37 Interview with Treasury civil servant.
38 Polak, ‘The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality,* p.39.
39 International Monetary Fund, Manual on Government Finance Statistics (Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund, 1977 and 1986); and Ali Mansoor, ‘Budgetary Impact of 
Privatization,’ IMF Working Paper, 15 October 1987, p.2.
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necessarily even very interesting. However, because the sale was successful in 
enabling the British government to meet its IMF agreed targets, it set an important 
precedent. The success was reinforced by the IMF as it became an advocate of 
privatization. Although the privatization concept was little used before 1983, from 
1984 to 1990, privatization was a condition for an IMF loan in at least 15 
countries.40 While Britain did not have to return to the IMF for loans in the 1980s, 
credibility in the world economy remained important. Thus, the acceptability of 
privatization proceeds by the IMF as government revenues made it an attractive 
option in the future.
Why the 1976 crisis was the first to lead to privatization needs further 
examination. Britain experienced repeated sterling crises after WWH (1947, 1949, 
1951, 1955, 1957, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1975 and 1976),41 most stemming from 
balance o f payments deficits, and yet the only sterling crisis that produced an asset 
sale was in 1976. Why did the 1976 crisis result in an asset sale when the others did 
not? Britain had owned BP since 1914, and it could have sold shares on any o f the 
previous occasions. In fact, the government had an offer to sell AIOC during the 
period 1953-57 (see Chapter Two), which coincided with the sterling crises o f 1955 
and 1957, and yet government ministers at that time decided not to sell its 
shareholding. Britain’s finance position can therefore explain why an asset sale in 
general became an attractive policy option but cannot explain why ministers selected
40 This number was compiled by a search on the Profile computer data base using the 
Economist and the Financial Times, searching for all articles containing IMF and 
privatization. This search revealed 15 different cases where privatization was part of the 
conditions for IMF loans; also see Chapman, Selling the Family Silver, p.7.
41 Burk and Caimcross, 'Good-bye Great Britain,9 p.5.
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the option at one opportunity and not another or why they chose to sell oil rather than 
other assets.
4.2. Britain’s Changing International Oil Position
Though oil has been an international currency since the 1950s, if  not earlier, 
much of the reason why oil was an attractive asset to sell in the late 1970s and 1980s 
is explained by the changes in the structure o f the international oil industry, 
particularly the rise of OPEC, the discovery and development o f new sources o f oil, 
and the transition o f the industry from control by an oligopoly to a market driven 
industry. Oil assets have in fact been a common choice for asset sales throughout the 
world, including France, Argentina, Malaysia and Portugal.42
The Changing Structure of the International Oil Industry
The history of the oil industry consists o f three distinct eras. As these are 
broader and have different implications than the periods o f British government 
intervention in the oil industry, they are important to review here briefly. The first, 
from 1900 into the 1960s, was the era of the oligopoly o f private oil companies, the 
majors.43 Second, during the 1960s and 1970s, was the era o f the oligopoly of 
Middle East oil producing countries, OPEC. Though brief, this second era was
42 Alice Rawsthom and David Buchan, ‘French Left-Overs on the Block,* Financial 
Times, 27 May 1993, p.23; ‘Financial Times Survey: Portuguese Industry,* Financial limes, 
14 November 1983; John Barham, ‘International Company News: Argentina Sells Energy 
Group in Three Units,* Financial limes, 12 July 1993, p. 19; and Victor Mallet, ‘Survey of 
Malaysia,* Financial Times, 28 August 1992, p.VI.
43 The ‘majors’ or Seven Sisters as they were also known included Jersey (Exxon), 
Socony-Vacuum (Mobil), Standard of California (Chevron), Texaco, Gulf, Royal Dutch/Shell 
and BP. There was also an eighth sister, the French national oil company, CFP.
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significant as the impetus for the transition from the first to the third era. And the 
third, the late 1970s to the present, is the era o f the free market. I review each period 
briefly before considering the implications for the British government’s ownership o f 
oil assets.
Following the break up o f the Standard Oil trust in 1911, the resulting 
American companies along with BP and Shell sought to control the oil industry 
through formal agreements signed in 1928 and 1934.44 W hile the smaller oil 
companies looked upon the agreements as a conspiracy, the United States and British 
governments supported the arrangements.45 The dominance o f the major international 
oil companies held through the 1950s and 1960s. As shown in Figure 4 .4 ., the majors 
owned 98.2 per cent o f world crude oil production outside o f the United States and 
the communist countries in 1950.
Control o f the industry by a few large companies ensured sufficient supply was 
produced and was distributed evenly during crises. This was especially important 
during the two World Wars.46 International oil sharing measures were necessary to 
ensure supplies to Britain and all the members o f the wartime alliances. The inclusion 
o f Standard Oil and Shell, however, were what really made the system work, and vast
44 Raymond Vernon, Two Hungary Giants: the United States and Japan in the Quest for 
Oil and Ores (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp.20-1; Yergin, The 
Prize, p.204 and p.264; and McBeth, British Oil Policy 1919-1939, pp.76-7 and pp. 106-7.
45 Yergin, The Prizey p.260 and p.266; and McBeth, British Oil Policy 1919-1939, pp.76- 
7 and pp. 106-11.
46 Lesser, Resources and Strategy, p.43 and pp.78-91; McBeth, British Oil Policy 1919- 
1939, p.25; Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), pp.287-97; 
Yergin, The Prize, pp.319-23 and pp.362-395; and Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the 
International System (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p.39.
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Middle East. There was
thus room to accommodate competition from the 300 private companies and 50 state- 
owned companies who either entered the international market or expanded their 
participation in it from 1953 to 1972.48 The sheer size of the industry can be seen 
from the investment required in the post World War II period. From 1955 to 1970, 
the industry spent $100 billion in exploration and development of oil, and a further 
$115 billion to produce and distribute it.49 The competition, including increased 
production from the Soviet Union, contributed to falling oil prices through the 1960s. 
But it also cut into the majors’ control of world crude oil production which, by 1982, 
had fallen to less than 30 per cent of world crude production compared to 69 per cent
47 The United States supplied 80% of the Allies wartime oil requirements, Yergin, The 
Prize, pp. 177-78; and Ferrier, The History o f  the British Petroleum Company, pp.235-7.
48 Neil H. Jacoby, Multinational Oil: A Study in Industrial Dynamics (London: Collier 
Macmillan, 1974), p. 120; Yannis Stourharas, Are Oil Price Movements Perverse!: A Critical 
Explanation o f  Oil Price Levels 1950-1985 (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,
1985), pp. 11-5; Brian Levy, ‘World Oil Marketing in Transition,’ International Organization, 
Vol.36, N o .l, Winter 1982, pp.116-9.
49 Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil, the Biggest Business (London: Eyre 
Methuen, 1975), p .301.
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in 1970 and 98 per cent in 1950 (see Figure 4 .4 ).50
As a result o f these factors, the majors’ profits also began to fall, so that in 
the 1960s they were forced to renegotiate their tax rate with their Middle East host 
governments, marking the transition from the first to the second era. Resenting the 
cut in oil tax revenues, the Middle East countries reacted by organizing politically in 
the form o f the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to demand 
a larger share o f the lucrative oil industry.51 OPEC’s influence was at its peak 
during the 1973-74 oil embargo. The impact was greater than in previous crises 
because the United States was no longer the provider o f last resort able to compensate 
for cutbacks by increasing its own production,52 and without domination by the 
majors, coordination o f supplies was more difficult.53
BP suffered greatly because its business had been heavily dependent on its 
crude oil production in the Middle East. With this taken away by nationalizations and 
renegotiations, BP’s other operations could not compensate for these losses.54 Shell,
50 Paul Stevens, ‘A Survey of Structural Change in the International Oil Industry, 1945- 
1984’, in David Hawdon, ed., The Changing Structure of the World Oil Industry (London: 
Croom Helm, 1985), pp.30-6; Levy, ‘World Oil Marketing in Transition,* p. 117; Jacoby, 
Multinational Oil, p. 158; and Yergin, The Prize, p.515.
51 Stevens, ‘A Survey of Structural Change in the International Oil Industry, 1945-1984,’ 
p.30; Tugendhat and Hamilton, Oil, the Biggest Business, pp. 158-9; and Richard Bending and 
Richard Eden, UK Energy: Structure, Prospects and Policies (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), p. 14.
32 Mary Ann Tetreault, Revolution in the World Petroleum Market (London: Quorum 
Books, 1985), p.34; Bending and Eden, UK Energy, p. 13; Stourharas, Are Oil Price 
Movements Perverse/, p.50; Tugendhat and Hamilton, Oil, the Biggest Business, pp.206-9 
and pp.291-2; Turner, Oil Companies in the International System (1984), p.206; Yergin, The 
Prize, p.436, pp.504-8 and pp.584-5; and Jeffrey Robinson, Yamani: The Inside Story 
(London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1988), pp. 102-11; Maull, ‘Oil and Influence,* pp.266-8.
53 Levy, ‘World Oil Marketing in Transition,* p. 129.
54 Shell Briefing Service, ‘The Oil Majors in 1980,* No.5, 1981, p.8.
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on the other hand, had a greater downstream operation, and was not as badly affected 
by OPEC’s assertion o f control over oil production in the Middle East. As Group 
Treasurer Howard McDonald explained: ‘We always could sell oil better than we 
could find it, so in a sense the OPEC changes were a good watershed for u s.’55 
Nonetheless, all companies were forced to become more international and more 
diversified. Responding to the increasing market forces, the majors responded by 
diversifying, fearing that without their oil cartel they would shrink. Not only did they 
expand their oil operations downstream, acquiring marketing networks in Europe and 
elsewhere, they also enlarged their tanker fleets, built refineries in Europe, and 
expanded into the field o f petrochemicals.56
The rise o f OPEC set in motion the forces leading to the third era - that o f the 
free market. In the wake o f the 1973-74 oil crisis and increasing oil prices, alternative 
sources o f oil to those in the Middle East became not only desirable, but for the first 
time economically feasible as they existed in more difficult places for exploration and 
production. New sources were developed throughout the world, but the two largest 
finds were in Alaska and the North Sea. Thus, OPEC paved the way for its own 
demise, the price increases caused initially by the 1973-74 crisis led to significant 
changes in the industry, the diversification o f sources o f oil and the ever increasing 
number o f companies made it virtually impossible for oligopoly control. Though 
OPEC remained a dominant player, by 1980, for the first time, the oil industry
55 Robert M. Grant, The Oil Companies in Transition 1970-1987 (Milan: Franco Angeli, 
1991), p. 104 and pp.67-8.
56 BP, Our Industry Petroleumy p.388.
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became market driven.57 As a result o f the majors’ diversification away from oil and 
the growth in the number o f players in the oil industry, there was no one who could 
control price or supply swings. At the same time, the international oil network as a 
free-market became even more responsive to increased demand in the form o f higher 
prices, thus marking the transition to the third era. In a free market, for a price, oil 
can be supplied quickly anywhere in the world.
Consequences for the British Government’s Oil Strategy
There were three major consequences for the British government’s policy 
options resulting from the changing oil industry structure. The first implication was 
that Britain’s oil security considerations changed from those o f an importer to those 
o f a producer. As a producer in an increasingly unstable oil market, the British 
government like many other governments created a national oil company. In fact, 
over 23 state-owned oil companies, over half the world’s total state-owned oil 
companies, were created between 1970 and 1982, while the rest were created before 
1970.58 Thus, the British government’s creation o f BNOC in 1976 can be seen as 
a response to this changing international situation. In addition to BNOC, the 
government could use access to the North Sea as a means o f leverage to gain greater 
cooperation from the private oil companies. Department o f Energy civil servants 
argued that the power o f the British government in awarding exploration licenses to 
operate in the North Sea was the reason that Britain suffered less than other European
37 Stourharas, Are Oil Price Movements Perverse!, p.51.
38 Financial Times International Yearbook, Oil and Gas, 1992 and 1993.
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countries during the 1973-74 oil crisis.59
Britain’s economic security considerations also changed as Britain gained an 
enormous competitive advantage over most o f its economic competitors who did not 
have domestic oil production and had to pay for oil imports. For example, from 1980 
to 1985, France, Germany and Japan decreased their total oil consumption and yet 
the cost o f their oil imports increased; for France from £10.7 billion to £12.5 billion, 
for Germany from £12.5 billion to £16.5 billion, and for Japan from £23.5 billion to 
£32 billion. Britain, on the other hand, went from paying £160 million in 1980 for 
oil imports to earning £7.7 billion as a net exporter in 1985.60
The second implication o f the changing oil structure was the reduction o f the 
value o f ownership o f BP. While the nature o f a free-market ensured that o il would 
be delivered for a price, it also precluded an international company from favouring 
one country over another for nationalistic reasons - the means to retaliate were too 
great. Therefore, the government’s ability to demand cooperation from the private oil 
companies in general increased due to the North Sea, and was more effective than 
investment in BP as a means o f ensuring security o f supply. As a successful 
international company, BP had repeatedly shown that it would not function as a 
national oil company. As previously mentioned, BP refused Prime Minister Heath’s 
request to favour Britain during the 1973 oil crisis. Reinforcing BP’s independent
59 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; and Robert Stobaugh, ‘The Oil 
Companies in Crisis,* Daedalus, Fall 1975, pp. 192-3 and p. 199.
60 The figures are only general guides because all countries imported more than they 
consumed (i.e. refined and reexported some). Prices listed here are as if purchased on the 
spot market; the cost in each country varies according to the term of the contract, and taxes 
within the country. International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics of OECD Countries, 1989- 
90 (Paris: OECD, 1992); and International Energy Agency, Energy Prices and Taxes, (Paris: 
OECD, 1992).
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nature, a few years later, newspaper reporters revealed that BP and Shell had 
subverted the government’s sanctions against Rhodesia from their inception in 
December 1965, which culminated in the establishment o f the Bingham Inquiry in 
April 1977.61
The third implication was the force that OPEC continued to exert. Although 
OPEC’s domination o f the oil market was broken by the end o f the 1970s, the 
organization’s members still controlled a third o f world production in 1980 and the 
majority o f the world’s oil reserves.62 OPEC’s emergence as an international power 
had many implications, including drawing attention to the British government’s own 
involvement in the oil industry. This was domestically embarrassing because, as an 
oil producer, the government benefited from oil revenues which rose with the price 
o f oil, but as an industrial country, Britain’s many consumers suffered from high oil 
prices.63 Through BNOC, the government soon found it had the ability to influence 
prices, but as an oil consumer, Britain did not want to be seen as a price leader.64
OPEC was at odds with Britain, especially as the price o f oil began to fall in 
the mid 1980s. Continued British production and reduced prices, at least in
61 In March 1977 Martin Bailey published a report, ‘Shell and BP in South Africa’, see 
M. Bailey, Oilgate (London: Coronet Books-Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), pp.248-52.
62 Levy, ‘World Oil Marketing in Transition,’ p. 117; ‘Foul Weather, Fair Friends,’ 
Economist, 12 June 1982; and ‘OPEC: I’ll Huff and I’ll Puff...Saudi Plans to Cut Oil Prices: 
OPEC Decides Upon New Production Ceiling,* Economist, 25 December 1982; ‘After the 
OPEC Decade: Seven Sisters Who Lost Family Control: Future of the Oil Industry,’ 
Economist, 15 October 1983; Lucy Kellaway, ‘The First 100 Years: A Long Learning 
Process, the Oil Price Shocks,* Financial Times, 15 February 1988, p.60; and Turner, Oil 
Companies in the International System, 1984.
63 Interview with Department of Energy civil servants and BNOC executives; and 
Jonathan Davis, ‘The Arithmetic of North Sea Oil - Who Wins and Who Loses?* Times, 3 
March 1992.
64 Interview with Department of Energy civil servants.
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appearance, undermined OPEC’s effort to cut supply and raise prices, and drew
hostile OPEC attention to the government’s contradictory aims, regarding oil price
and control and the free market. One BNOC executive recalled the political
embarrassment caused when BNOC began to reduce its prices:
The Saudis and the Nigerians were anxious and the government tried 
to stay out, but the Chancellor and Secretary o f State had a few  
conversations with their counterparts.65
According to N igel Lawson, Secretary o f State for Energy from 1981 to 1983, 
OPEC officials were in constant contact with the government and applied pressure to 
get Britain to cooperate with them. In one extraordinary meeting, Ahmed Zaki 
Yamani, the Saudi Arabian oil minister, asked Lawson if  Britain would like to join 
OPEC; Lawson declined. Yamani then got to the primary purpose of his visit and 
asked Lawson to cut Britain’s oil production in order to keep OPEC oil prices from 
slipping further. Lawson explained that the government had no influence over the rate 
of production or prices, and claimed that it left the free market to decide.66 In reality 
BNOC was actively setting the price for contracts on half o f North Sea oil production 
at the tim e.67
The tension between OPEC and Britain continued. OPEC questioned the 
British government’s denials o f involvement in oil pricing, and threatened a price
65 Interview with BNOC executive; ‘Where BNOC Leads: Cut in North Sea Oil Price,* 
Economist, 19 February 1983; ‘Why Keep BNOC? Arguments for the Abolition of the British 
National Oil Corporation,’ Economist, 2 April 1983; ‘Sheikh Canutes: OPEC and Cuts in Oil 
Prices,* Economist, 6 October 1984; and ‘OPEC Warns of Cuts in Oil Prices,* Economist, 
17 October 1984.
66 Lawson, The View from No.11, p. 193.
67 ‘Why Keep BNOC? Arguments for the Abolition of the British National Oil 
Corporation,* Economist, 2 April 1983; and interviews with Department of Energy civil 
servants.
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war. Because Middle East oil was (and still is) much cheaper to produce than off­
shore North Sea oil, OPEC producers could make profits at much lower prices than 
North Sea producers. Britain therefore could not win a price war.68 The British 
government’s difficult position was only finally resolved with the sale o f Britoil and 
the abolition o f BNOC. OPEC’s pressure, however, was not a primary cause o f the 
government’s sales; it was one o f several contributory factors.
4.3. The Influence of International Organizations
Neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-functionalism contend that international 
institutions and supranational organizations play a significant role in affecting the 
international environment in which policy makers choose options.69 Since the 
European Community (EC) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) are 
particularly large international organizations and have specific energy interests, we 
would expect them to be influential in this case. Surprisingly, I find that while 
economic interdependence between countries proved to be an influential factor, the 
EC and the IEA regulations were not.
68 ‘Britain Shows OPEC the Way: Effect on OPEC of North Sea Price Cut,* Economist, 
6 March 1982; ‘Where BNOC Leads: Cut in North Sea Oil Price,’ Economist, 19 February 
1983; ‘Being Nice to Nigeria: Production Quota Raised,* Economist, 14 July 1984; ‘OPEC’s 
Fellow Travellers Fall by the Wayside,’ Economist, 19 January 1985; and ‘OPEC Takes Rash 
Aim at Britain and Other Non-members: Cartel Threatens Oil-Price War,* Economist, 14 
December 1985.
09 Robert Keohane, ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,* in 
Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1989), p.3; Linda Cornett and James Caporaso, ‘Interests and Forces in the European 
Community,’ in James Rosenau, ed., Governance without Government: Order and Change 
in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.238; Ernst Haas, 
Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1964); and R.J. Harrison, ‘Neo-functionalism,* in A.J.R. Groom 
and Paul Taylor, eds., Framework for International Co-operation (London: Pinter Publishers,
1990).
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Uncoordinated EC Energy Policy
The EC was founded on three distinct entities:70
•  The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) set up by 
the Treaty o f Paris in 1951;
•  The European Economic Community (EEC) created by the 
Treaty o f Rome in 1957; and
•  The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) initiated by a 
second Treaty o f Rome in 1957.
The concern for energy within the EC has been evident from the beginning; both the
ECSC and Euratom dealt directly with energy. The ECSC focused on making the
price o f coal more competitive,71 while Euratom focused on the development of
nuclear power.72
Oil policy cooperation consisted o f only a few directives, and little action was 
actually taken. The first specific measure was a proposal by the EEC Commission to 
create a common stockpile o f petroleum in 1964. The original proposal (Directive 
68/414/EEC) adopted in 1968 was to cover a 65 day period, which was extended to 
90 days in 1972 (Directive 72/425/EEC). But the directive only took effect in January
70 They were founded by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. Members who joined later were: Denmark, Ireland and Britain in 1973; Greece 
in 1981; and Portugal and Spain in 1986. The EEC, the ECSC and Euratom merged on 8 
April 1964 to become the European Community (EC). C.D.E. Collins, ‘History and 
Institutions of the EC,* in Ali M. El-Agraa, ed., Economies of the European Community 
Second Edition (Oxford: Philip Allan Publishers Limited, 1985), p. 18.
71 Romano Prodi and Alberto Clo, ‘Europe,’ Daedalus, Fall 1975, p. 105; and Collins, 
‘History and Institutions of the EC,* p. 14.
72 Ali M. El-Agraa and Y.S. Hu, ‘Energy Policy,* in Ali M. El-Agraa, ed., Economies 
of the European Community, Second Edition (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1985), p.253.
125
1975, too late for the oil crisis o f 1973-74.73 Britain did not join the EC until 1973, 
and was therefore only peripherally affected by these early developments.
EC Cooperation during the 1973-4 oil crisis was minimal. The major problems 
were the large discrepancies between members in terms o f domestic resources and 
vulnerabilities. Germany and the Netherlands advocated coordinated responses, while 
Britain and France did not want to intervene. The EC countries were therefore left 
to scramble for oil supplies in competition with each other.74 At the Energy 
Committee meeting prior to the November 1975 Energy Council, Henri Simonet, the 
Commissioner responsible for energy, castigated the nine members o f the EC for their 
half-hearted efforts to adjust their national postures to facilitate a Community energy 
policy.75
Though the member states recognized that existing policies were insufficient, 
cooperation did not improve.76 Over the period 1973 to 1985, the move towards a 
common EC energy strategy was hampered by the differences among member states 
in resources and energy priorities and by the reluctance o f some member states to 
delegate part o f their sovereignty to the Community.77 These differences prevented
73 Robert Black, ‘Plus ca Change, Plus C’est la Meme Chose: Nine Governments in 
Search of a Common Energy Policy,’ in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb, 
eds., Policy Making in the European Communities (London: John Wiley, 1977), pp.181-83.
74 Rodney Smith, ‘International Energy Cooperation: The Mismatch Between IEA Policy 
Actions and Policy Goals,’ in George Horwich and David Leo Weimer, eds., Responding to 
International Oil Crises (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1988), p.20.
75 Black, ‘Plus ca Change, Plus C’est la Meme Chose,* pp. 183-4.
76 Report by the Commission in June 1983 as discussed in El-Agraa and Hu, ‘Energy 
Policy,* p.258.
77 B. Bourgeois, ‘Energy,* in Willem Molle and Riccardo Cappellini, eds., Regional 
Impact of Communities Policies in Europe (Aldershot, Hants: Avebury, 1988), p.71; Ulf 
Lantzke, ‘The OECD and Its International Energy Agency,* Daedalus, Fall 1975, p.217;
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the EC from agreeing on internal energy questions or even presenting a united front 
in the International Energy Agency negotiations.78 Britain was particularly 
obstructive o f any coordinated action which meant sharing its oil, to the great 
frustration o f other member states. The British government refused to sell North Sea 
oil to EC member countries at concessionary rates in normal times, and even refused 
to show a willingness to agree to policies concerning the size and stocking of 
reserves, or measures to ensure supplies to other EC countries.79 Summing up the 
feelings o f many o f the member countries, a German official stated in 1979: ‘Sooner 
or later Britain has to decide whether it is on the side o f the Nine or OPEC.’80 
Ironically, the demands by the Europeans made the British government realize the 
need to control the North Sea. BNOC also provided a focal point for the EC and 
provided evidence that Britain could direct supply and prices despite the government’s 
claims that they did not have the power to effect oil prices.81
More progress was made on energy policy in the 1980s by combining energy 
issues with other objectives such as foreign policy, environment, technological
Robert O. Keohane, ‘State Power and Industry Influence: American Foreign Oil Policy in the 
1940s,’ International Organization Vol.36, N o.l, Winter 1982, p.221, pp.225-6 and p.233; 
and G. John Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and Capacities of American Government 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.81, p.88, and pp.90-94; ‘National Security 
and Energy Link,* Petroleum Economist, May 1982, p. 196; and interview with Department 
of Energy civil servant.
78 El-Agraa and Hu, ‘Energy Policy,* pp.255-6; and Prodi and Clo, ‘Europe,* pp.107-8.
79 David Deese and Linda Miller, ‘Western Europe,* in David Deese and Joseph Nye, 
eds., Energy and Security (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co, 1981), p.200; El-Agraa 
and Hu, ‘Energy Policy,* p.255; Prior and Clo, ‘Europe,* p. 107; and Richard Bailey, 
‘Unequal Shares in the North Sea,* p.331.
80 Peter Norman, ‘Britain Resisting EEC Pressure for Pledge on Higher Oil Production,* 
Times, 5 December 1979, p. 19,
81 Interviews with BNOC executive and Department of Energy civil servant.
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advancement and regional development. By 1983, EC aid (subsidies and loans) 
represented 7.9 per cent o f the gross investment in energy in Europe. The aid was 
distributed according to priorities determined by the EC’s regional policy - not energy 
policy. This trend continued in October 1986 with the creation o f the VALOREN 
program, whose goals included making regions less sensitive to disturbances in the 
traditional energy markets, such as oil. Because Britain had more opportunities for 
large-scale projects and was better able to present them to the Commission than 
countries less w ell-off, in energy terms, Britain received an exceptionally large 
amount o f funds. This was particularly unusual given Britain’s low priority status for 
regional assistance.82 At the same time, Britain did not have to share the security 
and economic benefits o f oil ownership. Had EC policy been better coordinated, 
funds for energy development might have been tied to greater security cooperation. 
Even these measures would not have been sufficient to effect the government’s oil 
ownership decisions, either to halt the creation o f BNOC or spur its demise. In 
addition, once created, there were too many other state owned companies within the 
member states for EC policy to apply pressure for its sale.83
Although the institutions designed specifically to address energy policy were 
ineffective, EC countries gained important advantages through other broader 
measures. First, the general EC non-discrimination legislation meant that companies 
registered in EC member states could bypass the DEn’s requirement that all oil must
82 Bourgeois, ‘Energy,’ p.66-8 and p.85, footnote 1.
83 Ikenberry, Reasons ofStatesy p.81, p.88 and pp.90-93; also see, ‘National Security and 
Energy Link,* Petroleum Economisty May 1982, p. 196; Yergin, The Prizey quotes the 
headline of the Middle East Economic Survey in January 1974: ‘Bilateral Deals: Everybody’s 
Doing It,* p.629; and interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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be landed in Britain before being exported; and had to be treated without 
discrimination on licenses awards.84 Second, EC commitments meant that 
communication between foreign and economic ministers was frequent which proved 
to be very constructive during crises by minimizing uncertainty and aiding 
cooperation.85 W hile not directly affecting UK decisions to sell its oil assets, these 
factors may have helped to improve the oil market that in turn reduced the number 
and severity o f oil crises.
European Community Economic Interdependence
Although Britain did not enter the EC until 1973, it steadily became more 
dependent on EC member states from the 1960s on so that by the 1980s 
approximately 60 per cent o f legislation made in Britain at the national level involved 
European Community issues.86 The trend is also quantifiable in the trade statistics; 
Table 4 .1 . shows that both exports and imports have become more heavily 
concentrated on Britain’s EC partners.87 In addition, Britain’s trade with the U .S. 
and Japan has declined markedly so that by 1988 only 11 per cent o f British imports
84 The landing requirement was more theoretical because any request for a waver were 
approved. Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and minister.
85 Prodi and Clo, ‘Europe,* pp. 106-7.
86 Paul Taylor, International Organization in the Modem World: The Regional and the 
Global (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p.93.
87 William Wallace, Britain's Bilateral Links within Western Europe (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1984), p .l; and Ian Budge, David McKay, Rod Rhodes, David Robertson, 
David Sanders, Martin Slater, Graham Wilson, The Changing British Political System: Into 
the 1990s, Second Edition (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 140-157 and p.227; Alan Winters, 
‘Britain in Europe: a Survey of Quantitative Trade Studies,’ in Alexis Jacquemin and Andre 
Sapir, eds., The European Internal Market: Trade and Competition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 122.
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Table 4.1.
British Exports to and Imports from EC Member Countries 
Percent o f Total UK Trade
1957 1974 1981 1986 1988
Exports to EC 14.6% 33.4% 41.2% 47.9% 62%
Imports from EC 12.1% 30.0% 39.4% 50.4% 64%
Source: Ali M. El-Agraa, ‘Basic Statistics of the EC,’ in Ali M. El-Agraa
ed., The Economics of the European Community, Third Edition, (Oxford: 
Philip Allan Publishers Limited) 1990, p.61-2.
came from the United States and 6.1 per cent from Japan, while 12.9 per cent of 
British exports went to the United States and 2.2 per cent to Japan.88
The evidence from this case supports Paul Taylor’s contention that the British 
government formulated its energy policies with consideration for its EC partners, but 
not because o f specific legislation.89 In other words, the forces o f economic 
interdependence that provided the impetus for the EC have also led to the adoption 
o f common policies across Europe. This explains why, as Alan Walters (Mrs. 
Thatcher’s economic advisor from 1981 to 1983) has pointed out, all European 
countries reduced their adjusted borrowing and experienced fiscal contractions in 
recessionary conditions on a scale similar to Britain’s.90 In addition, across Europe 
(France and Germany) and the industrialized world (Canada to New Zealand), there
“ T. Hitiris, ‘Trade Policies,’ European Community Economics, Second Edition (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), p.208; also see Winters, ‘Britain in Europe,* pp. 125-6.
89 Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World, p.94 and p. 106.
90 Alan Walters claims that Britain’s economic tightening was less severe than others, but 
this only holds true with some calculation adjustments. Alan Walters, Britain's Economic 
Renaissance: Margaret Thatcher's Reforms 1979-1984 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986), pp.96-7.
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was interest in asset sales. Very few countries sold assets in the early 1980s most 
waited until the late 1980s or did not sell at all.91
There is no evidence that EC laws restricted the British government’s decision 
to sell its oil assets, yet the broader interdependent ties may have influenced the 
thinking o f some civil servants and politicians in Britain. For example, during the 
1973-74 oil crisis, Prime Minister Heath did not pass a law to require BP to favour 
Britain with oil supplies for, among other reasons, fear o f antagonizing Britain’s EC 
partners. Similarly, a DEn civil servant explained that Britain’s official position on 
oil prices was for lower prices because Britain could not overtly side with OPEC 
when higher prices would hurt its new European partners.92
EC company legislation, however, has had a peripheral effect on BNOC’s 
evolution. The first time EC regulations were a factor was in 1976 when BNOC and 
the participation agreements were being created. There were concerns that BNOC’s 
objective o f supplying Britain in a crisis was inconsistent with international 
obligations, specifically free trade in the EC.93 Although the issue was raised by the 
Conservatives who opposed the creation o f BNOC, it was not a major point o f 
contention nor sufficient to delay the creation o f the national oil company. BNOC was 
not in absolute control because there were other companies operating in the North 
Sea, there was oil from the Middle East and elsewhere, and the arrangements were 
only voluntary commercial agreements. Technically, BNOC could not be challenged,
91 Survey of privatization as reported in Economist and the Financial Times using Profile, 
1983-1992.
92 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
93 Lord Strabolgi, Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords) , 9 November 1976, vol.377, 
col. 182-185 and 18 November 1975, vol.377, col. 1459-1460.
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but as one DEn official observed, the government was always afraid it would 
be.94
The EC’s classification o f public companies and take-over laws also affected 
the form taken by British privatization. The government avoided retaining more than 
50 per cent in companies in part because they would be classified as public companies 
in the EC, making the British government liable for debts o f the enterprise.95 EC 
takeover laws affected the government’s decisions with what they omitted. While 
member states could not forbid a takeover offer launched by an EC investor, there 
was no such rule prohibiting intervention in bids by non-EC corporate bodies.96 This 
was a useful outlet in 1987 when ministers referred the case o f Kuwait Investment 
Office’s purchase o f 21% of BP shares to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC). Since KIO was not a member o f the EC, it was not discriminatory for the 
MMC to rule against KIO and force it to reduce its shareholding in BP to below 10 
per cent.97 The effect o f company legislation was limited, however, because there 
was little that was more restrictive than pre-existing British law. In fact, much o f EC 
company law was based on British practice. EC legislation on takeovers, for example, 
was similar to Britain’s City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.98
94 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 9 November 1976, vol.377, col. 183; and 18 
November 1976, vol.377, col. 1459; and interview with BNOC executive.
95 Gardner, Decade ofDiscontenty p.20.
96 Confederation of British Industry, Company Law and Competition (London: Mercury 
Books, 1989), p.43.
97 Steven Butler, ‘Divorce With a Degree of Dignity: The Way BP has Cleared Up the 
Problems Created by the KIO’s Shareholding/ Financial Times, 4 January 1989, p. 17; and 
‘Survey of Arab Banking: Working in the Spotlight - The Kuwait Investment Office/ 
Financial Times, 24 October 1988, p.41.
98 CBI, Company Law and Competition p.42.
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The International Energy Agency
In the wake o f the 1973-74 oil crisis, Britain as an oil consumer was active 
in the creation o f a new type o f organization, distinct from EC initiative? The IEA 
was formed by 16 industrialized countries including the United States, Japan, and 
most EC countries, but not France who disagreed with the organization’s 
approach." In addition to keeping records and providing a means for communication 
between countries, the main feature o f the IEA was the oil sharing mechanism, called 
the Emergency Management System (EMS). Through the EMS all members were 
committed to reduce oil demand and to share available oil in the event o f any 
significant disruption in the world oil supply, defined as a 7 per cent loss o f normal 
supply by one or more member countries. The IEA also required every member 
country to maintain reserves enabling it to sustain consumption for 90 days without 
oil imports.100 Britain had the advantage o f the North Sea, which had enormous 
reserves. Stockpiles maintained on-shore were costly, and most countries passed this 
responsibility and cost on to the oil companies. As a result the stocks were usually 
industry working stocks, such as oil waiting to be refined, and therefore not truly
99 The original signers of the IEA agreement in November 1974 were: Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany. Greece, New 
Zealand and Norway joined in 1976-77, Australia in 1979, and Portugal joined in 1980. The 
only OECD countries who are not members of the IEA are France, Finland and Iceland. 
Smith, ‘International Energy Cooperation,* p.21; and Deese and Miller, ‘Western Europe,*
p.200.
100 Peter Ellis Jones, Oil: A Practical Guide to the Economics of World Petroleum 
(Cambridge: Woodhead-Faulkner Ltd, 1988), pp.232-38; International Energy Agency, The 
International Energy Agency (Paris: IEA/OECD, 1983), p. 16; Smith, ‘International Energy 
Cooperation,* pp.28-31.
133
surplus.101
After North Sea oil came on line (1975) Britain was pressured to share its oil 
resources with fellow members, which made the British government more possessive. 
The government feared that their present comparative strength in oil supplies would 
commit them in advance to put substantial North Sea oil supplies at the disposal of 
other IEA countries.102 This pressure by the IEA is illustrated by the way it 
calculated its statistics. The international organization treated any energy resource 
within western Europe as indigenous to every country in the region. Thus, oil and gas 
produced by Britain and Norway were assumed to remain in western Europe and to 
be immediately available to all western European consumers, without entering into 
international trade, which was far from the actual case.103
BP and Shell were also very active participants in the development o f the IEA 
mechanism. For the oil companies, an equitable distribution of oil, such as during the 
1973-74 crisis, was in their best interests.104 The decline o f the majors* control over 
oil supplies meant that they were no longer able to enforce such a system on their 
own. The IEA formal mechanism enabled the large number o f companies entering the 
international industry to coordinate oil distribution where they might not have been
101 Edward Krapels and Sarah Emerson, Storage in the International Oil Market, Special 
Report No. 1117 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987), pp.31-2; and David Blair, 
‘The International Energy Agency: Problems and Prospects,’ in Gasteyger, ed., The Future 
for European Energy Security, p. 117; and ‘Stocks for Crisis Management,* Petroleum 
Economist, October 1982, p.398.
102 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; Deese and Miller, ‘Western 
Europe,’ p. 199; and El-Agraa and Hu, ‘Energy,* p.255.
1(0 Ian Smart, ‘European Energy Security in Focus,’ in Gasteyger, ed., The Future for 
European Energy Security, p. 150.
104 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servant and BP executive.
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able to otherwise. According to the IEA over 200 national and international 
companies and 21 countries participated in the 1978 Second Oil Allocation Systems 
Test.105 Real cooperation, however, was limited by U .S. anti-trust legislation which 
prevented American companies from divulging information on oil pricing.106 Given 
this fact, one British civil servant explained that the IEA had nothing better to do than 
prepare and practice, but that the efforts were only ‘paper exercises’.107 The IEA’s 
oil sharing mechanism has never been tested. Even during the 1979 oil crisis and 
Sweden’s 17 per cent shortfall the formal sharing arrangements were never 
enacted.108 Because some members (such as Britain) would have refused to 
cooperate if  the formal mechanisms had been enacted, the Agency instead resorted 
to attempts at informal coordination, consultation and advice,.109
The 1979 crisis was alleviated and the drastic price rises avoided due to the 
willingness o f Saudi Arabia to increase production, the high level o f oil stocks and 
weakness in demand, and through IEA information-sharing and strong (but general) 
statements.110 Within the DEn the IEA received no credit for smoothing the chaotic 
international oil turbulence, and a few civil servants even made jokes about the
105 Blair, ‘The International Energy Agency,* p. 116; and IEA, International Energy 
Agency, p.25.
106 Blair, ‘The International Energy Agency,* p. 117.
107 Interview with Treasury civil servant.
108 Although seasonal adjustment brought Sweden’s shortfall to 9.8%, it was still above 
the 7% threshold. Blair, ‘The International Energy Agency,* pp. 112-3; Smith, ‘International 
Energy Cooperation,* pp.35-38; and Keohane, After Hegemony, p.229.
109 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp.231-36; and Smith, ‘International Energy Cooperation,* 
pp.68-84.
110 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp.236-7. Information sharing and top level coordination 
were confirmed by Department of Energy civil servant.
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organization. Only one civil servant suggested that the IEA mechanisms actually 
alleviated the need for BNOC, though several DEn civil servants recognized that 
some o f their powers were being delegated to the IEA, such as the collection of 
statistics which occurred in the mid 1980s.111
Britain’s resistance to oil sharing measures can be understood when the 
specific costs o f sharing are recognized. Rodney Smith has calculated that per capita 
net losses from oil sharing for Britain in the early 1980s would have been $4.02 with 
a 7 per cent supply disruption and $5.56 with a 15 per cent supply disruption, while 
net gains would have accrued to Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden 
and Switzerland. Only Japan and the United States would have remained relatively 
unaffected.112 Despite minimal action by the IEA, the fact that it exists and that 
Britain is an active member illustrates that the member countries involved 
acknowledge their interdependence and the broader costs o f not cooperating. As one 
DEn civil servant explained, Britain could see that even as an oil producer, not 
agreeing to share would hurt the world economy which would then hurt Britain.113
Conclusion
Although systems level models can explain why Britain was more susceptible 
to international pressures on financial issues and less so on oil issues from 1975 to 
1985, these types o f models can not explain the specifics, such as the 1976 IMF
111 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants; and Lawson, A Radical View 
JromNo.lly p. 163.
112 Smith, ‘International Energy Cooperation,* pp.52-3.
113 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; Smith, (‘International Energy 
Cooperation,’) however, argues that this is fortunate for energy security and oil consumers 
because IEA measures would have worsened the situation (pp.68-84).
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crisis, or change, such as the shift from an oil oligopoly to an free market for oil. A  
systems level model does, however, highlight the fact that states work within 
constraints beyond their immediate control, and that a country’s position in the 
international system sets the parameters for the policy options available to politicians. 
This proved to be true for Britain in the case o f its oil assets, where the international 
financial situation and the structure o f the international o il industry narrowed the 
range o f what was possible, though only its financial position in 1977 had a direct 
impact. Though membership in international organizations was not specifically an 
influence, economic interdependence was, through a self-interest in the welfare o f its 
trading partners. By focusing on an issue, the role o f international organizations is 
already included. Studying organizations separately is less revealing. As Susan 
Strange has argued: the study o f regimes or international organizations is ‘obfuscating 
and confusing instead o f clarifying and illuminating, and distorting by concealing bias 
instead o f revealing and removing it .’114
The effect of international factors on the British government’s decision to sell 
its oil assets can be illustrated with a Venn diagram, in which the intersection o f 
circles represents the overlap o f international parameters which sets the range o f 
policy options (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6). The three international level variables 
examined in this case are represented by circle 1 for the policy options possible with 
the international financial position o f Britain, circle 2 for policy options possible with 
Britain’s position in the international oil industry, and circle 3 for the policy options 
consistent with Britain’s membership in international organizations. In both figures,
114 Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hie Dragones:A critique of Regimes Analysis,’ in Stephen 
Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p.337.
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point A represents the policy to increase 
taxes, point B represents the policy to 
increase the budget deficit and point C 
represents the policy to sell oil assets. In 
1974, just after the 1973 oil crisis, selling 
oil assets was not possible (as illustrated in 
Figure 4.5 by the exclusion o f point C from 
circle 2 .) In 1977 the oil situation had 
changed so that a sale was possible as 
ownership was less effective in the free 
market (point C now included in circle 2 o f 
Figure 4 .6). As a result o f severe balance 
o f payments deficits and IMF intervention, 
however, Britain’s international financial 
position had changed so that a budget increase was no longer possible (point B 
excluded from circle 1 in Figure 4.6).
Though the international level played an important role, it alone did not 
determine the government’s options, contrary to international systems scholars claims. 
It is, therefore, necessary to look at other sets o f intervening variables, which
however were also influenced by international factors. The full force o f international
pressure includes both the direct and indirect effects, as illustrated in Figure 4.7 . In 
the next chapters I examine sets o f intervening variables and how these sets o f 
parameters affected Britain’s politician’s decision to sell the state’s oil assets. The 
three sets o f variables are the management o f the oil companies in Chapter Five, and
International Policy Parameters, 1977
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the civil servants in 
Chapter Six, and the 
political process in 
Chapter Seven.
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of International Variables
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Chapter Five: Structure. Motivations and the Managers of the 
State-Owned Oil Companies
Applying the conventional public choice models o f individuals as economic 
utility maximizers to the managers o f Britain’s state-owned oil companies, we would 
expect them to welcome privatization, as a move to the private sector would allow  
greater financial freedom for their company and higher salaries for them personally. 
Yet many managers actually impede privatization. Their resistance is often listed in 
the privatization literature as an obstacle to privatization but without an explanation 
as to why, or more specifically why some managers are not opposed and why some 
are more successful in achieving their preferences.1 One o f the reasons the role o f 
the managers has not been satisfactorily analyzed is that they do not fall into standard 
categories o f analysis. Though the managers o f state-owned companies are not private 
sector employees but rather state employees subject to ministerial directives, and 
partly supported by central government funds, they are not normally included in 
analyses o f government bureaucracies.2
Initial differences between the managers’ reactions can be understood from the 
differences between types o f companies. As Yair Aharoni has pointed out, not all 
state-owned industries are alike.3 In the British case there were three distinct types 
o f companies: the Morrisonian public corporation, the semi-detached corporation and
1 Vickers and Yarrow, ‘The Politics of Industrial Privatization in Western Europe,* pp.18-
9.
2 Interviews with BNOC and BP executives; Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of 
State Owned Enterprises, p.5; and Gavin Drewry and Tony Butcher, The Civil Service Today, 
Second Edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 16-7.
3 Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises, p.396.
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the virtually private company. BGC was a traditional Morrisonian corporation created 
to serve the public interest while being run along commercial lines, breaking even one 
year with another. The company’s charter was (recreated by Acts o f Parliament in 
1948, 1965 and 1972 which ensured government control over national assets, and its 
directors, appointed by ministers, were to ‘regard themselves as the high custodians 
o f the public interest.’4 BNOC was created much later than the traditional 
Morrisonian corporations and with closer attention to fiscal control and economic 
efficiency. As such, though still created by an Act o f Parliament, BNOC’s domain 
was more narrowly defined and more tightly controlled, both by legislation and by 
operating in the private-sector oil industry.5 BP represents the third type, a virtually 
private-sector company. As a Companies-Act company, the government acted only 
as a large shareholder and was not involved in the day-to-day running o f the 
business.6
These fundamental structural differences help explain why different strategies 
are rational for different managers and suggest why some mangers are more likely 
to be successful than others. Aharoni identifies the major variables that explain the
4 H. Morrision, Socialisation of Transport, (1933) as quoted in Cento Veljanovski, Selling 
the State, Privatization in Britain (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), p.58; David 
Heald, ‘The United Kingdom: Privatisation and its Political Context,* in John Vickers and 
Vincent Wright, eds., The Politics of Privatisation in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 
1989), p.34; Lynn Pearson, Organization of the Energy Industry (London: Macmillan, 1981), 
p.98; and interviews with British Gas Corporation executives.
3 Department of Energy, ‘About Britoil,’ 1978; BNOC, Annual Report, 1976; and 
Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises, pp. 13-5.
6 Heald, ‘The United Kingdom: Privatisation and its Political Context,’p.34; Bradbury 
and Bridges letters; and Aharoni, The Evolution and Management o f  State Owned 
Enterprises, pp. 13-5.
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differences within the state-owned industries group.7 Extrapolating from these 
variables, I argue that there are three factors that influence how managers react to the 
possibility o f privatization, and how effective their support or opposition is. These 
factors are organizational autonomy, financial independence, and success in achieving 
its missions - either profit or national interest.8 The consequences o f these factors are 
summarized in Table 5 .1 .
In terms o f organizational autonomy, all companies desire to be autonomous 
and w ill resent any governmental interference in the organization. Managers will 
therefore employ tactics to maintain the company’s autonomy, while managers o f less 
autonomous companies w ill seek to become more self-sufficient through means 
including: making commercial agreements with the private sector, expanding 
internationally and retaining profits by spending or reinvesting them, as w ell as 
urging the government to sell the company to the private sector. Managers w ill react 
positively to privatization as it represents another means to increase their autonomy. 
A company’s chances o f privatization increase the more self-sufficient the company, 
as less autonomous companies are harder to transfer to the private sector.
Managers o f companies which are financially independent seek to remain that 
way and employ the same tactics as autonomous companies. Managers o f companies 
which depend on government finance may, however, resist a move to the private
7 Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises, pp.396-400.
8 National interest: ‘The concept of the security and well-being of the state’, Jack Plano 
and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary, Eighth Edition (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1989), p.498.
A more cynical definition: ‘The cause in which political leaders claim to be acting 
when pursuing a policy unpopular with the electorate or with other states - or especially when 
pursuing their own interests.* Nicholas Comfort, Brewer's Politics: A Phase and Fable 
Dictionary (London: Cassell, 1993), p.401.
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Table 5.1. Company Status and Objectives
Company
Status
Management’s
General
Objectives
Management Tactics in 
Response to Privatization 
Proposals
Likelihood of 
Privatization
Organizational
Autonomy
-High 
- Low
- Maintain autonomy
- Increase autonomy
- distance itself from the 
government
- make private sector 
agreements
- expand 
internationally
- retain profits
High
Depends on 
mission
Financial
Independence
-High - Maintain 
independence
- same as high autonomy
High
- Low - Obtain financial 
support
- seek government 
investment
- seek private sector 
investment
Low
Success in 
Achieving Mission
- Profit - No government 
intervention
- same as high autonomy High
- National 
Interest
- Retain government 
mandate for 
national interest 
mission
- achieve highest 
standards
- publicize service 
provided
- delay government 
efforts
- lobby against 
privatization
Low
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sector as it could mean selling o ff their assets, closing down the company and 
ultimately unemployment. They w ill most likely resist privatization using delaying 
tactics and lobby government ministers so as not to lose their financial backing.
The management o f companies which successfully achieve their mission, either 
achieving high profits or providing a recognizable national service, fight to keep their 
company together as an entity. Success breeds loyalty and pride. The management o f 
a company with a profit mission have limited allegiance to their government owners 
and thus may prefer private ownership, but they w ill definitely react strongly against 
any action that breaks apart the company or limits its future potential. In contrast, the 
managers o f a company with a national interest mission depend on government 
ownership for a justification o f their non-profit mission, and therefore seek ways to 
maintain that mandate including highlighting the usefulness o f the service they are 
providing and continuing to improve the service. The result is less clear for managers 
o f companies who have been less successful in achieving their missions. Depending 
on their financial independence and organizational autonomy, they may be frustrated 
and therefore may be more willing to consider alternatives, including privatization, 
or they may be fearful for their future, and thus resist change.
The ability o f managers to influence policy outcomes is also affected by the 
company’s structure. Managers in companies with high levels o f financial or 
organizational independence have a greater ability to persuade the government to 
implement their preferences, while managers o f a company that is financially 
dependent with little success in achieving its mission w ill be less able to influence the 
government (see column three in Table 5 .1 .)
Finally, these three factors affect the degree o f difficulty a government w ill
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have in  selling a company. The companies where the feasibility o f a sale is highest 
are those which are financially and organizationally independent and operate with a 
profit mission because the management has no significant ties to the government and 
sees gains from the sale. (See the last column in Table 5 .1 .) The most difficult to sell 
are those with a national interest mission and either low organizational autonomy or 
low  financial independence because they rely on the government to function and 
would suffer costs from a sale (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 . Low Organizational 
Autonomy Versus Mission
Profit
Success
National
Interest
Autonomy
Low
Privatization
Likely
Privatization
Unlikely
5.1. British Petroleum Under Threat
By the 1970s, BP was financially independent from the government, 
successfully established internationally and struggling to redirect itself into more 
profitable areas. The company’s independence was threatened in two ways; by an 
increase in  the government’s share ownership and by the need for new capital. These 
precipitating conditions led the management to reconsider the costs and benefits o f
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government ownership.
Fear of Government Reasserting Control
The government’s holding in BP decreased steadily over time (see Figure 5.2).
In fact, from the 1950s, BP had a strategy o f increasing the total capital o f the
company in order to
dilute the government’s
shareholding. As BP
expanded, it issued new
shares to pay for
purchases, such as the
Trinidad Petroleum
Company in 1955,
A p e x  (T r in id a d )
Oilfields in 1960, Kern Oil Company in 1961, an asset purchase from the Distillers
Company in 1967, and a merger with Super Test Petroleum Coiporation in 1971.9
As one BP executive recalled:
If you look at when Morris Bridgeman was chairman, he was always 
keen to hit the 49 per cent spot...There were various attempts, at 
various times, to use shares to purchase companies with the thought 
that the small change might bring HMG [Her Majesty’s Government’s 
holding below 51 per cent. It was all part o f eroding the government’s 
shareholding.10
It was in fact under Bridgeman in 1967 that the government’s shareholding dropped
9 BP, Annual Report and Accounts, 1955-1971.
10 Interview with BP executive.
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Figure 5.2.
to 48.9 per cent due to the issue o f new shares to purchase the chemical and plastics 
interests o f the Distillers Company.11 Government ministers assisted in these efforts 
by not subscribing to two o f BP’s new share issues, in 1957 and 1981.12
Why BP followed this strategy o f reducing the government’s stake is not clear. 
The views of senior BP executives were mixed. Some argued that the 50 per cent 
mark was not necessarily important because it had no legal significance. The 
company’s Articles o f Association, not the size o f the government shareholding, gave 
the British government the veto and put two ministerial nominees on the board of 
directors.13 Others pointed out that government ownership did make a difference to 
BP’s operations abroad. Some countries such as Venezuela and Guatemala refused to 
allow foreign government owned oil companies to operate in their territory. This 
impact was evident by the fact that as soon as the British government sold 5 per cent 
o f its BP shares in 1979 bringing the total down to 46 per cent, BP became eligible 
to operate in Venezuela and immediately set up facilities there.14
The best explanation o f the management’s attitude, however, is that there was 
an ideological or psychological barrier to government ownership over 50 per cent.15 
The management valued its independence, and government ownership over 50 per 
cent threatened their image o f themselves as an sovereign company. The managers 
perceived that government ownership handicapped them, limiting their decisions
11 BP, Chairman’s Statement, Annual Report and Accounts, 1966, pp.6-7 and p.21.
12 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 20 December 1957, vol.580, col. 135.
13 Interview with BP executive.
14 Interview with BP executive.
13 Interview with BP executive.
unnecessarily. These feeling came through as late as Sir Peter Walters speech to BP’s
shareholders after buying back KIO’s holding in BP in 1989. The emphasis was on
independence - from any government.16
When the government purchased Burmah Oil’s holding in BP, thereby raising
its holding to 68 per cent - more than two-thirds o f the company’s equity - BP’s
managers were shocked and dismayed to learn that their reduction policy had been
drastically reversed in a single day. BP, in fact, had always disliked having Burmah
as a major shareholder. One BP executive explained:
[We] had to have a couple o f Burmah chaps on the board who never 
contributed anything.. .I’d always been wondering how we could shake 
Burmah off our backs who had no particular oil expertise but had this 
say... [they] just got a dividend and passed it on to their own 
shareholders.17
When Burmah ran into financial difficulty in 1974, company executives approached 
BP managers to determine whether BP would be prepared to take over Burmah. BP 
could not have bought back its shares from Burmah, however, because there were 
laws against it at the time (these have since changed). Instead, BP was offered some 
of Burmah’s properties.18 But after examining Burmah’s accounts, BP executives 
realized that the situation was far worse than had been conveyed, so disappointedly, 
they were forced to decline the offer. One BP executive counselled Burmah to go 
‘very quickly to the Governor o f the Bank o f England.’19
Burmah did go to the Bank o f England, and as part o f the rescue plan, the
16 ‘Shareholders Support BP Buy Back,* Financial Times, 1 February 1989, p.25.
17 Interview with BP executive.
18 Interview with BP executive.
19 Interview with BP executive.
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Bank purchased Burmah’s holding in BP. Though the BP managers knew o f Burmah’s 
troubles and even recommended that they go to the Bank, they did not suspect the 
result would be an increase in the government’s holding in BP. As one BP executive 
complained:
It’s one thing to have your 51% but to have a majority as big as that 
for the government would have made it too much o f a temptation for 
the government to break the Bradbury letter agreement. I wasn’t very 
keen on that. Not that I was consulted as I remember.20
The chairman o f BP, Eric Drake, was furious. He demanded on several occasions in
writing and in person to the Prime Minister that the shares be sold.21 One such
documented occasion was on 15 July 1975 when Drake told Benn that the
government’s holding must be kept below 50 per cent, otherwise it would destroy
BP’s credibility in the US, New Zealand and elsewhere (BP operated in over 80
countries).22
Exacerbating BP’s fear o f increased government ownership was the fact that 
the share increase occurred under a Labour government, which included Tony Benn 
as the Secretary o f State for Energy, who advocated socialist measures such as 
nationalization. Benn increased BP’s fears o f government intervention by questioning 
the structure o f the relationship between BP and the Treasury and proposing policies 
such as participation that sounded all too similar to the measures that had abolished 
their oil concessions in the Middle East.23 As one BP executive explained: 
‘Obviously we wanted the government around less, especially because Benn had made
20 Interview with BP executive.
21 Interview with BP executive; BP, Annual Report and Accounts, 1975, p.6.
22 Benn, Against the Tide, p.419.
23 Interview with BP executive.
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us aware of the threat the government’s stake could present.’24 The fear was 
reinforced by the impression that BP executives gleaned when visiting Benn’s office. 
One BP executive described the horror o f finding BP included on a wall chart o f 
government owned energy industries, and commented: ‘But Benn didn’t own BP, the 
Treasury did.’25 BP was thus on alert for the possibility that partial government 
ownership could evolve into a complete takeover, or nationalization, o f the company.
A ll o f the BP executives who I interviewed pointed to the Bradbury letter as 
the guiding principle o f the relationship between BP and the government. To BP, this 
letter meant that the government would not intervene in the running o f the company, 
and that autonomy was valued highly at BP.26 Whenever the party in power 
changed, BP made a point o f getting a question asked in Parliament about the 
government’s policy towards BP. In 1975, a BP company memo stated: ‘As we all 
know, what we want is ... an unequivocal statement in the House o f Commons that 
the practice o f non-intervention, non-interference is to continue.,27
In fact, the Bradbury letter and the subsequent Bridges letter (1951) are vague 
agreements that in reality failed to rule out direct intervention into BP’s affairs. For 
example, the government agreed not to use its right o f veto except if  BP’s activities 
of the company affected the government’s foreign, naval or military policy; or the 
company’s status changed; or BP planned new activities with control implications; or
24 Interview with BP executive.
25 Interview with BP executive; also see Bradbury letter in Appendix I which defines BP’s 
government contacts as the Treasury and the Admiralty.
26 Interview with BP executives.
27 BP memo, December 1975. See also statements in Hansard Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons), 29 April 1965, 26 February 1969 and 18 March 1974.
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where fuel oil was sold to foreigners in a situation which might endanger the 
fulfilment o f current Admiralty contracts. (See the copy o f the Bradbury letter in 
Appendix I.) The letter does not elaborate on these exceptions; they are, therefore, 
open to interpretation.
Thus, it was not the Bradbury letter per se, but the Treasury’s interpretation 
o f that letter that has been the foundation o f the non-intervention relationship between 
BP and the government. BP saw the Treasury as being a defender o f their 
independence because they profited from the investment in BP and had developed a 
satisfactory working relationship over decades.28 As one BP executive explained: 
‘The Treasury was the department responsible for our shareholding; and they couldn’t 
have cared less what we did as long as we went on being a profitable and successful 
and efficient company.’29 When Benn came into office, he questioned not only the 
Treasury’s relationship with BP, but the interpretation o f the Bradbury letter itself. 
A review o f the House o f Commons debates shows that while the government’s 
ownership had been controversial over time, Benn was the first to question the 
structure o f BP’s relationship with the government.30 Benn argued that the 
government should use its now dominant shareholding to control the company and the 
shareholding should be transferred from the Treasury to the Department o f Energy 
as part o f a move to make BP into a national oil company.31
28 Interview with BP executive.
29 Interview with BP executive.
30 Review of all discussion of BP as listed in the index to Hansard Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons and Lords), 1913-1977.
31 Interviews with Department of Energy and Treasury civil servants and Labour 
ministers; Blackstone and Plowden, Inside the Think Tank, p. 81; Geoffrey Fry, The 
Changing Civil Service (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 15-7.
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BP executives saw their independence being threatened by this challenge to the 
Bradbury letter, and thus lobbied hard against the Department o f Energy controlling 
the BP shares and against becoming a national oil company.32 In addition to the 
problems o f increased government ownership, out right nationalization could mean 
retaliation against their downstream operations in Europe and production interests in 
Alaska.33 Aiding BP’s efforts was the fact that the company had the specific goal o f 
getting the government to sell its shareholding, and several means to achieve it.34 
In addition to contacts with the top level civil servants, BP also had political 
connections. As one BP executive explained: ‘[We] had access to the Prime Minister, 
the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary or any other m inister...at the drop o f a hat.’35 
Though not contributing directly to the Conservative party, as part o f a complex 
relationship with the government, BP was a large public contributor remaining one 
o f the top five contributors to charity in Britain, with contributions rising from 
£500,000 in 1979 to £14.5 million in 1992.36 Though, as one o f the ten largest 
companies in Britain, in terms o f revenue and profit, BP is a company that no
32 Interview with BP executive.
33 Turner, Oil Companies in the International System (1978), p. 120; and Turner, ‘State 
and Commercial Interests in North Sea Oil and Gas,* p.97.
34 Wyn Grant, ‘Business Interests and the British Conservative Party,’ Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 15, Spring 1980, p. 157.
35 Interview with BP executive.
36 In 1979 BP was the fifth largest public contributor, in 1986 and 1987 BP was the 
largest, and in 1992 BP was second only to BT. ‘Big Increases in Firms’ Charity Handouts,’ 
Independent, 3 February 1993; ‘Big Companies Reduce their Gifts to Charity,* Independent, 
17 January 1989; ‘Charitable Britain,* Economist, 26 December 1981. Some charitable gifts 
can be linked to political causes. For example, from 1984 to 1987 BP contributed to the 
Industrial Trust which financed Industrial Research and Information Services which in turn 
produced an anti-militant trade union pamphlet. ‘Charity May Face Tax Inquiry,* 
Independent, 3 February 1989.
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government could afford to ignore.37
In lobbying the government, BP took advantage o f a perceived split between
Benn and the rest o f the Cabinet. BP managers understand that several Labour
ministers were moderates who could see the benefits to keeping BP as an independent
company and maintaining the government’s tradition of non-intervention.38 These
moderates included Prime Minister James Callaghan, Chancellor Denis Healey,
Paymaster General Edmund D ell and the Dutchy o f Lancaster Harold Lever. A ll were
regarded as much more reasonable and balanced in their views than Benn.39 One
minister claimed he ‘saved BP from Kearton,’ the chairman o f BNOC:
[Tjhough I was for a British owned oil company, I was not in favour 
o f harming BP. It was a big successful company; it was nonsense to 
harm it. Therefore, I opposed it, and fortunately successfully.40
In 1976, the chairman o f BP changed, and the new man, David Steel saw that
in order not to jeopardize the Cabinet’s support, it was essential for BP to be seen to
be cooperating with the government. Even though BP was strongly opposed to the
government’s proposed participation policy for North Sea oil production, the company
continued to put forward their best people in negotiations and worked hard preparing
papers for discussion.41 The government’s desire to get an agreement from BP on
participation was very strong, as it would set an important precedent for the rest o f
37 Wyn Grant, ‘Large Firms and Public Policy in Britain,’ Journal of Public Policy, 
Vol.4, Fall 1984, pp.2-3.
38 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servant, Labour ministers and BP 
executive.
39 Interviews with BP executives.
40 Interview with Labour minister.
41 Interview with BP executives.
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the companies operating in the North Sea. On this one issue the Cabinet did appear 
united, and BP perceived that it had become politically important for the Labour 
government to show progress on its energy policy.42
BP thus set its priorities and offered its cooperation on participation in 
exchange for the reduction o f the government’s shareholding. The link was made only 
at the highest level, between the Secretary o f State for Energy, the Prime Minister, 
and the chairman and deputy chairman o f BP; lower level managers did not know of 
these discussions.43 Tony Benn records an evening at Chequers where the subject 
was discussed:
Then we sat round the log fire with coffee, brandy and cigars and 
Harold Wilson said, ‘We take no decisions at Chequers. This meeting 
didn’t take place. Tony has explained your position but I didn’t 
understand a word; w ill you tell m e.’ David Steel then launched into 
BP’s objectives: independence, cash flow from the Forties Field, North 
Sea operations and international operations to be preserved. He said,
‘The BP shares owned by the Bank o f England are a problem. We can 
offer you help but no more.m
Callaghan and Benn formally insisted, however, that the issues not be connected.
Whether they were secretly linked or not, BP agreed to a final participation
agreement in July 1976,45 and five months later in December 1976 the government
announced that it would reduce its holding from 68 per cent to 51 per cent, and the
company’s independence was thus maintained.
42 Interview with BP executives.
43 Interview with BP executives.
44 Benn, Against the Tide, p.506 another example on p.449; and confirmed by interview 
with BP executive.
45 For BP agreement on participation see: ‘Gulf Agrees to North Sea Share for State,* 
Times, 26 February 1976, p .l; and Roger Vielvoye, ‘BP and Government Sign Wide-Ranging 
Deal on North Sea,’ Timest 2 July 1976, p.21.
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Government Could Not Come Up With the Cash
Changes in the structure o f the international oil industry had caused BP to
expand in new and costly ways, which forced the company by 1981 to raise additional
cash from its shareholders. The company’s financial health was threatened if  its major
shareholder was unable to meet the new demands placed on it. By 1980, BP needed
to raise cash. The government, in fact, had always been a reluctant investor.46 As
one BP executive explained:
There had always been a problem over the years. Whenever we 
wanted capital, it was always the wrong time to get it. The government 
would respond that they couldn’t find the money this year, or could we 
do it some other way than effecting the government’s shareholding, 
like convertible debentures.47
BP’s cash needs arose after the flush period o f the mid-1970s. Though BP’s 
sources o f crude oil were declining, profits increased through the 1970s with the price 
rises beginning in 1973-74. These profits provided the funding for BP’s exploration 
in the North Sea and Alaska, as well as diversification through acquisition - both 
geographically, in terms o f oil exploration, and also into new industries including 
chemicals and nutrition. The problem many BP managers argued was that BP paid 
too much for many o f those acquisitions.48 When the oil price dropped, the cost o f 
exploration and production in the North Sea and Alaska remained high and the non-oil 
businesses were still not making a profit. Therefore, BP found itself in a position 
where its turnover continued to rise through 1985, but its profits declined steadily
46 Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, p.242 and pp.212-4.
47 Interview with BP executive.
48 Interview with BP executives.
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(see Figure 5 .3).49 Beginning in the late 1970s, BP managers became concerned that
although their resources exceeded their immediate requirements, the company had 
insufficient retained earnings to replace its diminishing reserves of crude oil.50
BP P r o f i t  and Turnover
1973-1989
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Figure 5.3.
Traditionally, BP’s only other source of finance was from its shareholders. 
Because the government was reluctant to invest further, BP was forced into an 
uncomfortable position of turning to debt markets, selling subsidiaries or reducing 
growth.51 The sheer size of the financial commitment to invest in further share 
offerings can in part explain the government’s reluctance. The sums involved were 
vast. For example, BP’s investment costs in 1983 worldwide were £2.8 billion and
49 ‘A Year of Frustrated Expectations,’ Petroleum Economist, December 1982, p .482.
50 ‘Fifty Years of the Oil Industry,’ Petroleum Economist, September 1983, p .327; 
Donald Croll, ‘Focus on Upstream Operations,’ Petroleum Economist, May 1984, p. 169.
51 Donald Croll, ‘Finance and Investment,’ Petroleum Economist, September 1983, p .333; 
Uwe Jahnke and P. Gordon Webb, ‘A Bankers’ View of Project Funding,’ Petroleum 
Economist, October 1983, p .383; and ‘Financing New Oil Production,’ Petroleum Economist, 
May 1984, p. 166.
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in the North Sea alone, from BP’s first investment in the late 1960s to 1984, BP spent 
£4.5 billion in the North Sea, paid £11 billion in taxes to the British government, and 
realised £7 billion in profits.52 The cost to the government would have increased if  
they had enlarged their shareholding, unless the government chose not to subscribe 
in which case their percentage was diluted. The government’s potential liabilities for 
BP’s actual share issues in 1972 and 1981 for different percentage holdings are 
depicted in Table 5 .2 . The cost o f nationalizing BP was not a one time expense o f the 
acquisition o f outstanding shares, but a continuous cost because the company required 
capital inputs to grow, as estimated in Table 5.2 .
Table 5 .2 . Cost for Retaining Shareholding 
Percentage, Actual and Hypothetical, £ million
Actual 1972 1981
48% 36 —
46% — 288
Hypothetical
68% 51 424
100% 75 624
Source: BP, Annual Report and Accountsy 1972, p.29; and
1981, p.44.
The Costs of Government Ownership Overcame The Benefits 
The benefits to government ownership, from BP’s perspective, were primarily 
preferential treatment in the North Sea. The North Sea was very important to BP,
52 ‘Bringing in the Catch,’ Economist, 12 May 1984.
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more so than to the other major international oil companies. BP estimated that by 
1980, 60 per cent o f its UK sales came from the North Sea versus 20 per cent for 
Gulf, Shell and Exxon.53 BP and Shell with their British ownership (Shell being 40 
per cent British owned) proved to be the government’s preferred choice for control 
o f the North Sea.54 However, when weighing the benefits, by the mid-1970s the BP 
management realized that the costs were clearly greater, especially as they realized 
that the benefits could be sustained without government ownership. The costs as 
previously mentioned were financial constraints and liabilities abroad.
BP’s relationship with the government had become more complicated and 
different from when the government first invested in Anglo-Persian. When BP was 
operating abroad and repatriating profits back to Britain, the government benefitted 
from the inflow. In the North Sea, however, if  BP diverted profits from the North 
Sea abroad, the government would realize an outflow o f funds from Britain. BP’s 
future depended upon building up world wide markets, and they therefore needed 
North Sea production revenues to meet their growing business abroad, especially 
Europe.55 In contrast, the British government was less concerned with the 
companies’ revenues than making sure that the oil was available for Britain.
The determining factor for the BP management, however, was the discovery 
o f o il in Alaska and the growth o f BP’s markets abroad. British government 
ownership was a liability in the United States where there was a long history of
53 Interview with BP executive.
34 Shell (a 60% Dutch, 40% British company) worked in partnership with the US 
company Exxon in the North Sea.
55 BP, Annual Report and Accounts, 1980, 1989.
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protected markets and favouritism for American producers. It was, therefore, difficult 
for BP, a British company, to enter the market and gain concessions to fields in 
Alaska. The United States government did not want BP exporting Alaskan oil to 
Britain (or anywhere) if  a crisis should occur and there were oil shortages in the 
United States.56 Even today, BP oil produced in Alaska cannot be exported.57
The shifting centre o f BP’s activities is evident from the statistics. By 1980, 
over 20 per cent o f BP’s crude oil production came from Britain and over 30 per cent 
came from the United States; by 1985, these proportions had reached 33 per cent and 
59 per cent respectively. Britain had always been the largest source o f crude oil sales, 
representing 57 per cent in 1980 and 52 per cent in 1985, but the importance o f the 
United States grew rapidly during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The United States 
represented 25 per cent o f sales in 1980 and 36 per cent by 1985.58 W hile not 
determining factors, the management also saw a government share sale as a way to 
increase the number and geographical distribution o f its shareholders, something they 
thought necessary for an international or ‘stateless’ company.59
56 Interview with BP executives, Treasury civil servant, CPRS official and Labour 
minister; Donald Croll, ‘Marked Recovery for Most in 1987,’ Petroleum Economist, June 
1988, p. 196; and BP Annual Report and Accounts, 1987 and 1988. Some in BP played this 
down, however, arguing it was over-stated in the UK. Interview with BP executive.
37 Interview with BP executive.
58 BP, Annual Report and Accounts, 1981 and 1989.
59 Interview with BP executives. See discussion of ‘stateless* companies in Wyn Grant, 
‘Economic Globalisation, Stateless Firms and International Governance,* University of 
Warwick, Department of Politics and International Studies, Working Paper No. 105, April 
1992; and William Holstein with Stanley Reed, Jonathan Kapstein, Todd Vogel and Joseph 
Weber, ‘The Stateless Corporation,* Business Week, 14 May 1990, pp.52-9.
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5.2. The British National Oil Company and the National Interest
By the early 1980s, BNOC was financially independent from the government 
and was grudgingly recognized as a success both in terms o f profit and achieving 
national objectives. The management o f BNOC was proud o f both successes and by 
the early 1980s exceptionally loyal to the entity they had created. Though BNOC’s 
credibility remained linked to government ownership, there was tension with ministers 
which heightened the management’s desire for greater autonomy from government 
intervention. When the government proposed to split and sell only half o f the 
company, however, the BNOC management was opposed, placing greater importance 
on the company than on the form o f ownership. Because o f BNOC’s relatively small 
size and influence, they were limited in their ability to prevent the move.
Profit and Grudging Respect
Because BNOC’s objectives for serving the national interest were not stated 
explicitly, it is hard to measure the company’s success in those terms. In market 
terms, however, there is more concrete evidence. The management was able to raise 
funds from the private market beginning in 1977 with a loan o f $825 million from a 
consortium o f twelve UK and US banks, and expanded internationally (as discussed 
in Chapter Two). Most importantly, the company’s finances were strong. The 
company’s turnover increased from only £24 million in 1976 to over £9 billion in 
1984, and was making a healthy profit o f over £21 million by 1979 and £88 million 
in 1980. In 1981, however, Britoil was separated from BNOC, and the profits o f the 
company were drastically reduced (see Table 5 .3).
In 1979, the new Conservative government eliminated BNOC’s special
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Table 5.3. BNOC Accounts
Turnover 
£ mil
Net Profit 
(Loss) £ mil
1976 24 (2)
1977 28 (2)
1978 432 (3)
1979 3,245 22
1980 4,323 88
1981 5,752 77
1982 6,465 58
1983 7,910 0
1984 9,562 (12)
Source: BNOC, Annual Report and Accounts, 
1976-1984.
privileges including access to the National Oil Account, the right to sit on all 
operating committees, exemption from paying Petroleum Revenue Tax, the right o f 
first refusal on all leases changing hands, and the right to 51 per cent o f all new 
licenses. The private oil companies operating in the North Sea had treated BNOC 
with contempt and suspicion because o f these privileges.60 Because the privileges 
were seen as politically imposed liabilities rather than privileges, their elimination was 
a boost to BNOC’s commercial image. One BNOC executive explained: ‘We were 
heartily thankful. I was delighted because we didn’t want all o f those political 
duties.’61 Those in the DEn though saw it as a reduction o f BNOC’s power. One
60 Roger Vielvoye, ‘Exxon Chairman Says Group Not Volunteering for State 
Participation,* Times, 3 March, 1976, p. 17; and ‘Putting in Their Oar,* Economist, 2 June 
1982, p.S16.
61 Interview with BNOC executive.
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Department o f Energy civil servant stated: ‘It was a "body blow" to BNOC; they saw 
that their special position would be eroded.’62
BNOC also co-operated when the government encouraged BNOC to sell 
exploration acreage and to license new developments in existing fields to other 
operators. Since BNOC was only three years old at the time, the creation o f a Labour 
government and not well connected in the Conservative party, its management was 
tentative over its future and thought this might be a means to appease the 
Conservatives, heading o ff moves to split the company or sell more valuable 
assets.63
Serving the National Interest
The managers o f BNOC were committed to their company and excited by
BNOC’s potential ability to serve the country which they felt they could do better
than any other organization. There were many references to BNOC’s expertise versus
the government’s lack o f understanding. Sir Alistar Morton argued:
BNOC could have developed the whole North Sea, and cost was not 
the problem. BNOC had no problem raising the funds in 1977, and 
could have done this on a much bigger scale, five to ten times larger.
At the time $820 million could be paid back by one BNOC well [off­
shore oil field] in four to five years. $820 million is now equal to $4 
billion. What was missing from government, and always is, was vision 
or purpose.64
In many cases, the BNOC management argued that they could serve the national
62 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servant and BNOC executive.
® Interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 October 1993, and interview with BNOC 
executive.
64 Interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 October 1993.
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interest better than the government. For example, in terms o f the minimum 
percentage o f North Sea oil required to be refined in Britain, one BNOC executive 
explained:
The percentage that could go through the UK was larger than the [oil] 
industry had persuaded the Department o f Energy it could be. BNOC’s 
conviction was stronger than the department’s. BNOC regularly 
surpassed the percentage requirements.65
Two o f BNOC’s objectives were often in conflict - supplying oil to Britain in 
a crisis was not always compatible with maintaining a stable oil price. In order to set 
the price o f oil, or at least strongly influenced the price in the short-term, BNOC 
used contracts agreed quarterly or longer.66 The use o f long-term contracts 
compromised BNOC’s ability to supply oil to Britain quickly. The 1979 oil crisis was 
BNOC’s only real test, and (as described in Chapter Two) the business contracts that 
it had made, meant that BNOC could not shift the oil immediately.67 In addition, 
honouring a preset price, even when short-term oil prices were falling, BNOC was 
forced into a loss-making situation. The management fought to end long-term  
contracts in favour o f the current business practice o f short-term or spot market 
purchases, but despite their arguments and substantial losses, the government required 
the continuation o f long-term contracts.68 The primary explanation for the
65 Interview with BNOC executive.
66 Interview with BNOC executives; Richard Bailey, ‘Unequal Shares in the North Sea,* 
p.2 and p.4; Zuhayr Mikdashi, Transnational Oil Issues, Policies and Perspectives (London: 
Francis Pinter Publishers, 1986), p.35 and p.71; ‘Good Year for State Oil Companies,* 
Petroleum Economist, June 1982, p.253; ‘Britain’s Oil Policy,* Petroleum Economist, April
1984, p. 123; and Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 13 March 1985, vol.75, 
col.305.
67 Interview with BNOC executive; Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 14 May
1985, vol.79, col.254.
68 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 14 May 1985, vol.79, col.203-4.
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government’s resistance was financial. Because the price set by BNOC was the price 
the government used as a tax reference point, the higher BNOC’s price in a declining 
market, the less the government lost in terms o f taxes. And the more stable BNOC’s 
prices, the better the government could predict its oil revenues.69
The BNOC executives envisioned a larger role for themselves, but one that 
depended on governmental support. As part o f their justification for remaining a 
whole company in government ownership, the management tried to convince the 
government o f the importance o f its potential role. As one BNOC executive 
explained:
There could develop the situation where the North Sea was not 
attractive and [the private oil companies] would move elsewhere. At 
that time, the government would need a competent British company 
whose first priority was to develop North Sea oil in the interest o f 
Britain as distinct from any commercial interest. Commercial and 
national interests may diverge.70
Because the government had explicitly ensured that daily revenues were deposited in
the National Oil Account, BNOC had no way o f retaining funds to develop the
company infrastructure necessary for such non-commercial growth.71 To institute
this new objective, BNOC was dependent on government backing. From the
beginning, finance was an important aspect o f the company, and Treasury funds were
made available only to meet BNOC’s most basic development needs. In fact, as one
Department o f Energy civil servant remarked: ‘[The] Treasury’s real concern, once
BNOC was established, was that it would not represent an additional burden to the
69 Interview with BNOC executive; and Alick Buchanan-Smith, Minister of State for 
Energy, Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 18 December 1984, col.234.
10 Interview with BNOC executive.
71 Interviews with BNOC executives.
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PSBR. ’ For example, there were no funds available for BNOC to expand to the
refinery stage as intended from their original business plan.72
The management o f BNOC was quick to point out the power BNOC had. Sir
Alistar Morton explained:
BNOC decided who got the o il and for how long. The price was set 
by the world market, but the power was in who received the oil and 
for how long. This was a great bargaining advantage for BNOC and 
the UK.73
He gave several examples o f how BNOC used this advantage to serve Britain. These 
included how he negotiated a favourable contract with Germany to calm threats about 
going to the EC to settle the question o f sovereignty over the North Sea; developed 
plans to convince all companies to explore west o f the Shetland Islands, and aided 
British Airways during the 1979-80 oil crisis.74
Other BNOC executives also mentioned services BNOC provided. In the late 
1970s, ministers requested three times that BNOC place orders for drilling rigs on 
Clydeside yards, but BNOC was not sure they could buy the rigs and sell them at a 
profit. BNOC therefore requested an official direction from the Secretary o f State for 
Energy before fulfilling the order.75 In another case, BNOC served the government’s 
development needs by moving BNOC headquarters, in a controversial decision, to
72 Interview with BNOC executive; House of Commons Nationalized Industries Select 
Committee, ‘Testimony by Frank Kearton, Chairman of BNOC,’ p.2; and Peter D. Cameron, 
Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case o f North Sea Oil (London: Academic Press, 
1983), p. 158.
73 Interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 October 1993.
74 Interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 October 1993.
75 Interviews with BNOC executives; and Department of Energy, ‘About Britoil,’ p. 10.
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Glasgow instead o f Aberdeen.76 Possibly the most important event for the 
functioning o f the business though was when BNOC’s needs were deferred to the 
government’s financial needs and the development o f the Clyde oil field was delayed 
for three years in the mid-1980s.77
BNOC also arranged forward oil sales in 1980 and 1981 which enabled the 
government to record the revenues one year in advance, to meet the government’s 
short-term financial objectives.78 Sir Alistar Morton explains how these sales came 
about:
In the summer o f 1979 the government came to BNOC and told us that 
they were £500 million short, could we sell something, were any fields 
worth £450-£500 million? We responded by asking, if  we can raise the 
money another way, can we avoid breaking up BNOC? We knew that 
once the government started [selling o ff BNOC] they would’t stop.The 
concept o f a forward sale o f oil confounded them, but to us, it was old 
hat, we had raised $820 million in 1977 in that way. The government 
thought it would take us six months, the sale o f an oil field would have 
taken that long, but it only took us 17 days to raise £620 million.79
BNOC was able to raise £620 million in this way to credit the 1979/80 PSBR. The
following year, BNOC again sold oil forward, this time raising £550 million to credit
to the 1980/81 PSBR.80 Morton went on to add his disdain for the government’s lack
of understanding about the power o f oil: ‘Oil was valuable, but the government did
76 John McCall, ‘The Lawyer’s Role in the Oil Industry - A Look at the British National 
Oil Corporation and its Legal Department,'International Business Lawyer, Vol.7 (iii), 1979, 
p. 146; and interview with BNOC executive.
77 Interviews with BNOC executives; and Martin Quinlan, ‘The Need for New Oil,* 
Petroleum Economist, June 1981, pp.249-50.
78 Interview with BNOC executive.
79 Interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 October 1993.
80 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 9 October 1980, vol.413, col.708-710; 
Redwood, p. 109; and ‘BNOC: Up for Grabs,* Economist, 4 October 1980, p.63.
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not recognize it. The whole thing bedazzled them .’81
The Management’s Dilemma
With the prospect o f privatization, the BNOC management was forced to 
decide and defend its ownership preference. W hile government ownership was not 
obviously important, keeping the company whole and retaining the right to fulfil their 
original mission was (see discussion in Chapter Three). A ll o f the executives and 
board members who I interviewed expressed a sense o f accomplishment and pride. 
They were attached to the business they had helped create and were determined to 
defend its future. The reasons why they joined BNOC and why they wanted it to 
continue varied, however, from nationalist to commercial arguments.82 BNOC was 
described as ‘a great opportunity’ and a chance ‘to get in on the ground floor o f 
something interesting and new .’83 One former civil servant joined because he was 
worried about his finances and could earn more at BNOC than in the civil service.84 
Others had enjoyed working with Kearton previously and were persuaded by him to 
join BNOC.85
The one thing they did have in common, a BNOC executive explained, was 
that ‘most employees had a belief in the need for BNOC; they identified with it, and
81 Interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 October 1993.
82 Interviews with BNOC executives; and House of Commons Nationalized Industries 
Select Committee, ‘Testimony by Frank Kearton, Chairman of BNOC,’ p.56.
83 Interviews with BNOC executives.
84 Interview with BNOC executive.
85 Interview with BNOC executive.
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they had strong m otivations/86 The new chairman Frank Kearton believed that the
state should participate in the advantages o f North Sea oil, but also believed these
assets should be controlled by a commercially run entity.87 A few o f the early board
members, however, were committed to the ideology o f state owned industries. By the
time Kearton retired in 1979, the remaining members were predominately business
oriented, with some degree o f regard for the national interest.88 One BNOC
executive claimed:
I actually got more kick from believing that I was doing something 
which was in the community’s interest...than I got from the salary.89
Sir Alistar Morton summarized the position o f most managers: ‘BNOC was capitalist,
but not Thatcherite. We all strongly believed that the UK should have a state oil
company, and BNOC proved this in many w ays.’90
The management’s strategy to prevent a change was to delay the government’s
moves towards a sale. As one BNOC explained:
We made sure that they [the Conservatives] were aware o f all the 
complications, legal implications with the joint ventures, international 
markets etc. ..by the time we finished with them, they were really 
confused. We thought that the Conservative’s desire [to sell BNOC] 
would pass, so delaying tactics were best.91
86 Interview with BNOC executive.
87 Interviews with BNOC executives.
88 Thomas Balogh was Member of the Economic and Financial Committee of the Labour 
Party, 1943-64 and 1971-85; Minister of State in the Department of Energy, 1974-75; and 
Deputy Chairman, BNOC, 1976-78, and economic advisor, 1978-79. Interviews with BNOC 
executives.
89 Interview with BNOC executive.
90 Interview with Sir Alistar Morton, 15 October 1993.
91 Interview with BNOC executive.
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The commitment o f the management to the company was an important factor in all 
o f the asset sales but the government’s ability to appoint a new chairman, negated the 
power o f this factor in the case o f BNOC. It was apparent that the Conservative’s 
choice, Philip Shelboume, was committed to privatization, but even he was not 
enthusiastic about the idea o f splitting BNOC.92 But since his loyalty was to the 
government, he took on the task o f convincing the board to accept the government’s 
decision even though they were strongly opposed.93
For the personnel o f BNOC in 1981, the split and the sale meant that all 
operations stayed intact, but separately. Britoil became a private sector company, with 
Shelboume as its chairman, and BNOC remained an oil trading operation headed by 
the then deputy chairman Lord Croham. Those who went with Britoil were reluctant 
because, as one BNOC executive said: ‘I would have liked to stay with BNOC, but 
didn’t think it was viable.*94 They were persuaded that they might still be able to 
serve the national interest by further developing the North Sea, and only one 
executive resigned when Shelboume was appointed, which by all accounts was for 
personal reasons.95 In fact, the management o f Britoil continued many o f BNOC’s 
practices which were oriented towards serving Britain’s interest, such as focusing on 
exploration in the North Sea. Some argued that this was to the detriment o f Britoil’s
92 Interviews with BNOC executives.
93 Interviews with BNOC executives; Hugh Stephenson, ‘A Dreadful Waste of Energy,’ 
limes, 17 June 1980, p. 19; and Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights, p. 168.
94 Interview with BNOC executive.
95 Alistar Morton and Philip Shelboume had had a falling out years earlier when they 
were both working for merchant banks. Peter Hill and Richard Evans, ‘Top Executive 
Resigns from BNOC,’ Times, 31 May 80, p .19.
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future and one o f the reasons why the company was such an easy takeover target.96
For those in the trading operation, prospects were not as good. Though Ian
Goskirk, a dynamic oil executive, remained to head the trading operations, it was
clear that BNOC’s days o f controlling the majority o f North Sea oil were over. Once
the government’s plans o f splitting the company were confirmed, two senior officials
in the trading operation resigned to return to the private sector.97 One executive who
stayed with BNOC confessed:
I would have preferred to go to Britoil, I was more interested in 
physical operations than trading operation. I had only planned to work 
for 5 years after retirement from civil service anyway.98
Another recognized the limitations the split imposed for the career opportunities for
younger employees as previously there had been much back and forth between the
production and trading operation that would no longer be possible.99 Ultimately the
remaining trading operations o f BNOC were wound down in 1985 and Britoil was
taken over by BP in 1988, thus confirming the management’s initial fears in 1980.
5.3. British Gas Corporation: Defending Its Empire
By the early 1980s, BGC had proved not only that it was financially 
successful, but that it was a strong and independent company finding and providing 
gas efficiently to British customers. As such, the management was proud o f what it 
had achieved, but as a large, long established and successful company also had
96 Interview with BNOC executive.
97 Ray Dafter, ‘Two Senior Officials Resign from BNOC,’ Financial Times, 25 February 
1982.
98 Interview with BNOC executive.
99 Interview with BNOC executive.
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important resources to defend its interests, which it chose to use in the face o f the 
government’s plans to disassemble and sell its oil assets.
Independence and Success
BGC became financially independent by 1980: It was greatly aided by the
discovery o f gas in the North Sea, and also by the structure o f the company as
defined in the 1972 Gas Act and its monopoly power. One o f the crucial clauses in
the Act prevented the government from directly taking the profits from British Gas
(as it could do with BNOC). When the Gas Act was written in 1972, the corporation
was small and only limited quantities o f gas had been brought ashore from the North
Sea. The financial legislation, therefore, focused on borrowing requirements and
assistance, not on profits and profit retention. While the Secretary o f State was given
the authority to withdraw excess revenues (should there be any in the future), there
was a caveat that became important later. The Secretary o f State could have excess
revenues paid to him, provided:
that no such direction shall be given as respects any financial year 
unless the total o f the sums standing to the credit o f the Corporation’s 
reserves at the beginning o f that year exceeds 10 per cent o f the value 
at the beginning o f that year o f their net assets as for the time being 
defined for the purposes o f this section by the Secretary o f State.100
In practice, this meant that the government could only extract profits after
British Gas had made provisions to build adequate reserves.101 The finance
100 Gas Act of 1972.
101 British Gas Corporation, ‘The Work of the Financial Division,* internal memo, early 
1980s, p.2; and William Jewers, ‘Required Rate of Return, Test Discount Rate, Pricing 
Policies and Financial Targets,’ Seminar on the Financial Target of Public Corporations, 30 
January 1979, p.2.
171
managers o f British Gas acknowledged that the amounts necessary to replace existing 
assets were not easy to determine, especially during periods o f high inflation. The 
problem was that existing reserves had to be replaced at current prices rather than 
historic costs. Officially, the rates o f depreciation, as well as BGC’s financial targets, 
were set by the Ministry o f Trade and Industry and later the Department o f Energy, 
in consultation with BGC. As the main provider o f information, the management, 
however, was very influential. They convincingly argued that savings based on 
historic cost alone would oblige British Gas to borrow money to meet current costs 
just to maintain the business in its existing state, potentially creating an interest 
charge burden that BGC could not support.102 One BGC finance executive argued 
that it was his responsibility to ensure that the replacement o f existing assets at 
current cost was met from current revenues.103 BGC also had (or created) room to 
manipulate the accounts to protect its own interests. For example, two measures were 
introduced in the mid-1970s which increased the amount o f revenues set aside for 
building reserves, and also had the effect o f keeping profits down. In the 1976-77 
fiscal year, BGC introduced a supplementary depreciation charge into the revenue 
account to provide for the current replacement cost o f assets, and from the 1975-76 
fiscal year BGC charged certain day to day items o f replacement expenditure to 
revenue.104
By the early 1980s BGC began to assert its independence more and its
102 BGC, ‘The Work of the Financial Division,* p.5; and Jewers, ‘We’re Not As Different 
as Private Industry Thinks,* pp.330-1. This was a generally accepted characteristic of BGC, 
see Lynn Pearson, Organization of the Energy Industry, p. 100.
103 Jewers, ‘Required Rate of Return,* p.8.
1(H BGC, ‘The Work of the Financial Division,* p.5; and Jewers, *We*re Not As Different 
as Private Industry Thinks,* p.332.
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management became adamant that they and not ministers should run the business. 
Even though the government had the power to set the financial targets in consultation 
with BGC, in 1980 the chairman Denis Rooke wrote to David Howell, the Secretary 
of State for Energy, and argued that he did not agree with his financial targets. 
According to a BGC executive, Rooke said that the gas industry was his industry, not 
the government’s, and BGC should, therefore, be setting the financial targets.105 
The government ultimately had the final say. For example, in 1984 BGC wanted to 
expand internationally by purchasing gas from Norway’s Sleipner field. In the 
company’s view this step was consistent with serving its customers and preserving the 
future o f the business. Access to the enormous Sleipner field would have ensured 
adequate long-term supplies. Christopher Brierley, Head o f Economic Planning, 
explained: ‘British Gas cannot gamble with its customers’ supplies.’106 In February 
1985, ministers rejected the proposal because they wanted to ensure that gas resources 
in Britain were developed. BGC managers were deeply disappointed and resentful o f 
the government’s interference.107
BGC also gained some independence by increasing its private sector 
operations. In 1976-77, BGC was granted permission to operate in the commercial 
market.108 Given the valuable assets the company had developed, the private sector
105 Interview with BGC executives.
106 Martin Quinlan, ‘British Gas Stresses Need for Imports,* Petroleum Economist, 
December 1984, p.445.
107 Martin Quinlan, ‘British Gas Stresses Need for Imports,* Petroleum Economist, 
December 1984, p.445; and ‘Sleipner Cancellation Boosts UK North Sea,’ Petroleum 
Economist, March 1985, p.84.
108 Pearson, Organization of the Energy Industry, p. 100.
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was willing to finance most o f its needs.109 BGC worked to increase its production 
as well as the number o f supply contracts with private companies. As a consequence, 
it was necessary for BGC to follow current business practices so that private 
companies could better evaluate the corporation, which forced BGC to act more like 
a private company. This strong business attitude was welcomed by the Treasury, 
which BGC saw as an ally. As was the case for BP and BNOC, the management o f 
BGC perceived that the Treasury supported their business success. As one executive 
explained, ‘what was good for BGC was good for Treasury. BGC profits meant a 
better PSBR for the Treasury.*110
Being a monopoly in the gas industry, the corporation took advantage o f the 
power, but being government owned was also subjected to political intervention. For 
example, in 1976 the government imposed an increase in the price o f gas not because 
the industry required it, but for political reasons, to help offset the rising PSBR.111 
Though oil was not the corporation’s core business, the management feared that the 
oil asset sales were another means for the government to interfere, they were 
especially worried because the measures could set a precedent for the rest o f their 
business.112
BGC’s position was also weakened because its financial success (linked to the 
1972 Gas Act structure) became too conspicuous. By 1981 not only had BGC repaid 
its loans to the government, it started lending money (£200 million in 1979 and
109 BGC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1985.
110 Interview with BGC executive.
111 Interview with BGC executive; and ‘Large Rise in Gas Prices,’ Petroleum Economist, 
19 February 1980, p.80.
112 Interviews with BGC executives.
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another £100 million in 1980) to the government under a ‘reverse* National Loans 
Fund arrangement with an interest rate agreed between the Treasury and BGC, 
approximately two points below the going rate.113 The government also developed 
means to extract extra revenue from BGC through taxes and levies. BGC went from 
paying £184.8 million to the government in taxes and royalties in the 1979-80 fiscal 
year and £87.6 million in 1980-81 (in addition to the loans in both years) to £1 billion 
in 1982-83 (when no further loans were made). The tax bills declined slightly in the 
following years but only to £704.9 million in 1984-85. At the same time, however, 
the government received the £392.2 million proceeds from the sale o f BGC’s offshore 
oil assets.114
Illustrating the corporation’s political power, instead o f accepting the tax 
increase quietly, the company passed them on to customers and enclosed a leaflet with 
every household gas bill which effectively blamed the government for the rise in 
prices. Conservative Members o f Parliament were inundated with complaints from 
constituents who held the government responsible.115 BGC’s strong public campaign 
demonstrated its corporate emphasis upon autonomy and its readiness to exploit 
available resources actively to contain adverse policy shifts by ministers.
113 BGC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1981 and 1985; and Jewers, ‘We’re Not As 
Different as Private Industry Thinks,* p.330-1; and interview with BGC executive.
114 BGC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1981-85; and Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale,’ 
p.iii. The tax figures exclude VAT and PAYE.
115 Lawson, The View from N o .ll, p. 172; and interview with Department of Energy civil 
servant; Ian Glover-James, ‘Gas Price Row is Cooled,’ Daily Telegraph, 31 July 1981, p.2; 
and ‘Large Rise in Gas Prices,* Petroleum Economist, 19 February 1980, p.80.
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The Management’s Commitment to its Corporation
The BGC management was loyal, proud o f the corporation, and resented 
government interference. Many of the executives had the choice of working for either 
a private sector company or BGC and chose BGC despite the lower pay. They were 
rewarded with a sense o f accomplishment in building up an organization they saw as 
a national asset.116 As a whole, one BGC executive explained, BGC was a valuable 
British resource:
Britain is fighting an economic war against the rest o f the world. BGC 
is a little bit of it with international obligations. Rather than try and 
carve everything up in Britain and make every man at every level 
compete with his brother, what you [the government] should be doing 
is try to build up a number o f significant lead industries in Britain 
which are important to the core industry and strong enough to be 
independent and fly world wide. What you should be doing is to 
reinforce success where you find it, because there is too little o f it in 
Britain. What you are doing is carving up companies whether they are 
successful or not, just on some theoretical model.117
Like BNOC, the management opposed any division of their corporation. The
BGC management argued that selling discrete pieces such as its oil assets would
undermine their ability to serve the national interest. The 1980-81 Annual Report
stated: ‘The corporation believes that disposal [of the oil fields] would impede or
prevent the proper discharge of its statutory duties.’118 The pride managers felt in
their achievement made them adamant that none o f BGC’s operations should be
destroyed or diminished.119 Managers also had less noble reasons, such as benefits
116 Interview with BGC executives and Department of Energy civil servant.
117 Interview with BGC executive.
118 BGC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1980-81, p. 10.
119 Interview with BGC executives their personal views as well as an assessment of the 
Board and BGC employees.
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that stemmed from being employed in a lucrative monopoly. BGC’s offices were 
plush and there were non-salary benefits such as daily chauffeur transportation to and 
from work for top level executives.120 As one civil servant surmised: ‘Profits were 
part passed on to customers in cheap prices, part to government and part BGC spent 
on extravagances.’121
The management’s commitment to preserving the whole company intact, for 
national service or personal perks reasons, is evident from the corporation’s flat 
refusal to sell any of its assets unless ordered to do so. The issue o f selling its oil 
assets first arose in 1975 when the Labour government’s original plans for BNOC 
included transferring the oil assets from the National Coal Board (NCB) and BGC to 
the new national oil company.122 BGC, however, fought the sequestration by 
arguing that it was difficult to distinguish between oil and gas fields before they were 
developed.123 When BNOC was created in 1976, very few o f BGC’s fields had been 
developed. By the early 1980s, however, these arguments no longer held. Most of 
BGC’s fields had been explored and were producing, making it obvious which were 
gas and which were oil fields. At the same time, the general relationship between 
BGC and the government had changed too. In the mid-1970s, BGC was still repaying 
loans to the government, by the early 1980s, BGC was highly profitable and was
120 Interview with BGC executive and Treasury civil servant.
121 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
122 On 28 February 1975, John Smith, MP, Parliamentary Secretary in the Department 
of Energy announced that the assets of the NCB and British Gas would form the basis of 
BNOC. Gerry Corti and Frank Frazer, The Nation’s Oil: A Story of Control (London: 
Graham & Trotman, 1983), p. 104.
123 Interview with BGC executive and Department of Energy civil servant.
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loaning money to the government.124
Using its corporate expertise and well established government contacts, the
BGC management was able to resist implementation of the government’s plans. One
DEn civil servants stated: ‘I thought Rooke was as obstructive as he could decently
be. Other people thought he was indecent.’125 The management used all available
means to block the sale including lobbying Members o f Parliament, giving
information to members of the opposition parties who then called for hearings and
investigations, and arguing over the value of the field itself. The management argued
that the bids were not high enough and delayed the negotiations. They even tried to
retain a small shareholding, without success.
The implications for delaying the sale were significant as illustrated with the
Enterprise Oil sale. The timing of the 1983 election meant that the Secretary o f State
for Energy Nigel Lawson almost failed to implement the sale o f Enterprise Oil. As
Lawson explained,
I was just about to sign the instruction to [Rooke]...when the 1983 
election was called. Constitutional propriety required that any further 
action be delayed until the outcome o f the election was known.126
Had Labour won, or even a more sympathetic Conservative minister replaced Lawson
after the election, BGC might not have been forced to sell its oil assets. In fact, the
new Secretary o f State Peter Walker later proved to be more sympathetic towards
BGC. Lawson, however, was determined that only a (highly improbable) Labour
victory should thwart the sale. He signed a letter to enact the disposal before leaving
124 BGC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1979-1983.
125 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
126 Lawson, The View from N o .ll, p.215.
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for the campaign trail, and gave it to his private secretary for safekeeping with 
instructions to destroy it if  the Conservatives lost the election, but to send it on upon 
receipt o f a telephone call if  they won. Lawson telephoned the day after the election, 
and the letter was sent. It turned out to be Lawson’s last act as Energy Secretary 
before becoming Chancellor of the Exchequer.127 It seems that the Cabinet 
Secretary, Robert Armstrong, looked the other way at this breach of previous 
convention.
In BGC’s case, ministers did not take advantage of the end of the chairman’s
term to replace Denis Rooke, a very vocal opponent o f privatization. When his first
term ended in 1980, David Howell reappointed Rooke. Some Department o f Energy
civil servants thought that Howell was intimidated by Rooke and was too frightened
of making waves not to reappoint him.128 Lord Lawson’s hindsight view, however,
was that there was no reason to replace him:
Howell was not yet thinking about the privatization. The only thing 
that was being discussed for sale at the time was the BGC showrooms 
which were introduced by the Department o f Trade and Industry (DTI) 
in response to a poor report on competition policy.129
When Lawson became Secretary of State for Energy, he could not fire Rooke. But
he could and did appoint new board members to minimize Rooke’s power and
increase Lawson’s information about BGC.130
Ultimately, BGC’s management could not prevent the sale o f their assets, and
127 Lawson, The View from N o .ll , p.215.
128 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
129 Interview with Lord Nigel Lawson, 15 February 1994.
130 Lawson, The View from N o .ll , p.214.
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thus the sale proceeded, raising £215 million which was retained by BGC.131 The 
matter o f retaining the proceeds was not the key point o f conflict, however. In fact, 
BGC management had demonstrated its preference was to keep the assets. When the 
government announced its intention to separate and sell the oil assets o f BGC in 1980, 
but before any concrete plans had been made, Rooke was approached by the chairman 
of RTZ Alistar Frame who wanted to buy BGC’s offshore oil assets. Even though 
BGC could have received the proceeds from a sale to RTZ, Rooke refused and the 
board backed his decision.132 Shortly thereafter, the government passed the 1981 
Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act which gave the Secretary of State for Energy the 
authority to direct BGC to separate and sell its oil fields and directed the proceeds to 
the Treasury instead of BGC.
Conclusion
The variations in the three companies’ reactions to privatization clearly reflect 
their different situations in terms o f the three variables outlined above: organizational 
autonomy, financial independence, and success in achieving the company’s mission. 
The different situations o f the companies in terms o f organizational autonomy and 
financial independence are illustrated in Figure 5.4. BNOC started in 1976 as a 
company with a large amount of government control and little financial independence 
(quadrant 4). After obtaining finance in the private sector and increasing the size of 
its production and trading operations by 1980, BNOC became financially independent,
131 BGC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1983-84, p.5; and BGC, ‘Report to Employees,* 
1981-82.
132 Interview with business executive and BGC executive.
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Figure 5.4. Company Status: BNOC, BGC and BP
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but because o f the government’s narrow legislation remained under government 
control (quadrant 1).
BGC was a financially unsuccessful company controlled by the government 
(quadrant 4) until 1972 when its governmental control mechanisms were re-written 
with the 1972 Gas Act, it then became more autonomous (quadrant 3). After its North 
Sea fields began to produce, BGC’s position shifted again to one that was more 
financially independent (quadrant 2). As government ministers sought new means to 
assert control over the company and capture the company’s increased profits, BGC 
managers sought to preserve their autonomy and independence (i.e. fearing a return 
to quadrant 4).
When the government first invested in BP in 1914, it was because BP was in 
need o f financial assistance. But the financial dependence did not mean a loss of
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organizational autonomy as the government agreed to a non-intervention arrangement 
(quadrant 3). With its exploration and production success in the Middle East, BP 
became financially independent and became increasingly so with the oil price rises in 
the mid-1970s (quadrant 2). When BP faced cash shortages and turned to its 
shareholders, managers feared a return to financial dependence on the government 
(quadrant 3) and thus sought alternative means to maintain its independence.
Generalizing these findings, companies in quadrant 2 are the most receptive 
to privatization and are the best able to influence the outcome. Companies in quadrant 
1 and 3 have mixed preferences towards privatization and are less effective in 
demanding their preferences. Finally, managers of companies in quadrant 4 are 
resistant to privatization and such companies are the most difficult to transfer to the 
private sector.
A  company’s mission becomes important for privatization implications when 
a company has low autonomy in which case the company has a profit motive and the 
managers will be more enthusiastic for the company to be privatized than they would 
i f  the company had a national interest mission. The one exception is a company that 
has successfully achieved its mission, either high profits or good national service, and 
needs to be split in order to be sold. In such cases, the management will desire 
government ownership of the whole company over greater autonomy or independence. 
Because the companies in this case were all successful in achieving their missions, 
the managers were attached, loyal and protective of their respective companies. For 
the managers o f BP, this was not an important factor as the company was already 
autonomous and independent and had a profit motive - and the government did not 
consider splitting BP. Privatization o f BNOC and BGC’s oil assets, however, entailed
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splitting the companies and therefore the managers resisted the privatization measures, 
making privatization more difficult.
The ability of the managers of each company to resist was a product of the 
financial independence and their success in achieving their mission. Because BP was 
the most autonomous, financially independent and successful in achieving its profit 
mission, its managers were the most effective in keeping their company whole and 
maintaining their autonomy. Because BGC was autonomous and financially 
independent yet still susceptible to government interference, its managers were only 
able to delay the sale o f the company’s oil assets. Finally, because BNOC was not 
autonomous despite being financially independent, its managers were the least 
successful in maintaining the company as a whole. BNOC managers efforts to delay 
or prevent the split o f its company and privatization were thwarted by the 
government’s appointment o f a chairman favourable to privatization.
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Chapter Six: Public Choice and the Government Bureaucracy
Budget-maximizing theories assume (mostly from American experience) that 
bureaucrats not only want the power and status that comes with bigger governmental 
departments, but the pecuniary benefits that come through bigger budgets. The theory 
predicts that bureaucrats always demand bigger budgets and search for new means to 
create bigger departments.1 In the post war period, departmental budgets have mostly 
grown, providing some prima facie evidence that these assumptions could be correct. 
Applying the conventional expansionist model to a government’s sale o f assets, we 
would expect civil servants to resist any reduction of their department’s size, yet I 
found the exact opposite. The civil servants in the British government provided no 
opposition to the government’s oil asset sales and in several cases aided the process. 
More recent work in public choice suggests some explanations. First, recent empirical 
studies have argued that the link between budget growth and pecuniary benefits is 
weak if  it exists at all.2 Second, studies have questioned the traditional assumptions
1 Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, p.38; Robert Goodin, ‘Rational 
Politicians and Rational Bureaucrats in Washington and Whitehall,* Public Administration, 
Vol.60, Spring 1982; James Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan as interpreted in Richard 
McKenzie and Dwight Lee, Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement o f Wealth had 
Changed the World (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p.29; Dennis Mueller, Public Choice 
II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Chapters 3, 17, 23 and 24; Sam 
Peltzman, ‘The Growth of Government,’ Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.23, No.2, 
October 1980, pp.209-18; and A.H. Melzer and S.F. Richard, ‘Why Government Grows, and 
Grows, in a Democracy,* Public Interest, Vol.52, Summer 1978, pp. 111-18.
2 For example, Ronald Johnson and Gary Libecap (‘Agency Growth*) provide evidence 
to show: ‘At best, agency size would have to double for salaries to increase by 4.4 percent 
over a five-year period.’ (p.448); also see Robert Young, ‘Budget Size and Bureaucratic 
Careers,* pp.36-43; a study by Keith Roberson as described in Douglas Wass, ‘The Public 
Service in Modern Society,* Public Administration, Vol.61, Spring 1983; and Sophie Watson, 
‘Is Sir Humphrey Dead? The Changing Culture of the Civil Service,* Working Paper 103, 
University of Bristol, School for Advanced Urban Studies, July 1992, p.60.
Yet Andrew Dunsire shows evidence that staff cuts in the British civil service from 
1980 to 1984 of 8% produced a 5% salary increase. Andrew Dunsire, ‘Bureaucrats and
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about bureaucrats’ motivations. For example, Dunleavy’s ‘bureau shaping’ model 
argues that
higher-ranking bureaucrats place more emphasis upon non-pecuniary 
utilities: such as status, prestige, patronage and influence, and most 
especially the interest and importance of their work tasks.3
Accepting the importance of non-pecuniary motivations makes it possible to
understand instances where it is in the interest o f civil servants to reduce the size o f
their departments or o f the government apparatus in general. Dunleavy argues that
bureaucrats collectively pursue such strategies when greater power or job satisfaction
can be achieved as a result.4
To fully understand different bureaucrats’ actions, in addition to motivations,
we also need to recognize the different constraints faced by bureaucrats. Until
recently, the importance of the institutional structures in which actors work has not
been fully recognized. The work in the field o f the ‘new institutionalism’ can be seen
as a reaction to the lack of attention scholars have paid to constraints.5 Evidence
Conservative Governments,* in Blais and Dion, eds., The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat, 
pp. 192-4. Dunsire has merely shown a correlation, though. A more likely explanation for the 
salary increases was the Conservative electoral promises to honour the Clegg Commission pay 
rises. Hugo Young, One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher, Final Edition (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), p. 151; and Martin Holmes, The First Thatcher Government 1979-83: 
Contemporary Conservatism and Economic Change (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1985), 
p. 107.
3 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, pp.200-1.
4 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, pp.204-5 and pp.239-48; also 
see Laurence E. Lynn, ‘The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat: Is There a Case?* in Blais and 
Dion, eds., The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat, p.71; and Campbell and Naulls, ‘The Limits 
of the Budget-Maximizing Theory,’ p.89.
5 J.C. March and J.P.Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life,* American Political Science Review, Vol.78, September 1984, pp.734-5; Robert 
Grafstein, Institutional Realism, Social and Political Constraints on Rational Actors, (London: 
Yale University Press, 1992), p. 12, p.82 and p.91; and John Campbell and Leon Lindberg, 
‘The Evolution of Governance Regimes,’ in John Campbell, J. Rodgers Hollingsworth and 
Leon Lindberg, eds., Governance of the American Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge
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from recent studies using a cross country comparison has highlighted the importance 
of institutional structure as the determinant of bureaucrats’ behaviour and outcomes.6 
Though the motivations of actors are greatly influenced by the structures, institutions 
do not solely determine individuals’ actions. An individual chooses to join an 
organization and whether to advance according to the established rules or work to 
change those rules.7 Such findings highlight the need for a model to explain the 
differences between countries by incorporating institutional structures and a broader 
definition o f bureaucrats’ motivations.
The remaining factor that needs to be addressed is why most scholars o f 
bureaucratic behaviour have focused on the collective action o f bureaucrats, and why 
very few examine individual strategies. Though Dunleavy correctly notes that a civil 
servant ‘can most directly and strongly improve her personal position using an 
individual strategy,’ he does not elaborate on what those individual strategies might 
be or when they will be used. In fact his bureau-shaping model itself only analyzes 
collective strategies. This ommision is especially surprising for public choice theorists 
because the individual as the basic unit of analysis in public choice theories. By 
focusing on collective strategies, we have been missing much o f what is happening 
in government today.
University Press, 1991), p.327.
6 Lynn, ‘The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat,’ pp.75-80; Campbell and Naulls, ‘The 
Limits of the Budget-Maximizing Theory,* pp.99-104; Christopher Hood and Andrew Dunsire 
with Meg Huby, Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies: Popular Theories and 
Observed Outcomes in Whitehall, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and 
B.Guy Peters, ‘The European Bureaucrat: The Applicability of Bureaucracy and 
Representative Government to Non-American Settings,* in Blais and Dion, eds., The Budget- 
Maximizing Bureaucrat, pp.306-7.
7 David Silverman, The Theory of Organizations: A Sociological Framework, (London: 
Heinemann, 1972) Chapter 6 and pp. 147-52.
186
Figure 6.1.: Strategies and Structures
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The traditional view has been one of bureaucrats as budget maximizers, but 
budget-maximizing is only one of four possible strategies for bureaucrats (see Figure 
6.1). To explain the different types of bureaucrats* behaviour, it is necessary to 
recognize the structures within which bureaucrats function and the means they have 
to maximize their utility. The most significant structural feature is whether the 
bureaucrat is tied to one bureau or department or whether there is movement between 
divisions and departments. The individual then has the choice o f using individual or 
collective means to achieve his or her desired goals. As illustrated in Figure 6.1, in 
bureaucracies where there is little movement between departments, or such movement 
is only for demotion, bureaucrats will pursue strategies to enhance their immediate 
situation. As many studies have shown, this can be done in a collective manner by 
padding budgets, proposing large, inefficient projects and increasing the size o f the
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department’s staff, known as budget-maximizing (quadrant 4). But this can also be 
done on an individual level where civil servants will try to enhance their situation 
using numerous techniques ranging from delegating work to others to seeking 
additional job titles to hoarding departmental stationery; in other words, self- 
maximizing (quadrant 1). While the individual may chose between individual and 
collective strategies and many employ more than one strategy at a time (illustrated by 
the double arrows between quadrant 1 and 4), his or her situation is restricted by the 
bureaucratic structure.
Bureaucrats in a more flexible bureaucracy have less allegiance to one 
department and are therefore more concerned with their own personal advancement 
than with the growth or even continuation of their present department. This is done 
in a collective manner by contracting-out non-core functions and eliminating menial 
tasks, and is known as bureau-shaping (quadrant 3). It can also be done on an 
individual level. Techniques include working on high profile projects, efficiently 
implementing politically popular policies and protecting ones’ superiors (on whom 
their promotions depend) or, in other words, career-maximizing (quadrant 2). 
Bureaucrats in more flexible bureaucracies can chose between individual career- 
maximizing and collective bureau-shaping strategies (as illustrated by the double 
arrows between quadrants 2 and 3). They also have more choices than their 
counterparts in restrictive bureaucracies because, in some cases, they can choose not 
to move between departments, depending on their own personal capabilities including 
limited managerial abilities. In these cases they can select self-maximizing strategies 
or if  others have decided likewise, budget-maximizing strategies, (illustrated by the 
one-way arrows from quadrant 2 to 1 and quadrant 3 to 4).
188
Movement within bureaucracies can occur at three levels; between 
departments, between divisions within departments and within divisions. The greater 
the movement between departments, the more individuals will employ career- 
maximizing and bureau-shaping strategies. When movement is within divisions only, 
bureau and self-maximizing strategies are most likely. Movement between divisions 
but within a department presents an interesting intermediate case in which strategies 
are more likely to be mixed between career and self-maximizing, and between 
bureau-shaping and budget maximizing.
Next I examine why individual strategies will be most common in government 
bureaucracies. The difficulties of organizing collective action in general have been 
recognized by scholars at least since Mancur Olson’s seminal work, The Logic o f  
Collective Action published in 1965. To emphasize the difficulties o f achieving 
collective action in governmental bureaucracies, I examine the conditions necessary 
for such actions (see Figure 6.2). Assuming that bureaucrats are rational utility 
maximizers, they will react to a policy change based on how they perceive the 
personal effect of the policy. What is personally negative is in part determined by the 
degree o f movement in the bureaucracy or even within the department. When there 
is a high degree of movement, very few policies are actually perceived as personally 
negative because the civil servant can move to avoid such effects. Thus, most civil 
servants in flexible bureaucracies will not be threatened personally by change (Box 
3 or 4 in Figure 6.2).
Bureaucrats’ abilities to respond collectively are also determined by the 
strength o f their department. A department’s strength is a factor of its visibility,
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Figure 6.2. Bureaucrats’ Strategies:
Individual and Collective Responses to Policy Change
Strong Weak
Department Department
Personally
Negative
Change
Retaliate
collectively
2
Resist
individually
1
3 4
Personally Initiate Accept
Positive primarily individually individually
Change but collectively possible
importance to the public, and political ‘clout.*8 Collective action will not be 
effective in weak departments and is therefore not worth pursuing. An individual in 
a weak department who perceives change to be negative will resist that change 
individually by employing a range of techniques from voicing concern to selectively 
revealing information to threatening to resign (box 1). An individual in a weak 
department who perceives change to be positive need not employ any strategy, just 
accept the proposal and work to implement it (box 4).
An individual in a strong department who perceives change to be positive may 
do the same as their counterpart in a weak department and accept it, or because of  
their greater resources may encourage the policy further by suggesting efficient ways
8 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, p. 181; and also from Hood and 
Dunsire, Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies, p.49 - who have in turn extracted 
from Beck Jorgensen, ‘The Management of Survival and Growth in Public Organizations,* 
paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions, Barcelona, 1985.
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to implement the policy or additional arguments in favour or even block alternatives 
(box 3). Should others perceive the same, these actions can be done collectively as 
well, though it will be less advantageous because credit for the success will be more 
difficult to attribute. A civil servant in a strong department who perceives change to 
be negative will fight back with all the resources available, including fellow 
colleagues and the department's assets. This might entail devising alternative 
strategies or embarrassing the ministers proposing the changes. Fighting back is of 
course a high risk strategy because failure may prevent further career advancement 
or reduce departmental functions, but because personal negative change may threaten 
one's job altogether, it may be worth the risk.
The evidence of this case supports these general assertions and provides 
additional examples of career-maximizing strategies. In this study, I focus on the top 
level civil servants (Gl-7) in the Department of Energy and the Treasury. Higher 
level civil servants are the ones with the greatest ability to affect government policy. 
And while the Admiralty and later the Ministry o f Defence, the Foreign Office, and 
the Department of Trade and Industry also had interests in the sales, they were less 
affected by them and therefore are only considered tangentially in this analysis.
6 .1 . Civil Servants as Career Maximizers
Contrary to conventional public choice models, privatization was not seen as 
a threat by DEn or Treasury employees, in part because it did not infringe on civil 
servants’ jobs or the core function of the department. In fact, because privatization 
provided interesting work and a chance for some civil servants to be in the policy 
making limelight, it was generally well received.
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Interesting Work and Career Advancement
The primary motivation for the civil servants I interviewed was interesting 
work. Drawing from their statements, but also their actions, career advancement was 
their primary objective. While interest in perks and lax work schedules would not be 
revealed to an outside interviewer, the frequency and variety o f ways in which 
interest in their work was expressed suggests that it was a genuine factor, particularly 
since these opinions were often volunteered in the context o f other questions. For 
example, one civil servant described the thrill o f working on policies at the ‘heart of 
affairs.’ Another civil servant explained: The civil service is ‘notbadly paid, provides 
interesting work, is at the centre of power, and stimulating - especially times when 
working with ministers, but we’re not power crazy.’9 Civil servants’ desire to be 
involved and even to influence policy in most cases could not be construed as wanting 
to initiate or independently make policy.10
Many o f the civil servants recalled that their favourite periods in the civil 
service were when they were part of policy changes. The two periods most frequently 
cited by Department o f Energy civil servants were the mid 1970s when the 
participation arrangements were being negotiated with the oil companies operating in 
the North Sea, and in the early 1980s when privatization was being implemented.11
9 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
10 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants; reaffirmed by Wass, ‘The Public 
Service in Modern Society,* p. 11; and G.W. Jones, ‘A Revolution in Whitehall,* West 
European Politics, Vol. 12, No.3, July 1989, p.245.
11 Based on interviews with 17 civil servants from the Department of Energy or the 
Treasury. This is confirmed by a recent study by Watson, ‘Is Sir Humphrey Dead?* where 
she found, of the 28 civil servants she interviewed from across departments, 32% (the highest 
response) joined the civil service because the work would be interesting. This is also 
confirmed by Hugo Young’s {One of Us) description of the welcome civil servants gave to 
Conservatives. He points to the fact that they were eager for firm policies.
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Initially, DEn officials were unsure about oil privatization. As one civil servant 
described it, ‘every conceivable shade of opinion was represented in the 
department.’12 Over time the civil servants supported the sales because they provided 
interesting work, eliminated problematic responsibilities for the DEn and emphasized 
the importance of the Oil Division. One civil servant described being surprised at the 
time: ‘Privatization, in fact, proved to be very interesting work.*13 Another said 
working on a privatization bill was one of his ‘happiest times’ in the civil service.14 
The underlying importance of ‘interesting work’ was its connection to ministers and 
career advancement. Because a minister’s recommendation could be crucial to a civil 
servant’s promotion, officials were extremely sensitive to their ministers* goals and 
views. This is evident from the way DEn civil servants protected their ministers in 
Select Committee testimony, and also from the way they accepted their ministers* 
attitudes toward policies.15 In part, work was interesting if  it involved policies that 
their ministers advocated.
Summarizing the interviewees’ responses, the reasons why privatization was 
interesting work can be grouped into four categories which also highlight the career- 
maximizing connection.
12 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
13 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
14 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
15 Testimony by Donald Maitland, House of Commons Energy Select Committee, 
‘Department of Energy’s Estimates for 1981-82,* Second Report, British Parliamentary 
Papers, 1981-82, HC 231; House of Commons Energy Select Committee, Third Report, 
North Sea Oil Depletion Policy, British Parliamentary Papers, 1981-82, HC 337; House of 
Commons Energy Select Committee, First Report, BP/Britoil Job Losses and Asset Sales, 
British Parliamentary Papers, 1989-90, Vol.XX; and House of Commons Energy Select 
Committee, ‘Wytch Farm (Disposal of BGC Assets) Memorandum by British Gas 
Corporation.’
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(1) It was a newsworthy governmental policy. To be involved meant that the civil 
servants had the prestige of having their work discussed in the newspaper as well as 
among their clientele, the oil companies, and among friends and colleagues. Some of 
this status, though, may have come after the fact, which explains why the 
interviewees’ memories were so positive.
(2) It was a new policy; the specifics were not predetermined. Civil servants therefore
had room to offer suggestions and influence final outcomes. The DEn was the first
government department to undertake large scale privatization, and hence was
navigating uncharted waters. Civil servants described writing proposals and
considering many different methods of sale, since the process was new and had not
yet been worked out.16 As one official explained, by 1980, there were
several proposals under consideration for selling off, as well as other 
options and ways and means. We were writing one Cabinet paper a 
week. It was like the Labour party in ’46 who came in to nationalize 
the coal industry; they got in and then didn’t have a plan o f how to do 
it. DEn began meeting with merchant bankers trying to work out how 
to do it.17
In these initial privatizations, the DEn took the lead, though many civil servants 
perceived privatization to be driven by the Treasury.18 Civil servants found it 
stimulating to be involved in high profile policy projects, though it was more 
rewarding when proposals were accepted and they began to implement them under 
Lawson.19
16 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and minister; also see Lawson, 
The View front N o.ll, p.218.
17 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
18 Interviews with Department of Energy and Treasury civil servants.
19 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
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(3) It was an achievable task with a clear end. So much o f governmental work is on­
going administration without clear goals or targets. Privatization provided a more 
satisfying sense o f achievement. There was a clear end to a sale with large proceeds 
to show and work was created in the form of regulation o f the North Sea. In the case 
of BGC’s oil assets, civil servants had another result to show: Enterprise Oil. As one 
civil servant described it: ‘[We] made use o f the situation and made another 
independent British company.’20 Civil servant’s attitudes toward the Wytch Farm 
sale emphasize how important the immediate result was. Because BGC was able to 
delay the sale for two years, instead of being exciting work and a specific 
achievement, they saw the sales as a long, drawn-out and frustrating process.21 On 
the more humorous side, a civil servant pointed out the future tasks which the sales 
would create. He described civil servants before one privatization joking that they 
would be back in five years nationalizing what they were today privatizing.22
(4) It was a high profile policy. As such, work on privatization increased the civil
servants contact with higher level ministers in their own department but also the
Treasury. It also increased their contacts with outside experts, mostly from the City.
For example, one civil servant noted the excitement o f working with Nigel Lawson
on the privatization legislation:
When I was working on the privatization bill in 1982, Lawson would 
call me at home, rather than using his personal assistant to make the
call. It was hard work, but these were some of my happiest times in
the department. Lawson was stimulating to work for.23
20 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
21 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servant and BGC executive.
22 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
23 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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Civil servants under Lawson were very careful with the handling o f the policy. In
fact, one civil servant who voiced some objections to policy change was told by other
civil servants ‘not to rock the boat.’24 In theory, the development o f privatization
expertise would enhance a civil servant’s future job prospects in the civil service as
well as outside, though there is no evidence that any DEn civil servants were moved
to oversee privatization in other departments nor any evidence o f officials leaving to
join merchant banks.
Further support for these four DEn civil servants’ priorities is the way they
were reflected in the civil servants* views of their different DEn ministers. One civil
servant observed the general differences between the three ministers:
Under Benn the department was in the wilderness. Under Howell, 
whose [political] stock was not very high, not much got done. Lawson 
was great; he would take decisions, and win.25
Benn lost his fight with the Cabinet over the retention o f BP shares, as well as
transferring ownership o f the shares from the Treasury to the DEn. He was perceived
by the civil servants to be outside the political mainstream both in British politics as
a whole and within the Labour Cabinet where he consequently had little power. Civil
servants complained that much of their time was spent implementing damage
limitation measures. Benn was also notorious for being suspicious o f civil servants,
although this was not felt directly in the oil and gas divisions, and his stance caused
a general tension in the department, which many civil servants saw as a reason for
34 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
25 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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low morale within the DEn at that time.26 One BP executive even commented: 4I 
suspect that many of the civil servants were embarrassed by the things they were 
asked to do by Benn.’27
By contrast, David Howell was a much more middle o f the road politician. 
Yet because o f his personality and weak political links to the Prime Minister, many 
officials felt that things were no better under him. He did not accumulate much 
influence around Whitehall and rarely won his argument in Cabinet meetings. A  few 
bitter civil servants complained that after losing in Cabinet, Howell would turn and 
blame them for his defeat. In general, while Howell was respected for his intellect, 
the consensus was that under him morale in the DEn was very low.28
Nigel Lawson was the DEn civil servants’ preferred minister, but not because 
o f his ideas (many admitted concern or alarm over some o f his beliefs). Rather they 
were unanimous in praise o f his leadership. Lawson was ‘a breath o f fresh air’. He 
was complimented for getting his way in Cabinet, for being decisive, and for being 
a team player. One civil servant described him as ‘being demanding on those who 
worked for him, but that was okay when the department was winning,’ and by 
another as ‘the best Secretary of State I ever worked for.’29
26 Interviews with Department of Energy and Treasury civil servants and minister; 
Blackstone and Plowden, Inside the Think Tank, p. 81; and Geoffrey Fry, The Changing Civil 
Service (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 15-7.
27 Interview with BP executive.
28 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and CPRS official; and Blackstone 
and Plowden, Inside the Think Tank, pp.82-3.
29 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and CPRS official.
197
Not a Threat
At first glance, privatization appears to have caused, or at least coincided 
with, job losses in the DEn, as the number of jobs dropped from over 1,300 in 1976 
to under 1,000 in 1991 (see Figure 6.3). While figures for the overall DEn are 
readily available, the 
break down by category 
is not as accessible. By 
combining the statistics 
published in a Select 
Committee on Energy 
report in 1981-82 with 
those published in the 
1983-84 and 1986-87 
Supply Estimates, it is clear that the number of civil servants working on oil matters 
decreased before privatization, but actually increased over the period in which the 
privatization occurred, 1982-87 (see Table 6.1). This is confirmed by informal 
estimates from DEn civil servants.30
30 House of Commons Energy Select Committee, ‘Department of Energy’s Estimates for 
1981-82,’ Second Report, British Parliamentary Papers, 1981-82, HC 231; Supply Estimates 
for 1983-84, Class IV: Industry, Energy, Trade and Employment, British Parliamentary 
Papers, Vol.26, p.83; Supply Estimates for 1985-86, Class IV: Industry, Energy, Trade and 
Employment, British Parliamentary Papers, Vol.31, p. 12; and interview with Department of 
Energy civil servant.
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Figure 6.3.
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Table 6.1. Department of Energy Staff by Select 
Categories
1979 1981 1983 1986
Employees in oil 390 337 334 359
Total DEn Staff 1267 1182 1135 1075
Percent of Total 31% 29% 29% 33%
Source: Supply Estimates, 1983-84 and 1986-87; and Select 
Committee on Energy, 1981-82, HC 231.
Because no independent regulatory agency was set up for the oil industry (as 
there had been for gas), the DEn itself was the only means left to regulate the oil 
industry. The DEn civil servants who I interviewed pointed out that new regulatory 
agencies that needed personnel were created in the wake o f privatization, and that 
they had opportunities in other departments.31 The second portion o f the bar in 
Figure 6.3 represents the employees of the Office of Gas Supply starting in 1987 and 
the Office o f Electricity Supply starting in 1989, which both employed many DEn 
civil servants. Also minimizing the harmful effects o f the sales was the fact that 
though the DEn’s overall staff numbers were decreasing during the early 1980s, 
overall salaries were increasing. Andrew Dunsire has calculated that while the number 
o f total British civil servants declined by 14 per cent, salaries for those remaining 
increased by 21 per cent, though this did not compensate for the 52 per cent decrease
31 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants; also see Brian Hogwood and 
B.Guy Peters, Policy Dynamics (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 145; and Hood and 
Dunsire, Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies, pp. 123-4. But, as the government 
talks of privatizing internal functions, civil servants are expressing some concern for their 
future. See Peter Kemp, ‘Mandarins are not the Only Fruit,* Times, 6 May 1993, p. 18.
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in salary which occurred during the 1976-80 period.32 In the long run, however, all 
divisions of the DEn suffered job losses, and once the last shares o f Britoil were sold, 
there were no more assets to sell nor the interesting work such sales provided.
A much greater threat than privatization came from the decline o f North Sea 
oil production and DEn’s amalgamation with the DTI in April 1993.33 One civil 
servant estimated that by the end of 1993 the Energy Division was composed o f only 
about 550 civil servants. In an effort to achieve economies o f scale, the former DEn’s 
central and economic forecasting services were combined with the DTTs
Generalism and Bureaucratic Behaviour
The generalist structure of the British bureaucracy helps to explain British civil 
servants’ acceptance of privatization. The first point is that the civil service terms of 
employment provide greater job security than do contracts in the private sector. Thus, 
while a company selling off assets might find strong resistance from its employees, 
civil servants do not need to interpret policies in terms of the effect on their own 
future employment.35 Change was an accepted part of being a civil servant. In this 
case, the most enthusiastic civil servants were young during the period, but there 
were others who were older and yet just as pleased to be part o f something
32 Dunsire, ‘Bureaucrats and Conservative Governments,’ pp. 192-4.
33 Interviews with the Department of Energy civil servants.
34 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
35 Adrian Ham, Treasury Rules, Recurrent Themes in British Economic Policy (London: 
Quartet Books, 1981), p.25. Although there is now talk of changing the career and therefore 
the job security aspect of the civil service, no measures have yet been implemented. See Fry, 
The Changing Gvil Service, pp. 150-3.
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important.36 One DEn civil servant stated emphatically: ‘There were no old civil 
servants who opposed change. It was part of the nature o f the job.*37
Three more factors specific to the British government accentuate civil servants* 
loyalty to implementing government policy rather than to defending their department 
or division. First, the British bureaucracy is a career civil service and senior officials 
are trained as generalists. They advance in many cases by moving between 
departments or at least undertaking ‘tours of duty* in central departments. 
Consequently, the very strong organizational loyalties which exist in the United States 
government departments or in the British nationalized industries, for example, do not 
develop to the same degree.38
Cecil Parkinson described his frustration with the emphasis on promotion in 
the civil service:
No Civil Service job ever seems to be an end in itself. It is all part o f  
the process o f training for the next job. I lost track of the number o f  
times over the years that I discussed personnel changes with senior 
civil servants and heard the expression: ‘This move will be very good 
for his or her career development.’ Career development seems to be 
the number one priority, ranking way above actually doing any 
particular job. This means that however good the person is at the job 
he or she had, they will only be there for a matter o f time before they 
are moved on to the next, and probably unrelated, job.39
36 Contrary to earlier finding by Ham, Treasury Rules, p. 10.
37 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant. However, in light of Mrs 
Thatcher’s accusations about the civil service, officials were probably very sensitive to and 
defensive of questions regarding resistance to change.
38 Hood and Dunsire, Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies, p.35 and p.41; 
Campbell and Naulls, ‘The Limits of the Budget-Maximizing Theory,* p. 100; and Peters, 
’The European Bureaucrat,* p.315. Only one of the Department of Energy civil servants I 
interviewed moved to private industry after serving in the department.
39 Cecil Parkinson, Right at the Centre: an Autobiography, (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1992), p. 153.
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The second structural factor explaining civil servants* motivations was that 
promotions at the higher levels of the service are centralized. Rather than being 
reliant on the discretion of a bureau chief, civil servants depend for their advancement 
on their abilities as perceived by their professional peers, by ministers and (in very 
prominent cases) by the Prime Minister.40 Criticisms were made that Margaret 
Thatcher in particular politicized the Permanent Secretary appointments. The 
(Conservative dominated) Treasury and Civil Service Committee, however, argued 
that there
is no evidence that this is politicization in the overt sense of senior 
appointments being made on the basis o f a civil servant’s political 
affiliation. Instead, Mrs Thatcher has displayed a strong preference for 
what has been called the civil servant who embodies the ‘can do’ 
approach and is willing enthusiastically to implement the minister’s 
policies.41
None o f the civil servants I interviewed thought that political selection occurred even 
during the Thatcher era, with the possible exception o f Peter Middleton’s promotion
40 Hogwood and Peters, Policy Dynamics, pp. 143-4; Lawson, The View from No.11, 
p.384; G.WJones, ‘A Revolution in Whitehall,’ pp.244-5; Drewry and Butcher, The Civil 
Service Today, p. 169; F.F. Ridley, ‘Career Service: A Comparative Perspective on Civil 
Service Promotion,* Public Administration, Vol.61, Summer 1983, p. 198; and Hugo Young, 
One o f Us, p. 169 and p.337.
41 Seventh Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1985-86, Vol.I, para 
5.9, as quoted in Drewry and Butcher, The Civil Service Today, pp. 169-70. Ranelagh argues 
further that there is no evidence that Thatcher was promoting civil servants on a political 
rather than a merit basis. John Ranelagh, Thatcher*s People: An Insiders Account o f the 
Politics, the Power and the Personalities (London: Fontana, 1991), p.243. There is other 
evidence, however, that suggests senior promotions were politically driven. For example, 
Peter Hennessy (Whitehall  ^ reports that the Labour government would not work with civil 
servants they saw as being politically promoted. And Denis Kavanagh suggests that a civil 
service is no longer above party affiliation with evidence of the increase in the leaking of 
secret documents to the press or to opposition MPs. Denis Kavanagh, British Politics: 
Continuities and Change Second Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.253; 
also see Fry, The Changing Civil Service, p.27.
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to Chief Secretary of the Treasury.42 Yet they were well aware of the emphasis on 
action, and one civil servant described a shift in the civil service during the 1980s as 
one away from an emphasis on intellectual capability (i.e. political thinking) towards 
one on management capabilities.43
The third structural factor was that civil servants’ responsibilities are so 
narrowly defined that they have few means to affect overall policy. Civil servants 
pointed out that their work was so focused that they would not have the time or the 
reason to know what their colleagues in other divisions, even in their own 
department, were pursuing. One said simply: ‘I only know the people on this floor 
working in this area.’44 More importantly, civil servants do not have any means of 
gaining the legislative authority necessary to create a policy. Civil servants cannot ask 
for Parliamentary time, submit a bill to Parliament or even participate, unless 
requested, in a Parliamentary debate.45 However, civil servants do have a network 
o f personal contacts in other departments gained by moving between ministries or by 
interacting on committees with officials holding related positions in other departments.
To assess the impact of these factors on career mobility, I traced what 
happened to the 73 senior DEn civil servants listed in the Civil Service Yearbook in 
1982. By 1985, only 36 per cent remained in the same DEn division, a figure which 
was more than halved again to 13 per cent in 1988 and then fell to just 4 per cent by
42 Interviews with Department of Energy and Treasury civil servants.
43 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
44 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
45 Rose, Understanding Big Government, p.45; Campbell and Naulls, ‘The Limits of the 
Budget-Maximizing Theory,’ p. 103; Fry {The Changing Gvil Service) makes a more general 
argument that the influence of the civil service has often been overstated (pp.21-8).
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1992. Over the time period of the major privatizations, 1982-88, less than one sixth 
o f the higher level civil servants were in the same division in which they started while 
40 per cent had left the department entirely (see Table 6.2).
Table 6.2. Percentage of Senior 
Department of Energy civil servants 
remaining in post or changing division or 
department, 1982 to 1988
Total, N = 73
1982-85 1982-88
Same division 36 13
New division 32 45
New department 10 15
Left civil service 22 26
Total: 100 100
Source: Civil Service Handbook, 1982, 1985,
1988 and 1992.
These statistics show that movement was in fact high within and out o f the 
Department o f Energy in the 1980s, supporting the connection between career- 
maximizing type strategies and a flexible bureaucratic structure. This connection is 
called into question by the fact that a quarter of officials who were in the DEn in 
1982 subsequently left the civil service between 1982 and 1988. If they were forced 
to leave, this would negate the incentive for career-maximizing strategies. While 
reasons are not available for the DEn specifically, according to the Civil Service 
Statistics, during the 1980s at most 4% of all leavers were made redundant or retired 
pre-maturely ‘in the public interest.’ All others were voluntary resignations,
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retirements, deaths or illnesses.46
This movement is also supported by descriptive evidence, as a DEn civil
servant related in terms of his department:
In the Department o f Energy there were mostly career civil servants 
in the administrative jobs. It was exceptional to be entirely in one 
department. Typically, civil servants moved to other departments. The 
brighter ones went to the Treasury for two or three years or stayed 
permanently, and a few came to the Department o f Energy from the 
Treasury. Civil servants move more at the senior level, Permanent 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary, and at one stage there was an 
organized swapping program...Experience rather than expertise is the 
requirement. Civil servants are to know whom to ask, not necessarily 
know it themselves, like a barrister does. A few went to work for 
industry and one came back. When oil was found in North Sea, all 
engineers and geologists which made up the Petroleum Production 
Division came from private companies. Traditionally, civil servants 
have an Oxbridge background, more than half, but some have made 
their way up from the bottom.47
6.2. The Department of Energy: A Weak Department?
Drawing from the history of the Department of Energy (see discussion in 
Chapter Two) and accounts of civil servants, I estimate the relative strength o f the 
Department o f Energy over time (see Figure 6.4) using the four criteria mentioned 
above: size, visibility, importance and clout. Size is merely the measure of a 
department’s staff and budget. Visibility is how much the public is aware o f the 
department or the department’s functions, which can be raised quickly though through 
specific events or crises. Importance measures the department’s contribution to the 
country, either in terms o f revenues or service. Clout is a measure o f the 
department’s connections and stature in Whitehall. This can be established over a long
46 HM Treasury, Civil Service Statistics, 1989-90, p.37.
47 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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Figure 6.4. Strength of the Department of Energy 
1974 to 1993: A Hypothesis
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history or through the strong leadership o f a minister.
During the initial period 1974-80, energy issues were very visible with the 
1973-74 and 1979-80 energy crises; the department’s role was therefore very public. 
Similarly, the department’s importance in terms of influencing prices, ensuring supply 
and providing large revenues for the Treasury was also raised. Control o f energy was 
also very important to Britain, and both of these were a large contribution to the 
department’s strength. The department’s size grew very quickly; having been formed 
in 1974 it reached its peak in terms of staff in 1976. The department’s clout during 
this phase, however, was not high in Whitehall, with the exception o f Lord 
Carrington (1974) and Harold Lever’s (1975) brief service as the Conservative and 
Labour Secretaries o f State respectively. Under Tony Benn and David Howell, for 
different reasons, the department suffered Cabinet defeats and endured poor 
leadership.
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From 1981 to 1987, the department’s strength reached its peak. While the 
department’s visibility declined as energy supply issues subsided, this decline was 
partially compensated for by the visibility of the department’s privatization 
programme and its new Secretary of State, Nigel Lawson. Similarly, compensating 
for the department’s declining importance in terms o f controlling energy supplies was 
the increasing importance of the department’s privatization proceeds on top o f its 
already large oil revenues. Oil revenues reached a peak in 1984 o f £13 billion, 
enormous compared to the department’s budget o f £50 million.48 In addition, 
privatization proceeds added £549 million to the Treasury’s revenues in 1982, £617 
million in 1984 and £450 million in 1985. The department’s size had started to 
decline, though only slightly during this period. The issue that changed the most from 
the previous period, however, was that o f the department’s clout. As the leader in 
privatization and under the direction of Nigel Lawson, the department’s clout in 
Whitehall was greatly expanded. Even when Lawson left in 1983 to become 
Chancellor, the privatization proceeds remained important to him and thus his 
contacts with the new Secretary of State and Cabinet veteran Peter Walker remained 
high.
After 1988, when the department’s oil and gas assets had been sold, the more 
difficult sales of electricity and coal remained. In addition, with the drop in the price 
of oil, revenues from the North Sea also declined. As a result, the department’s 
strength declined in terms of importance and size. In terms of visibility, DEn civil 
servants lamented, ‘the lack o f crises has lulled people into accepting the free market
48 Supply Estimates 1983-84; and Central Statistics Office, Financial Statistics, May 1983 
and May 1987.
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and thinking that controls aren’t necessary.’49 In terms of size, the department’s staff 
numbers and budget continued to fall. In fact, one of its Secretaries of State, Lord 
Wakeham had his job divided between Energy and special assignments for 
Thatcher.50
Figure 6.5. British Departments
Relative Strengths, 1970 -89
h
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The strength of a department is relative to other departments. Thus, in 
comparison with the Treasury and the Department of Industry (and later the DTI), the 
DEn was a relatively weak department in terms of budget and staff throughout, even
49 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants; and Blackstone and Plowden, 
Inside the Think Tank, p .80.
50 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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at its peak in the 1981-87 period (see Figure 6 .5).51 Because civil servants perceived 
policy change in a positive way, they pursued career-maximizing strategies. A review 
o f the civil servants’ reaction to the oil asset sales provides further evidence.
Due to the semi-autonomous nature o f the nationalized industries, DEn 
ministers were often embarrassed in the House o f Commons because they could be 
questioned about all energy matters, including the activities of the nationalized 
industries over which the DEn had little control.52 This proved to be a problem with 
BP, but more so with BNOC and BGC. In relation to BP, one DEn minister 
explained that ‘the DEn has little say in the relationship.’53 BP used its traditional 
links to the Treasury (which held the government’s shares in BP) to secure influence 
with the government. Officials in the DEn found BP particularly difficult to deal with 
because the company was constantly trying to assert its independence. Many civil 
servants agreed that Shell was a more effective company in terms o f supplying oil for 
Britain, and one civil servant argued: ‘BP had not actually been a useful tool for 
energy policy matters’54 Even so, the sale of the government’s BP holding in 1977 
and later sales were Treasury decisions.55 Civil servants in the DEn were not 
consulted before the 1977 sale, although Tony Benn, as Secretary of State for Energy,
51 Mclnnes, ‘Policy Networks,’ p.22; Dunleavy, ‘Architecture of the British Central State. 
Part n,’ pp.412-3; and Christopher Hood and Andrew Dunsire with K.Suky Thomson, 
Bureaumetrics: the Quantitative Comparison of British Central Government Agencies 
(Famborough, Hants: Gower, 1981), pp. 143-4.
52 G.WJones, ‘A Revolution in Whitehall,* p.257; and interviews with Department of 
Energy civil servants and minister.
53 Interview with Department of Energy minister.
54 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
53 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
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was very vocal in his opposition. In 1979 the Treasury did ask the DEn whether the
government’s control of BP would be affected if  their stake fell below the 51 per cent
mark. Thus, the DEn’s only contribution to the sales was the judgement that the
government would maintain the same level of control with a sale.56
Though BP and the DEn worked closely together, and some argued that the
department often favoured BP, this relationship could continue whether BP was
government or privately owned. Because the closeness was often perceived
negatively, some civil servants thought that private ownership would make it easier
for the DEn to work with BP.57 A BP executive emphasized the point:
In the early days, BP did get an extra good cut. Civil servant Angus 
Beckett was fired for being too close to BP. That must be symptomatic 
of the fact that BP was too close. I rather doubted that he did favour 
BP too much. However, without his benevolence, the North Sea 
wouldn’t have been produced as fast as it was.58
The reaction of DEn civil servants to BGC’s asset sales provides an interesting 
illustration o f civil servants’ priorities. In its relationship with BGC, though the DEn 
often found that the corporation did things differently from the DEn’s preferred 
course o f action, they were proud of the corporation, and as a large company, it was 
one of their biggest clients.59 Officials were frustrated, though, that their department 
could not stand up to the major nationalized companies it oversaw. Specifically, the 
DEn was unable to make BGC do anything it did not wish to do.60 One DEn civil
36 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
37 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
38 Interview with BP executive.
39 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
150 Mclnnes, ‘Policy Networks,’ p.21; and interview with BGC executive.
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servant described the nationalized industries boards as ‘law unto themselves’, and 
complained that board members and the chairmen were virtually impossible to 
unseat.61 From the other side of the table, BGC executives argued that in the 1980s 
the ‘Department of Energy understood what was going on, but it didn’t account to a 
row of beans.’62 The real aggravation was between BGC and DEn ministers because 
they were seen as impotent compared to Denis Rooke, the chairman o f BGC. In the 
early 1980s, Rooke refused to even talk with ministers from the DEn.63 The 
ministers made the argument that Rooke was getting too powerful and stood up to the 
government too much. Opinion among DEn civil servants, however, was mixed. For 
those working on the sale, the priorities were interesting work and high profile 
activities, not the long term viability of BGC. A civil servant not working on the sale, 
however, argued in favour o f BGC, pointing out the competitive advantages for BGC 
to be in the oil industry.64
DEn officials* stances were more harsh regarding the Wytch Farm sale 
because o f the embarrassing delays created by BGC managers’ opposition. Because 
BGC administered the sale, the lengthy and frustrating progress emphasized the 
DEn’s impotence which was publicly highlighted and keenly felt by DEn ministers 
and civil servants alike.65 Many wished the government had waited until the 1982 
Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act which gave them clearer authority which they thought
61 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
62 Interview with BGC executive.
63 Interview with Treasury civil servant.
64 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants
63 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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would have strengthened their position vis a vis BGC and facilitated the sale. The sale 
o f Enterprise Oil provided some spiteful pleasure for DEn ministers, but was viewed 
merely as a more successful implementation of policy by civil servants, who this time 
had complete control o f the transaction. As one BGC executive explained, they ‘just 
told us what to do.’66
From the DEn’s perspective as a whole, or the Oil Division in particular, 
there were no strong reasons to keep BNOC or Britoil. A civil servant explained that 
DEn relied more on licensing awards than it did on BNOC to influence events in the 
North Sea.67 On the one hand, the sale of BNOC imposed no negative effects 
because it did not reduce the DEn’s capabilities. On the other hand it provided two 
positive effects: It reduced the tension between the companies and the DEn, and the 
creation o f Britoil fulfilled a DEn objective of encouraging regular British commercial 
involvement in developing the North Sea.
The ‘friendly tension’ between the DEn and BNOC began when the company 
was created. The department’s officials were jealous o f BNOC in the 1970s because 
the BNOC staff got better terms and working conditions than DEn’s civil servants.68 
The agencies were thrust together immediately to negotiate the North Sea oil 
participation agreements, which is how some o f the animosity began. As one DEn 
civil servant admitted, BNOC executives had a brasher but a more effective style. 
The DEn was concerned that in carrying out a role for itself, BNOC was destroying
66 Interviews with BGC executive and Department of Energy civil servant.
67 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
68 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
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the government’s long term relationships with the private oil companies.69 On a 
professional level, BNOC had better technical skills and more direct access to 
information. In addition, BNOC was given the statutory duty to offer advice to the 
government, and DEn civil servants were irritated by the fact that the company took 
full advantage o f this formal power.70 However, there were also some strong ties 
between the DEn and BNOC. The DEn appointed two civil servants to the board of 
BNOC, and a few civil servants were also seconded to the company. Both steps eased 
communication problems and helped relations. The civil servants who worked with 
BNOC were proud of the company’s accomplishments.71 Most civil servants, 
however, recognized that a constant level of tension was sustained merely by BNOC 
doing things differently from the way DEn wanted them. Rather than being 
antagonistic or offensive, one civil servant explained, BNOC was merely 
‘inconvenient’.72
One of the most striking features o f my interviews with BNOC executives was 
their enthusiasm for ensuring British development and control o f North Sea oil. This 
was markedly different from the more politically pragmatic view o f DEn civil 
servants. The result was that some DEn officials felt that BNOC was at times 
‘unnecessarily extreme.’73 The DEn civil servants* saw BNOC’s enthusiasm for 
getting more than the required percentage of oil refined in the UK - surpassing the
69 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
70 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and minister.
71 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
72 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
73 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servant and minister.
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DEn’s requirement - as naivety (see Chapter Five). As one civil servant explained: 
‘The more you know about refining in the UK, the less feasible [the policy] was.’74 
Another civil servant pointed out that the DEn had other constraints which BNOC did 
not have, including the EC, the Treasury’s budget pressures and the interests o f the 
private sector.75 The DEn saw the policy as a politically necessary target that need 
not be adhered to in practice, so that whenever a waiver was requested by an oil 
company, it was granted. Some DEn civil servants also feared that BNOC was or 
would become too powerful.76 This was felt even more strongly by the ministers: 
‘BNOC was becoming so damn powerful,* and there was already the precedent that 
‘Statoil was practically dictating to the Norwegian government, and that BGC and the 
NCB were already enormously more powerful than the government.’77
Some of the differences between the DEn and BNOC can be explained by their 
different goals and constituencies. The DEn’s main client in terms o f oil and gas 
policy were the private oil companies and their promotion depended on ministers. 
BNOC, in contrast, competed with the private oil companies - and had a notoriously 
antagonistic relationship with them, and their jobs were relatively secure from 
ministerial intervention.78 As one civil servant saw it, BNOC wanted to make 
decisions about the North Sea and emphatically did not want the private sector oil 
companies to be making such decisions. The big oil companies, however, wanted
74 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
75 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
76 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
77 Interview with Department of Energy minister.
78 Interview with BNOC executive.
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freedom to operate, and applied pressure on the DEn to achieve this goal.79 One 
civil servant described the DEn as playing ‘the role of honest broker between the 
companies and BNOC.’ However, a BNOC executive found that if  ‘the industry was 
lobbying the department on a particular point, it would take a very strong argument 
for the department to back BNOC.’80
The one example where the department’s core functions, and as such, civil 
servants’ immediate work tasks were threatened was in 1983 when the Treasury 
sought to end the department’s discretionary licensing system in favour o f auctions 
for licences. Though this had been tried in 1971, it had not resurfaced until 1983 
when ironically the DEn was at the zenith of its power. Being at its strongest, we 
could expect collective action with a chance o f success. Though auctions actually took 
place in the 1983 licensing round, they were only for seven blocks while the other 
eight blocks were awarded according to the department’s discretionary criteria. This 
appears to be a one-off foray as the auctions were not repeated subsequently. The 
strategies employed to secure that the auctions were not repeated included 
emphasizing that the discretionary nature of the licences enabled the DEn to ensure: 
(1) acceptance of the terms of royalties, (2) government had current information about 
the North Sea, including potential tax revenue, (3) profits o f foreign companies were 
not repatriated, (4) the oil companies purchased British supplies, and (5) British 
companies were awarded a reasonable share o f the North Sea.81 Thus, the
79 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
80 Interviews with BNOC executive and Department of Energy civil servant.
81 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
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department also had important political allies in the British oil companies.82 How 
these arguments were made, individually or collectively, by DEn officials or the 
British oil companies was not revealed through my interviews. The first time the 
auction option was suspended was after the 1971 auctions, before the Department of 
Energy was even created. But because the licences were issued by the strong DTI, 
it is not surprising that the civil servants were able to fend off future auctions. It is 
surprising though that the second challenge came at the height o f the DEn’s power, 
and as such accentuated the DEn’s relatively weak position versus the Treasury.
6.3. The Treasury’s Threat
As the department in charge of all spending, the Treasury was an interested 
player in the activities o f the nationalized industries, including BP, BNOC and BGC. 
In addition, as a ‘super-control’ agency which oversaw the central government 
organization as a whole, the Treasury had the means to influence the future o f the 
companies.83 Its encouragement of the DEn’s privatizations can be seen as a 
collective-action strategy to ward off threats to its own core functions.
While the Treasury had the reputation of being the most powerful department 
staffed with the best and brightest civil servants, it attracted some criticism early on
82 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
83 Pliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. Thatcher, p.3; Blackstone and Plowden, Inside the 
Think Tank, p.83; Richard Rose, ‘British Government: The Job at the Top,* in Richard Rose 
and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds., Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington, DC: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), p.39; and Dunleavy, ‘The Architecture 
of the British Central State, Part II,’ p.400. Keith Middlemas (Power, Competition and the 
State), however, questions this preeminent role, arguing that some of the biggest adjustments 
made post World War II in foreign affairs and defense took place without Treasury review 
(p.456).
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in the Thatcher government.84 Thatcher and her Cabinet colleagues questioned the 
Treasury’s capabilities, especially with regard to the PSBR, an innovation o f the 
Treasury’s in the 1960s. As the residual between two very large numbers, the 
government’s income and expenditure, the average error in the PSBR over the decade 
o f the 1970s in fact was about £3 billion -1 .5  percent of GDP; these errors continued 
into the 1980s.85 Not trusting the Treasury civil servants, Prime Minister Thatcher 
and Chancellor Howe both appointed outside advisers to brief them and proceeded by 
assuming that the Treasury could not be trusted to deal with public spending alone.86 
The Treasury’s defense was that the PSBR was the difference between two huge 
numbers which were not easy to predict. Beginning with the IMF crisis in 1976, 
Treasury civil servants came out against policy being strongly focused on the PSBR 
because it was so variable.87 But Treasury officials o f course thoroughly agreed with 
the Conservatives on the desirability of controlling public expenditure.88
The Treasury had means to alter the PSBR figures in the short-term. A former
MPliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. Thatcher, p. 13; Anthony King, ’Margaret Thatcher: 
The Style of a Prime Minister,’ in Anthony King, ed., The British Prime Minister, Second 
Edition, (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp.48-9; Jim Prior, A Balance of Power, (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p. 122; and Lawson, The View from N o .ll , p.26.
83 Walters, Britain’s Economic Renaissance, p.80; and C.N. Morris, ‘Budgetary
Arithmetic and the 1982 Budget,’ in John Kay, ed., The 1982 Budget, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1982), p.94.
86 Hugo Young, One of Us, pp. 152-3; Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 134; Judy 
Hillman and Peter Clarke, Geoffrey Howe: A Quiet Revolutionary (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1988), pp. 143-4; William Keegan, Mrs. Thatcher’s Experiment (London: Penguin 
Books, 1984), p. 167; also see Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, p.237, p.246 
and pp.275-6; Lawson, The View from N o.ll, pp.960-1; and Ranelagh, Thatcher’s People, 
pp.228-30. The idea of a ’counterweight to the Treasury’ was not new, see Hood and 
Dunsire, Bureaumetrics, pp. 168-9.
87 Interview with Treasury civil servant.
88 Hugo Young, One of Us, p. 155.
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Chief Secretary of the Treasury, Joel Barnett, recalled that ‘finding ways o f cutting
the PSBR without having any real effect, especially on employment, occupied our
most fertile minds’ - an activity which he refers to as ‘fiddling the figures*.89 One
former Treasury adviser recalled that during his time at the Treasury, he could
change the PSBR by £1 billion in the course of a morning’s work.90 However, these
illusions could not be sustained indefinitely.
Privatization as a negative contribution to spending was useful to the Treasury.
According to a former official, privatization
has gone farther and faster than was ever planned at the outset, and the 
receipts from these special sales o f assets have helped significantly in 
reducing the need for public borrowing.91
Under pressure to get the numbers right, the Treasury became more vigilant against
arrangements that would delegate spending power. They also became more interested
in short-term cost control measures, even at the expense of longer term benefits.92
Privatization became one of those short term measures.93 The fact that proceeds
from privatization were counted as negative spending was one o f the most important
factors in the decision to sell BP shares in 1977. As one politician explained, in terms
of its effect on the balance sheet, ‘selling shares had the same effect [on the PSBR]
89 Gardner, Decade ofDiscontenty p. 120.
90 Donald MacDougall, Economic Adviser to the CBI and a former Treasury adviser, 
quoted in Prior, A Balance of Power, p. 131.
91 Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Decade: How Britain Has Changed During the 1980s 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p.91; and Pliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. Thatcher, p.24 
and p. 112.
92 G.W.Jones, ‘A Revolution in Whitehall,* p.257.
93 M.R. Gamer, ‘British Airways and British Aerospace: Limbo for Two Enterprises,* 
Public Administration, Vol. 58, Spring 1980. Gamer was formerly an Under-Secretary in the 
D ll; also see ‘Government to Retain 49% of State Oil Assets,* Times, 21 October 1981, p .l.
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as cutting old age pensions...the government always cut where it was easiest.’94 Had 
share sales been counted as revenue, the government’s spending totals would have 
been higher, revealing how difficult it was for the Treasury to actually decrease 
spending.95
The costs to this strategy were minimal in the short term because, as with the 
DEn, the government’s companies with oil assets caused the Treasury problems and 
did not provide obvious benefits. The Treasury and BP were on fairly good terms 
with each other; they shared the common goal o f increased profits, and met on an 
annual basis to discuss BP’s dividends. While BP saw the Treasury as an ally, not 
everyone in the Treasury was a enthusiast of BP. In fact one o f the civil servants 
involved with BP, like some officials in the DEn, thought that the company provided 
no advantage to Britain, and that Shell did more to serve the country.96 Most civil 
servants in the Treasury were in accord with BP in wanting the complete sale o f the 
government’s shareholding.97
The Treasury had the most difficulty controlling BGC’s finances. As BGC’s 
financial arrangements were made in the 1972 Gas Act, when the company was loss 
making, they focused primarily on loan arrangements and did not specify how profits 
would be allocated (see discussion in Chapter Five). Because o f this, BGC later 
retained most of its earnings.98 The Treasury thus sought means to break BGC’s
94 Interview with Treasury minister.
95 Pliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. Thatcher, p.36.
96 Interviews with Treasury civil servant and BP executive.
97 Interview with Treasury civil servant.
98 Interview with BGC executive.
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control, first by creating a new gas tax in 1981, and later by forcing the sale of
BGC’s oil assets, Enterprise Oil and Wytch Farm. As one official explained: ‘The
Treasury felt that the sale could help the PSBR. But the issue really was one o f
rationalizing the interests o f BGC.*99 The government felt that a national gas
company should not be involved in oil too.
Turning to BNOC, the Treasury was sceptical about the enterprise from the
beginning. As one Treasury civil servant explained, BNOC was
an unnecessary brass plate company. The government already had the 
power it needed to control the North Sea. BNOC just oversaw paper 
transactions of the sale of oil; they had no relevance. They had little 
or no management, with their equity stakes they were just sleeping 
partners... die government had the power it needed to control the 
North Sea, such as taxes and regulations.100
The Treasury also had problems controlling BNOC’s expenditure, despite the control
measures written into the company’s charter. The Treasury’s orientation towards
saving money often put Treasury officials at odds with BNOC, whose goal was the
expansion of its oil business. Particularly when BNOC was being created in the mid-
1970s, these spending constraints limited what the company could do.101 However,
as BNOC grew with the acquisition of Burmah Oil’s assets and was able to raise
funds in the private market, the Treasury mattered less to its development.
Eventually, BNOC was able to thwart the Treasury’s controls. Working in the
private sector, BNOC had to abide by private sector business practices. The North
Sea oil fields were operated through consortia of companies and run by the partner
99 Interviews with Treasury civil servants.
100 Interview with Treasury civil servant.
101 Interview with BNOC executive.
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with the majority holding, and all partners were bound by law to contribute according 
to the schedule agreed with the majority partner. Therefore, when BNOC had a 
minority holding, investment schedules were determined by the stronger partners and 
the Treasury’s hands were tied. As a BNOC executive pointed out: ‘if  BNOC was 
seen to be constrained by the government, then BNOC would find it very hard to join 
consortiums for licensing rounds.’ He concluded that ‘while the Treasury had control 
in theory, in practice it didn’t really.,102
There is one exception where the Treasury was able to defer development of 
BNOC’s interests. Because BNOC was the majority partner in the Clyde field, BNOC 
and, de facto  the Treasury, could control the development schedule. In the name of 
a graduated depletion policy, the government delayed the development o f the field for 
five years. It was well known, however, that the Treasury was opposed to any 
restrictions on production and the ensuing taxes, so many saw the delay as the lack 
o f funds because o f pressure on the PSBR. BNOC executives argued fiercely with the 
Treasury that their reputation as an operator of profit-making fields would be ruined 
and in the end compromised with a three year deferment of the development o f the 
field which was long enough for Britoil to be privatized and the investment burden 
to be transferred to the private sector.103
Even though BNOC’s expenses were reported outside the PSBR, the Treasury 
was tied to ventures in an inherently risky business. To stem BNOC’s expansion, the 
Treasury supported the move to sell BNOC’s exploration acreage. They were also 
placated against any more intrusive moves in the first round of spending cuts by the
102 Interviews with BNOC executives.
103 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servant and minister and BNOC executive.
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forward sale of oil.104 The Treasury was aided by the Conservatives’ support and
BNOC’s assistance with measures that avoided privatization. One o f the proposals
made by BNOC in 1980 to prevent the privatization o f its production operations was
to sell bonds to the public. The Treasury opposed this proposal because they feared
all future profits would accrue to the bondholders rather than to the Treasury, while
the proceeds from the bond offerings would yield less than a straight-forward sale of
the production assets.105
The reason for the Treasury’s reserve over BNOC, Sir Alistar Morton
complained, was because they did not understand the oil business:
In February 1980, civil servants came to me to ask how much the 
company was going to borrow or retain by the end o f March because 
the PSBR was really tight. I asked them how much they wanted the 
amount to be. They said that this was a serious meeting so asked again 
how much money do you want, and I explained I had 10 or so tankers 
at sea for which I could pay or get paid before or after March. When 
I told them I had £50 to £70 million to swing either side o f March, the 
civil servants were amazed, as they were only looking for £1 million 
or so. They just didn’t understand the magnitude and power o f o il.106
One final point o f contention was also resolved when BNOC was abolished.
BNOC set the price for oil and the Treasury’s revenues were dependent upon that
price. A higher price meant higher Treasury revenue, yet this was often in conflict
with BNOC’s own goals, such as increasing the amount o f oil refined in the UK, and
profits, especially when the price of oil was falling.107 The conflict was resolved
once BNOC was abolished because the Treasury took over the role o f deciding the
104 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and minister.
105 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
106 Interview with Sir Alistair Morton, 15 October 1993.
107 Interview with Treasury and Department of Energy civil servant and BNOC executive.
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tax reference price.108
From 1983 onwards, with the level of the PSBR improving, the Treasury’s 
policy-making role expanded again. In part, this was due to the proceeds from the oil 
asset sales. One sign of the Treasury’s rehabilitation was that Prime Minister 
Thatcher appointed the Treasury the lead department in charge o f co-ordinating the 
whole privatization programme. Because it increased their control over spending and 
receipts, the Treasury was one of the few parts of Whitehall to be fully committed 
to the new strategy, and the only department in the central position necessary to make 
the concept into a coherent policy and the central theme o f the Conservatives’ second 
term in government.109 Symbolizing the Treasury’s strength compared to the DEn, 
no DEn civil servants were moved to the Treasury, even though the DEn was the 
department with the most experience with privatization.110
In terms of department strength and collective action, unlike other measures, 
encouragement of the privatization programme could not be done at the individual 
level. The coordination, planning and perseverance by Treasury officials demanded 
collective action for success. Ironically, the strategy was to shape another department 
rather than their own, which emphasizes the point that different options are available 
to departments with different levels o f strength. As possibly the strongest department 
in Whitehall, ‘government-shaping’ may be a strategy uniquely available to the 
Treasury.
108 ‘Free at Last,’ Economist, 16 March 1985, p.77.
109 Lawson, The View from No.11, p.7; Abromeit, ‘British Privatization Policy,* pp.74-5; 
and Riddell, The Thatcher Decade, p.92.
110 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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Conclusion
The traditional public choice view is that bureaucrats are budget-maximizers, 
but based on a structure and means typology, I argue it is only one o f four 
possibilities. As such, bureaucrats can also be bureau-shapers, self-maximizing and 
career-maximizers. Because British civil servants have a high degree o f mobility 
within the government bureaucracy, their loyalty is to the central government 
apparatus as a whole rather than a particular department or division. As such, few 
policies are perceived as personally negative, so that rather than fearing for their own 
survival, their primary interest is in work tasks. An important element o f that 
definition is as its use as a vehicle for promotion, apparent from officials’ emphasis 
on contact with ministers and top level civil servants, and definable projects where 
success can be easily determined. Part o f this analysis is drawn from civil servants’ 
direct statements, which contradict broader surveys on the subject o f civil servants’ 
priorities, but this is not surprising as career advancement is not necessarily the kind 
of goal a civil servant wants to reveal. Support for this analysis is also drawn 
indirectly from the civil servants’ descriptions o f their ministers which fit well with 
previous research on ministers.111
Though the strength of the DE rose and then declined again, it was relatively 
weak compared to the Treasury and DTI throughout, and it is therefore not surprising 
that no collective strategies were detected in the DEn. The individual strategies 
observed, adding to our definition of career-maximization, included: providing 
feasible means of implementation, preventing other civil servants from objecting,
111 Simon James, British Cabinet Government ((London: Routledge, 1992), pp.36-7; 
Hogwood and Peters, Policy Dynamics, p. 139; and Sue Cameron, ‘Fortune Come Up 
Trumps,’ Times, 27 June 1987.
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working the long hours necessary, and facilitating ministers’ wishes. The Treasury, 
however, as a strong department with its core functions under threat did employ 
collective strategies to regain it pre-eminence over PSBR planning. One o f the 
strategies included encouraging privatization in other departments, suggesting that as 
a super-strong department, the Treasury may have a unique option available to it - 
government shaping.
Turning to a larger debate on the subject, there is some fear that the generalist 
structure which provides room for political influence on civil servants* careers has 
politicized the British civil service unduly. This generalist structure, however, is the 
key factor in this study that enabled officials to be cooperative with privatization 
policy. Rather than party loyalty, British civil servants are committed to the existing 
government. As such, when officials are presented with new policies by new political 
masters will implement the policies cooperatively as they did their antipodes. The real 
problem is not politicization, but rather short-termism. Civil servants implement 
policies and then move to another department. They therefore have little 
accountability for their work in the long-run. The elimination o f the flexible structure 
would increase long-term accountability, which combined with politicians’ notorious 
short-terms horizons might provide a useful balance. This structure also encourages 
self and budget-maximization, and would increase the civil servants’ reputation as the 
politicians’ nemesis.
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Chapter Seven: Politics. Careers and Elections
Most theorists who explain privatization focus on the later stages o f the 
Conservatives’ programme,1 yet these later stages differ markedly from the 
development stage of the policy. Originally it was a short-term programme, to 
address pragmatic fiscal considerations. It grew more radical over time.2 Most 
theories o f privatization cannot explain why politicians selected a policy in the face 
of little policy demand and proceeded in an ad hoc manner.
Existing public choice theories of policy-making focus primarily on the 
demand for policies, such as the traditional ‘median voter* model which assumes that 
a politician’s primary goal is to be (re) elected and predicts that to do so a politician 
will select policy positions to appeal to the largest number o f voters.3 The model 
cannot explain, except because of a lack of information, why politicians would choose 
a policy position which favours only a minority as was the case with privatization in 
Britain, especially of the oil assets. While public opinion did begin to shift towards 
private ownership in the 1980s, the majority was always opposed. A more accurate 
measure of demand, I suggest, includes the level of intensity of opinion for that 
policy because only when intensity is high will citizens cast a vote accordingly. As 
I show in this chapter, the majority of opinion on privatization was weakly felt and
1 Marsh spends four paragraphs on the Conservative’s first term (p.460-1) while the 
remainder of the article focuses on the aims and achievements of their second term. David 
Marsh, ‘Privatisation Under Mrs. Thatcher: A Review of the Literature,’ Public 
Administration, Vol.69, Winter 1991.
2 Abromeit, ‘British Privatization Policy,’ p.83.
3 Mueller, Public Choice //, pp. 180-2.
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thus, most votes were cast according to opinions on other issues. Other factors must 
therefore be at work in order to explain why the Conservatives raised privatization 
on the policy agenda and selected the policy position they did. There are, however, 
few supply-side explanations of policy-making which might explain the Conservatives’ 
choices.
Since public demand does not readily explain the privatization stance, elite 
theory is often proposed as an alternative. Elite theorists argue that ‘elites have 
introduced the policy [of privatization] because o f a belief that this would be 
technically more efficient, as well as consistent with the ideological principles o f  
rightwing parties or ‘post socialist* parties o f the left.*4 If elites were the driving 
force, we would expect a coherent programme using a logical progression to move 
state-owned businesses into the private sector. Instead, the early privatizations were 
done in an ad hoc manner with an emphasis on Treasury revenues over efficiency, 
and the sales were primarily of companies already operating in the private sector.5 
In the case of the oil sales, for example, ownership made no difference to the 
operations o f the company. In addition, the theory fails to explain why elites came 
to believe in privatization in the late 1970s and early 1980s rather than another point 
in time, or why they nationalized the companies in the first place.
There are few other supply-side explanations. Public choice theorists’ attention 
to the supply-side of policy-making has been limited to logrolling by special interest
4 McAllister and Studlar, ‘Popular Versus Elite Views of Privatization,* p. 158; also see 
Wolfe, ‘State Power and Ideology in Britain.*
5 Abromeit, ‘British Privatization Policy,* p.83.
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groups, pork barrel politics and capture o f agencies by external interests.6 In terms 
o f elections and policy position, public choice theorists focus on preference-shaping 
activities where politicians seek either to foresee public demand and plan accordingly 
or act to alter structural factors so demand will alter to suit their policies.7 Dobek 
adopts this view in explaining privatization in Britain, arguing that Tory politicians 
sought to expand the number of Conservative voters through wider-share ownership. 
Dobek emphasizes that the key was the politicians’ perception o f the policy’s effect, 
not necessarily the actual outcome. Dobek’s explanation, however, is not supported 
by the politicians’ actions on the oil asset sales. These sales were distinctly ad hoc, 
beginning with the Labour government in 1977 and were not timed for elections or 
other publicity. In addition, none of the oil sales targeted new shareholders. In fact, 
the government purposely did not advertise or encourage wider share ownership 
because oil was an inherently risky business.8
A better supply-side explanation is therefore necessary to explain why both the 
Labour and Conservative governments chose to sell oil assets to existing shareholders 
with minimal publicity over a ten year period with, at best, weak public demand for 
the sales. I suggest that the policy choice can be described as a multi-step decision 
tree (see Figure 7.1). The first branch stems from the demand for the policy. If there 
is large demand, politicians have very little room for choice and, therefore, adopt the 
policy where the demand and intensity are highest as more traditional theories predict.
6 Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal 
Democracy (London: Macmillan Education, 1987), p. 112.
7 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Chapter 5.
* Britoil, ‘Offer for Sale’; and Enterprise Oil, ‘Offer for Sale.*
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Figure 7.1.
Demand and Supply Policy Considerations
Calculation
Policy Issue
Few Options
Strong Demand Weak Demand
Policy O utcom e
Policy O utcom e
Party Political 
A dvantage
Personal Political 
Advantage
When there is low demand (not opposition), the process is very different because 
politicians have greater discretion in whether to select a policy and how to implement 
it. Politicians then calculate according to two different sets o f criteria, personally and 
electorally. (1) The personal calculation is whether the policy will provide individual 
political advantages to politicians such as a promotion into the Cabinet or an increase 
in their public profile. (2) The party political factors are a complex calculation 
comprising two additional sets o f factors: the concentration of costs and benefits to 
supporters and opponents over time, and the position and intensity party members. 
Depending on the combination of these factors, the policy is rejected or it is adopted 
and the most advantageous position selected, which was the process in this case.
Both personal and party supply factors are necessary for the adoption of a 
policy. To be adopted, a policy must have an entrepreneur willing to bear the initial
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costs o f developing the policy. To entice a politician to take on such costs, there must 
be clear personal advantage to be gained. In addition, there must be clear electoral 
advantage for the party to adopt the policy and risk tainting all their candidates with 
an unpopular or infeasible policy. The necessary combination o f these personal and 
party political factors is represented in Table 7.1. To be selected, either personal or 
party political advantage must be strong (+ )  to provide the impetus. Selection will 
be facilitated if  both are strong, however, as long as neither are opposed (-), i.e . their 
stance is positive or neutral (0), policy selection is possible. Opposition from either 
factor is normally too large of an obstacle to overcome, especially as other policies 
may offer easier alternatives.
Table 7.1.
Combinations o f Personal and Party Political Factors
Party Political Factors
Personal
Political
Factors
(+ ) (0) (-)
(+ ) Yes Yes X
(0) Yes X X
(-) X X X
In the next section I survey the evidence on the demand for privatization and 
apply existing explanations, first using the median voter model and then an 
alternative, the directional theory of voting. Though the directional theory offers some 
important insights, neither theory is sufficient to explain how privatization appeared 
on the electoral agenda or why the Conservatives chose the position they did. To 
explain these two decisions, I turn to supply-side factors, and argue that from 
personal political advantage and then party political advantage factors a much fuller
explanation o f the oil asset privatizations can be achieved.
7.1. Public Demand for Privatization
One o f the most misunderstood aspects o f the privatization phenomenon in 
Britain is its level of public support. The majority of public opinion was unfavourable 
to the sale of government industries throughout. These opinions, however, were not 
intensely held by the British electorate.
Table 7.2. Attitudes Towards Change in 
Ownership of Specific Industries
Nationalization Bad Idea Good Idea
Banks (1976) 76 14
Insurance Companies (1976) 76 15
Privatization Bad Idea Good Idea
Water (1989) 75 15
Electricity (1988) 66 24
Electricity (1989) 60 26
Coal Board (1988) 54 34
Steel (1988) 50 38
British Rail (1988) 49 40
British Gas (1985) 47 36
British Telecom (1983) 46 39
Source: MORI poll, May 1976; Gallup polls, November 
1983, November 1985, March, August and October 1988; and 
February 1989.
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Public Opinion and Privatization
Information from various opinion polls reveals that privatization was not a
popular policy nor an intensely held policy position by the majority o f the British
electorate, either for or against. The status quo, in fact, was the preferred position
as the public was opposed to both Labour plans to nationalize banks and insurance
companies in 1976, and Tory plans to denationalize (or privatize) specific companies
in the 1980s (see Table 7.2.).
On the issue of government ownership in general, the status quo has been the
most favoured policy since the 1960s (see Figure 7.2). From 1966 to 1979 the
question the pollsters used was whether there should be ‘more nationalization* or
‘some denationalization.* Since 1983, the pollsters asked whether ‘more should be
nationalised/ in public ownership* or ‘more should be privatised/sold o ff.’ In all
cases, respondents were also given the choice of ‘status quo’ or ‘don’t know.* Some
differences can be attributed to this change in phrasing from ‘some’ to ‘more*
privatization and including public ownership with nationalisation. The Economist
noted the effect o f wording in 1976:
The bad image surrounding the concept of nationalisation is partly 
semantic: when questions were asked about public ownership the 
position improved. For example, only 19% of voters agreed with the 
statement that "More nationalisation would be good for the country", 
whereas 35% expressed agreement when the words "public ownership" 
were substituted.9
According to Figure 7.2, the status quo was the preferred position over time, except 
when ‘more should be privatised’ slightly surpassed the status quo in 1983. Though 
there were shifts between ‘some nationalisation’ and ‘more denationalization* those
9 ‘Voters think Its’s Codswallop,* Economist, 11 September 1976, based an a MORI poll.
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Figure 7.2.
for ‘more denationalization’ were never greater than those who favoured ‘some 
nationalisation’ and the status quo combined, as represented by the line above the 
bars.10 When the status quo was not an option and the issue was presented as two- 
sided, the status quo position split so that opinion was almost perfectly divided with
44 per cent for more privatization and 43 per cent against with 13 per cent having no
10 The MORI research organization has found that, over time, there has been a 7% shift 
away from nationalization to denationalization. MORI, British Public Opinion, October 1987, 
p.7.
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opinion.11
Though there have not been specific measures of intensity o f opinion on 
privatization, its low salience is evident from its poor showing in the only four polls 
of important issues in which it was mentioned. Public ownership as an issue was only 
mentioned twice between 1978 and 1987 in the Gallup’s monthly poll o f most 
important issues, in 1978 and 1979. Both times it was on the list o f the two most 
important issues, and never on the list of the single most important issue facing the 
country. In both years, nationalization was eleventh with only 10 per cent of those 
polled mentioning it, compared to the number one issue, the cost o f living, which 68 
per cent o f those polled mentioned.12 Its low salience is also evident from the BBC 
Election Surveys in May 1979 and May 1983. In 1979, nationalization/public 
ownership was number 13 on the list and only 3 per cent o f those polled considered 
it one o f the two most important issues; in 1983 it was again last and this time only 
1 per cent o f those polled mentioned it.13 Other polls focusing on the salience of 
issues and why people voted for one party over another do not even mention 
privatization/nationalization.14 Specifically in terms o f the sale of oil assets, there 
were not even any opinion polls asking about the privatization of oil companies,
11 In December 1984 voters were asked whether they supported or opposed a policy the 
government could adopt: ‘Sell more state-owned industries to private shareholders.’ British 
Public Opinion, Vol.VI, No. 10, November/December 1984, p.7.
12 The question was: ‘Here is a list of topics that might be discussed at the next General 
Election. Which, if any, of them do you think should be concentrated on by the politicians?’ 
Gallup Poll, 14-23 December 1979; and December 1978.
13 The question was: ‘Think of all the urgent problems facing the country at the present 
time. When you decided which way to vote, which TWO issues did you personally consider 
most importantly?’ BBC Election Survey, 11-16 May 1983 and May 1979.
14 Gallup Polls, 5-11 April 1979; and Abromeit, ‘British Privatization Policy,* p.82.
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suggesting that the issue was not salient enough to warrant conducting a poll.
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Building from these pieces of evidence, I hypothesize that the distribution of 
positions regarding privatization during the late 1970s and early 1980s was fairly 
symmetrical (see Figure 7.3). The Labour and Liberal Democrats’ positions were 
close to the centre with Labour slightly further to the left, point A, than the Liberals, 
point B, and the Conservatives on the other side of the status quo on the far right, 
point C. From this distribution, the median voter model, using only the spacial 
proximity of position, predicts that voters will chose the candidate with the stance 
closest to their own, which in this case would be the Liberal Democrats followed by 
Labour, with the Conservatives receiving the least number of votes. Because the 
Conservatives won both the 1979 and 1983 elections, these predictions hardly seem 
accurate.
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An alternative explanation is suggested by George Rabinowitz and Stuart 
MacDonald’s directional theory of voting. The theory argues that voters react to 
politicians’ direction and intensity on an issue. The direction o f the policy is more 
important than proximity and, therefore, those even slightly favouring privatization 
will vote for politicians advocating vast privatization rather than a status quo position 
that is closer but in the opposite direction.15 While the theory argues candidates are 
punished for extreme positions outside a ‘region of acceptability,’ any position within 
that region is competitive (p. 108). The second dimension of the theory is the intensity 
o f opinion. The theory argues that ‘if a voter is directionally compatible with a 
candidate, increasing candidate intensity makes the voter like the candidate 
more.’(p. 101) Thus, the theory suggests that the Conservatives advocated a more 
extreme position to heighten the importance of the issue.
When the electorate is evenly divided on an issue, as we estimate they were 
for privatization, the theory predicts that if  the candidates are on opposite sides, each 
gets half o f the vote because voters choose according to direction not proximity 
(p. 109). In this case (and directly contradicting the median voter model), the 
Conservatives would receive half the votes because they were the only party on the 
right, no matter what their position. Labour and the Liberals, both being on the left 
would share their half of the votes. The Conservatives* position according to the 
theory was constrained only by the ‘region of acceptability’ and the need to raise the 
level o f intensity. Selection of specific positions in these situations, however, ‘are 
virtual lotteries...’(p. 115) and chosen according to ‘factors such as the state o f the
15 George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine MacDonald, ‘A Directional Theory of Issue 
Voting,* American Political Science Review, Vol.83, N o.l, March 1989, p. 114.
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times or candidate personality’(p. 109) or the preferences o f the elites (p. 111).
To better understand the position that politicians do chose, we need to relax
two o f Rabinowitz and MacDonald’s assumptions. First, intensity of opinion is not
necessarily correlated with the extremity o f the position. Voters can feel strongly
about a moderate policy position or their opinion may be weak for an extreme
position. The implication is that voters will not vote according to an issue if  they feel
weakly about it - no matter what their position. Second, while voters react to
candidates, they also influence candidates. Therefore, instead of the one-way direction
of influence Rabinowitz and MacDonald describe, through their intensity on a
position, voters can influence the policy position candidates choose. Thus, there is
actually a two-way flow of influence.
The case o f privatization can better be understood as an issue with a low level
o f intensity for the majority o f the population who therefore voted according to other
issues. Though the Conservatives chose progressively more extreme positions, the
level of intensity on the issue did not increase sufficiently so that voters reacted.
Thus, the politicians were able to select their own policy positions according to other
criteria, as discussed in the next section.
The low level of intensity was in fact a key aspect o f the politicians’ decision
making at the time as Nigel Lawson explained in our interview. The absence of
strong public feeling was the most important condition he identified and why he felt
he was able to initially implement the oil asset privatizations.
There was no organized lobby. There was a general uneasiness, a fear 
of what could happen. But also it was nothing that directly touched the 
man or woman in the street... If a North Sea oil company is going to 
be privatized it is not something that the man or woman in the street
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is going to feel strongly about.16 
His focus was fear of electoral punishment, not pleasing public demand or gaining 
votes - at least not in these early privatizations. This lends support to the view that 
voters do not always respond to stimuli from politicians and that politicians can have 
other reasons for selecting a policy position.
7.2. Politicians as Policy Suppliers
The development of most policies demands a policy entrepreneur to initiate 
and promote the ideas.17 A policy entrepreneur risks the costs and the possibility of  
policy rejection or the unsuccessful implementation o f the policy for the rewards of 
influence, patronage and social prestige for the successful adoption o f his or her 
policy. There are three sets of costs to initiating a policy: development, information 
and promotion. The start-up costs are the development costs which include defining 
and articulating the policy. Then there are the information costs associated with 
identifying potential supporters and opponents and devising a feasible plan for 
implementation. Finally there are the promotion costs with include publicizing the 
policy, either within the party or more broadly, as well as addressing grievances and 
opposition.
Policy entrepreneurs do not necessarily have to be politicians, though many 
of the rewards for success are most easily bestowed upon politicians, as was the case 
with the privatization entrepreneurs in the Conservative party. In the case o f the 1977
16 Interview with Lord Nigel Lawson, 15 February 1994.
17 Not necessarily the same as a political entrepreneur who organizes political interest 
groups (Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, p.34-5), though a policy 
entrepreneur may chose that strategy.
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sale under the Labour party, however, the policy entrepreneurs were BP executives 
and IMF officials. They took on the cost o f promoting the idea, building support and 
overcoming technical obstacles, such as promoting the sale and arranging the 
underwriting. Though the final decision was made by Labour politicians, the initial 
impetus came from outside. But notably, there were no politicians willing to take a 
personal stand of opposition. To do so they risked their Cabinet seat, one o f the prize 
personal political benefits. The BP sale was a singular case, possibly even a one-off 
because the sales might not have been sustained if  there had not later been 
Conservative party policy entrepreneurs.
The Prime Minister and Her Strategy
In Britain, many of the personal political benefits are bestowed by the Prime 
Minister. And because he or she has the power to make ministerial appointments, 
many MPs initiate policies that are favourable to the Prime Ministers* own strategies 
in an effort to gain his or her favour and advance their own careers.18 In addition, 
because the Prime Minister (PM) has considerable control over the policy-making 
apparatus, including top level bureaucrats’ promotions, the legislative timetable and 
Cabinet committees, support from the PM is important for the success o f the policy. 
For the case of the oil asset sales, it is therefore necessary to understand the PM’s 
own personal and electoral strategies and how they were affected by privatization. I 
will then examine the role of four politicians in the development o f the oil sales and 
the subsequent effect on their careers.
Though the extent to which Prime Ministers utilize the resources o f office
18 Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State, p. 110
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varies, the Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did so rather fully. She
sought to control the agenda and further her own ambitions by appointing her close
supporters to key Cabinet committee positions,19 shrouding the budget in secrecy
until the morning of the budget speech,20 and removing or side-lining her most
prominent critics.21 Thus, more so than other Prime Ministers, her own personal and
electoral strategies were important influences on the development o f other policies.
Thatcher’s position was strengthened by the Conservatives’ disciplined party
organization and the British first-past-the-post electoral system which allowed the
Conservatives a larger majority than represented by the population.22 For example,
the Conservatives’ victory in 1983 was secured with fewer votes than in 1979, yet
their parliamentary majority increased by 100 constituency seats to 144.
Thatcher was also well known for consistently rewarding those MPs loyal to
her and her strategy. Norman Tebbit recalled that towards the end o f 1980, Thatcher
made it plain that she wanted to begin the reconstruction o f the 
government to bring forward more of those who believed in the 
policies on which we had been elected,’ [or in other words] ‘who 
believed that the policy of government was right and that it could be
19 Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, p.259; Gamble, The Free Economy and 
the Strong State, p. 131; Hugo Young, One of Us, pp. 142-3 and p. 149; James, British Cabinet 
Government, p. 169.
20 House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee, Sixth Report, 
Budgetary Reform, Sixth Report, British Parliamentary Papers, 1981-82, HC 137, p.ix; 
Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State, p. 109; Pliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. 
Thatcher, pp.81-5; Hugo Young, One of Us, p. 149; Holmes, The First Thatcher Government 
1979-83, p.76; and Prior, A Balance of Power, p. 119.
21 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, pp. 130-1, pp. 152-3; Prior, A Balance o f Power, 
p. 132; Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State, p. 110; Norman St.John-Stevas, The 
Two Cities (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), p. 19; Anthony King, ‘Margaret Thatcher as 
aPolitical Leader,* in Robert Skidelsky, ed., Thatcherism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988), 
p.59.
22 Hugo Young, One of Us, p.324.
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carried through.23
In retrospect, many Conservative politicians have been criticised for allowing
Thatcher to proceed unopposed. One o f Thatcher’s leading adversaries, Jim Prior,
defends himself against these criticisms, explaining that though he would have been
prepared for the personal setback, he had been elected to represent his constituency
and could not let them down.24 He pointed out that resignation o f the whole
opposing faction within the Conservative Party
might have brought down the government. Certainly if  all those who 
had strong disagreement with the policy had resigned, it would have 
brought down the government. And we were not elected, as it were, 
to resign and bring down the government. So we stuck in there.25
The strategies that Thatcher chose, and therefore, that policy entrepreneurs
needed to accommodate, stemmed from her concern with her leadership image.26 A
decade of U-tums had made British voters sceptical of their politicians* ability to stay
the course. Thatcher saw this as the cause of Edward Heath’s demise: ‘It was also
irritating that it was because we had done a U-turn with the previous Conservative
government that we had lost, because people had lost respect for the government.’27
She therefore chose to differentiate herself from both the Labour Party and the
previous Conservative leadership. She portrayed an image o f determination and
23 Norman Tebbit, Upwardly Mobile (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), pp.9-10 
and p. 18.
24 Prior, A Balance of Power, pp. 140-1.
23 As quoted from ‘Thatcher: The Downing Street Years,* BBC1, 9:30 p.m., 20 
November 1993.
26 Jim Bulpitt, ‘The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s Domestic 
Statecraft,* Political Studies, Vol.XXXIV, 1986, p.21.
27 Margaret Thatcher speaking on ‘Thatcher: The Downing Street Years.*
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strength which emphasized credibility over popularity.28 Thatcher, in fact, staked her 
career on providing strong leadership. This came to mean a clear direction for the 
party without any policy U-tums. While there were benefits to such a strategy, there 
were also serious consequences; Thatcher set expectations and was then compelled 
to adhere to her pronouncements at the risk of losing credibility.29
Thatcher’s overall success is evident from her high favourable ratings as a 
leader, while the policies she used to establish that profile were not as highly rated 
by the public (see Figure 7.4). Because the Conservatives won elections in 1979, 
1983 and 1987 with Thatcher as their leader, the policies may have only had 
secondary importance, but there are no polls which measure the relative salience of 
leadership and issues to confirm this point.
One of the primary means Thatcher, and thus the Conservative Party, used to 
demonstrate her steadfastness was monetary policy. The changing international 
situation had made monetary policy an effective policy tool that no party could ignore 
(see Chapter Four). There was, however, a marked shift in emphasis under Thatcher 
who used it as a policy weapon capable o f producing powerful results.30 The way
28 Interview with Lord Home in Patricia Murray, Margaret Thatcher (London: W.H. 
Allen, 1980), p.140; Grant, ‘Business Interests and the British Conservative Party,’ pp.151-2; 
Keegan, Mrs. Thatcher's Experiment, p. 134; and Budge, et. al., The Changing British 
Political System, p. 14.
29 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 15 and pp. 148-53; Keegan, Mrs. Thatcher's 
Experiment, p. 160 and p. 183; Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1984), p.5 and p. 10; Hugo Young, One of Us, p.212 and p.319; and a similar 
version stated by Thatcher on BBC1.
30 Maurice Wright, ‘Big Government in Hard Times: The Restraint of Public 
Expenditure,’ in Christopher Hood and Maurice Wright, eds., Big Government in Hard Times 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), p.9; Browning, The Treasury and Economic Policy 1964- 
1985, pp.264-287; Riddell, The Thatcher Decade, pp. 16-7; and Ranelagh, Thatcher's People,
p.226.
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Figure 7.4. Public Opinion, 1979-88 
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monetarism was used to ensure financial confidence was by enhancing stability and 
forcing the government to act predictably, rather than engineering carefully timed 
changes through policy actions.31 In other words, its success depended on the 
government’s unflagging commitment to the policy over time.32 One o f the means 
the government devised to build the financial market’s confidence was the Medium 
Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), a statement of intermediate range targets including 
the PSBR.33 Given the difficulty in forecasting the PSBR, many economists have 
noted that it is surprising that it remained a central plank o f the government’s
31 Alan Meltzer, ‘Monetarism,’ in David Henderson, ed., The Fortune Encyclopedia of 
Economics (New York: Warner Books, 1993), p. 131; Keegan, Mrs. Thatcher's Experiment, 
pp.65-6; and Lawson, The View from No. 11, p.90 and p.414.
32 Gardner, Decade of Discontent, p.90.
33 Holmes, The First Thatcher Government 1979-83, p. 105; and Hillman and Clarke, 
Geoffrey Howe, p. 146.
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strategy.34 It did, however, continue to be of great importance and public attention, 
therefore, focused upon it.
The problem with this strategy was that the government failed to meet the 
targets, yet could not afford the credibility repercussions by admitting it.35 
Privatization as a means to help meet the PSBR target was, therefore, a welcome 
policy initiative, and those who developed it were well rewarded by Thatcher. 
Although the Treasury could ‘fiddle the figures’ (see Chapter Six) and the Bank of 
England could overfund the debt,36 these measures were primarily cosmetic.37 The 
real contributions were politically difficult - such as cutting spending or raising taxes. 
Privatization provided another method of reducing the PSBR which had the same 
affect as cutting spending, and was therefore very appealing to both the politicians
34 Morris, ‘Budgetary Arithmetic and the 1982 Budget,* p.99; Devereux and Morris, 
‘Budgetary Arithmetic and the 1983 Budget,’ p.39 and p.42; and Devereux et al., Budget 
Options for 1984, p.38.
33 As quoted in C. Johnson, The Economy XJnder Mrs Thatcher 1979-1990, p.68.
36 Funding the debt means selling medium and long term government debt (more 
commonly called gilts) to the non-bank public. Overfunding essentially means selling more 
government securities to the investing public than is necessary to meet die government’s own 
requirements. Scholars and civil servants and even Nigel Lawson have noted that a significant 
amount of overfunding occurred in 1981-82 and again in 1983-84. Professor Kaldor, in 
evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, produced impressive evidence that most of the 
growth in Britain’s money supply was the result of bank advances. The gilts, of course, had 
to be paid back, which caused greater spending pressure in the future. Pliatsky, The Treasury 
Under Mrs. Thatcher, p. 126; Lawson, The View from N o .ll, pp.448-9 and p.458; and 
Browning, The Treasury and Economic Policy 1964-1985, p.294.
37 Even the Labour government (1974-79) pursued devious means to achieve monetary 
targets. The Labour Minister Harold Lever used ‘ripping wheezes’ to achieve a reduction in 
the PSBR, by persuading the clearing banks and later the Trustee Savings Bank (TSB) to re­
finance export credit and shipbuilding, and to finance local authority mortgages. Lever did 
the same with Housing Associations, which were being financed through the National Loan 
Fund. Lever created a private limited company, the Housing Corporation, through which 
government grants were then channelled. When the company borrowed from the banks it did 
not count as public expenditure of PSBR, even though guaranteed by the government. 
Likierman, Public Expenditure, pp.9-10.
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who had staked their credibility on monetary policy and the Treasury whose 
reputation was under question (as described in Chapter Six).
The way privatization worked was that an asset sale simply allowed 
expenditure (or cuts in taxation) in the current period, beyond the extent feasible 
without it, by raising current income at the expense of future income streams.38 If 
the marginal increase in spending were less than was actually raised from the sale, 
the PSBR would be lower, all other things being equal. With an asset sale, however, 
the PSBR would be larger in future years unless the sale price reflected the loss of 
revenue to the government in the form of current and future profit and if  the 
government used the sale proceeds to purchase other financial assets providing a 
similar yield or to retire an equivalent amount o f outstanding debt.39 The British 
government, however, often used the proceeds from asset sales to offset increased 
spending which continued to increase from 1977 to 1989.40
Both the Labour Party in 1977 and the Conservatives after 1979 used 
privatization as a means to achieve PSBR targets. The Cabinet discussions o f the 
Labour government in 1976 during the IMF crisis illustrate why cutting the PSBR 
was important but spending cuts were difficult for political reasons (see Chapter 
Three). Similarly, the Conservatives entered office in 1979 having made too many 
promises to cut the PSBR on the one hand, and too many promises to increase 
spending on the other. The sale of BP shares was particularly important in 1979 and
38 Ali Mansoor, ‘Budgetary Impact of Privatization,* p.4; and Gamble, The Free Economy 
and the Strong State, p. 124 and p.250.
39 Richard Hemming and Ali Mansoor, ‘Privatization and Public Enterprises,* IMF 
Occasional Paper No.56, January 1988, p. 16; and Mansoor, ‘Budgetary Impact of 
Privatization,* p.5.
40 Central Statistics Office, The Government’s Expenditure Plans, 1977-90.
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1983 to help the Conservative government achieve its rigorous spending reductions
in the least harmful way.41 Asset sales soon became a regular part of the
Conservatives’ budget planning. In fact, asset proceeds were posted in the preceding
year’s budget, creating high risks if  the government failed to deliver. Failing to reach
privatization receipt targets would have negative budgetary as well as political
credibility consequences, which explains why some privatizations proceeded in the
face o f difficulties and complications.42
Privatization proceeds were the first major contributions to reducing the PSBR
while at the same time maintaining the spirit o f the MTFS.43 Leo Pliatsky, a former
Treasury civil servant explained the electoral advantages o f this:
The government’s supporters found some consolation for this setback 
[inability to cut public spending] in the better than expected success o f  
the programme of privatization of publicly owned industries and 
companies and disposals o f publicly owned assets; this form of cutting 
the public sector became to some extent a kind of psychological 
substitute for cutting public expenditure. The receipts from these sales 
also brought some material help to the government’s accounts.44
Oil may have been the largest contributor to the government’s revenues as
sales o f oil assets were the largest individual contributor to privatization and oil
revenues from the North Sea began to dwarf the PSBR by 1984. The effect o f total
privatization and oil revenues from the North Sea from 1977 to 1989 is illustrated in
Figure 7.5 as compared to the PSBR; it should also be noted that expenditure was
41 Lawson, The View from N o.ll, p.34 and p.284.
42 Letwin, Privatising the World, p.41; and Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong 
State, p. 131.
43 Keegan, Mr. Lawson's Gamble, p.94.
44 Pliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. Thatcher, p.210; also see C. Johnson, The Economy 
Under Mrs Thatcher, p. 173.
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Figure 7.5.
increasing throughout the period. Privatization proceeds rose steadily through 1988, 
while oil revenues peaked in 1984 and began to fall as the price of oil collapsed in 
1986.
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Policy Entrepreneurs - Successes and Failures
With these advantages, privatization, especially o f oil assets, was useful to
Thatcher and thus the Conservative’s overall political strategy. Though Thatcher was
not an initial supporter o f privatization, once she was shown the political virtues of
the policy,45 she supported it wholeheartedly.46 In addition, those who successfully
carried the initial costs and risks of policy development were well rewarded by
Thatcher with public recognition and promotion. I review the case o f four
Conservative politicians, Nigel Lawson, John Moore, David Howell and Hamish
Gray, and examine their entrepreneurship and corresponding rewards.
Nigel Lawson was one of Thatcher’s most important lieutenants. As Chief
Financial Secretary to the Treasury in 1979, Nigel Lawson’s career advancement and
personal credibility were bound up in the government’s commitment to the MTFS.47
He approached privatization from the political perspective, seeking revenues to meet
the government’s targets, and thus advocated the sale o f Amersham International in
1980. When the sale was 24 times oversubscribed, it appeared he had gambled to
ensure it was a political success and lost some personal credibility. Lawson recorded
the implications in his memoirs:
at the time I felt deeply humiliated, and resolved that the next 
privatization for which I was responsible, namely Britoil, would have 
to be a tender. Whatever happened, I could not afford a second 
Amersham.48
45 Lawson, The View from No.11, p. 199; and interview with Department of Energy civil 
servant.
46 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, pp.677-8.
47 Keegan, Mr. Lawson's Gamble, p.60 and pp.70-2; and Holmes, The First Thatcher 
Government 1979-83, p.62.
48 Lawson, The View from N o .ll, p.210.
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IAs Secretary of Energy from 1981 to 1983, Lawson was the driving force 
behind the DEn’s privatizations. He wrote the 1981 Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Bill, got 
it passed, privatized Britoil and prepared Enterprise Oil for sale.49 One civil servant 
thought that Lawson was self-serving and only trying to improve his ministerial 
image: because Howell had been so indecisive, Lawson saw that ‘the easy way to 
look good was to make a move.’50 It was also perceived at this time that his 
advocacy o f privatization might also be seen as a means of raising revenue to cut the 
PSBR to ensure that his MTFS targets were met.51 The oil privatizations were 
especially important to Lawson. As a policy entrepreneur and a young member of 
Thatcher’s Cabinet moving to the Department of Energy, which was not one o f the 
most sought after posts, he had to work with what was available to make his mark. 
Oil was especially important to Lawson because other types o f energy - coal, 
electricity, nuclear, even gas - involved too many obstacles, so much so that none 
were even targeted for privatization in the Conservative’s 1983 manifesto.52 Lawson 
accords the oil asset privatizations three chapters and oil a further chapter in the 
eleven chapters of his memoirs devoted to his experience as Secretary o f State for 
Energy; the first one was even titled: ‘Jewel in the Crown. *53
For taking an entrepreneurial risk, Lawson was rewarded with policy success,
49 Interview with Conservative minister.
30 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
51 Adrian Hamilton, Times, October 1981, as quoted in Keegan, Mr. Lawson’s Gamble, 
pp.94-5.
52 Conservative Party, ‘The Challenge of Our Times,’ 1983 Manifesto, pp. 16-7.
53 Lawson, The View from N o.ll. The 1987 BP share sale received a further two chapters
in Part IV of his memoirs.
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and his abilities and loyalty were much appreciated by Thatcher. She promoted him
from Energy to Chancellor of the Exchequer after the Conservatives won the 1983
election, recording her regard for him in her memoirs:
Whatever quarrels we were to have later, if  it comes to drawing up a 
list o f conservative - even Thatcherite - revolutionaries I would never 
deny Nigel a leading place on it. He has many qualities which I admire 
and some which I do not. He is imaginative, fearless and - on paper 
at least - eloquently persuasive. His mind is quick and, unlike Geoffrey 
Howe who he succeeded as Chancellor, he makes decisions easily....I 
doubt whether any other Financial Secretary to the Treasury could 
have come up with the inspired clarity o f the Medium Term Financial 
Strategy which guided our economic policy.54
Another Conservative minister who made political capital out o f privatization 
was John Moore. As Parliamentary Under Secretary in the DEn, he was in charge 
of the sale o f Amersham in 1980, and involved in the Britoil and Wytch Farm 
sales.55 In 1983, Moore was chosen to head the new Treasury unit overseeing the 
privatization programme as a whole as the policy became a central part o f the 
Conservative programme.56 Moore was cast as a trailblazer and Thatcher rewarded 
him with successive appointments to the posts o f Secretary o f State for Transportation 
in 1986, Social Services in 1987, and Social Security in 1988.
David Howell’s handling of privatization provides an example o f an 
unsuccessful policy entrepreneur. As one o f the original architects o f ‘Thatcherism’ 
and an author of The Right Approach and the 1979 and 1983 manifestos, David 
Howell also initially gained recognition for his work developing Thatcherite ideas.
34 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, pp.308-9.
33 Interview with Conservative minister.
56 Riddell, The Thatcher Decade, p.92; Pliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. Thatcher, 
p. 110; and Abromeit, ‘British Privatization Policy,* p.72.
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Appointed to the Cabinet in 1979 as Secretary of State for Energy, he was 
unsuccessful in turning the idea o f privatization into a concrete policy. Howell drew 
up the original studies on privatization and wrote a draft bill to privatize BNOC. He 
instructed the British Gas Corporation (BGC) to sell Wytch Farm (under the 1972 Gas 
Act),57 but he never got the Bill passed or completed a privatization. The reason, 
according to a fellow minister, was that he ‘could come up with 440 ways to answer 
a question but could not make a decision. The thinking was initiated under Howell, 
but things didn’t get done.’58 According to a DEn civil servant the delay in 
privatizing BNOC from 1979 to 1982 could specifically be attributed to Howell’s 
indecisive personality.59
As well as stepping back from privatization, he did not perform well in crises, 
particularly the threatened coal strike in 1980. He also muddled the DEn’s oil 
depletion policy and created additional problems over gas and electricity prices. One 
civil servant stated simply, ‘it was embarrassing. ,6° Howell was moved to head the 
Department o f Transport in the September 1981 Cabinet reshuffle, and was dropped
57 Many of the civil servants I interviewed had to think for a few minutes before recalling 
that Howell did start the privatization process. They all pointed to the fact that it was actually 
Lawson who got them going, and therefore, Howell’s contribution paled in comparison. 
Interviews with Department of Energy minister and civil servants.
58 Interview with Conservative minister.
59 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
60 A Conservative minister claimed that Howell was one of the first proponents of 
privatization advocating it as early as 1970 in his pamphlet, ‘New Style of Government* 
published by the Conservative Political Centre. Interview with Conservative minister; Hillman 
and Clarke, Geoffrey Howe, p.71; Adrian Hamilton, ‘Mr. Lawson Starts the Big North Sea 
Sell Off,’ Times, 20 October 1981; Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 142 and p. 151; 
Lawson, The View from N o .ll, p. 185; Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, p.249; 
and interviews with Department of Energy civil servant and BNOC executive.
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from the Cabinet after the 1983 election.61 Competence as well as ideas were
necessary to successfully create a policy in Thatcher’s Cabinet.
Hamish Gray is an example of a Conservative minister failing to support
Thatcher’s policies or propose more successful alternatives. As a Scottish MP and
Minister o f State for the Department of Energy Gray sought to direct benefits to
Scotland in general and his constituency in particular, through government
involvement in the oil industry. He advocated keeping BNOC. He also supported the
DEn’s gas pipeline proposal as well as the department’s plans for depletion policy,
all o f which would have aided the future of the Scottish oil and gas industry. These
issues, however, found little favour with Lawson and Thatcher, and all were
eventually defeated, except for the retention of BNOC’s trading operation.62 Gray
was not a policy entrepreneur, but a policy realist with limited aims. After gaining
the concession that it would remain in Scotland, he withdrew his opposition to the
sale o f Britoil. As one civil servant explained:
Gray was an old school Tory. He was pragmatic; he didn’t argue for 
change. But he did not die in a last ditch effort to prevent change, and 
didn’t have the power to do so anyway.63
He was described by a Conservative minister as ‘a pair o f safe hands. He saw that
privatization was right, but that it was difficult. He would never have ventured out
on it on his own.’64 Gray lost his seat in the 1983 election, but because o f his
61 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 142 and p. 151; and Middlemas, Power, 
Competition and the State, p.249.
62 Lawson, The View from No. 11, p. 184; and interviews with Department of Energy civil 
servant and minister.
63 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
64 Interview with Conservative minister.
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Scottish base, he was made a Lord and appointed to the Scottish Office for two years. 
Ministers pointed out, however, that the Scottish Office was not nearly as interesting 
or as prestigious as the DEn.65
7.3. Party Political Advantage for the Conservatives
There are two dimensions to party political advantage. The first is a cost- 
benefit analysis which computes the costs and benefits for supporters and opponents 
over the short and long-term. A positive outcome influences party leaders to place the 
issue on the political agenda. The second dimension is the distribution and intensity 
of Conservative voters on the issue. By calculating the demand within the party, 
leaders can determine the position of greatest advantage.
The Cost-Benefit Analysis
The supply side calculation of electoral advantage, for policies without strong 
demand factors, includes the distribution o f costs and benefits and the time horizon 
of their impact, see Figure 1.6.66 Politicians and parties seek policies that will target 
benefits towards their supporters. Because it is not fruitful for politicians to pursue 
policies that do not have benefits for their supporters, the table does not consider such 
options. While benefits ideally go to supporters, costs ideally go to opponents. The 
time horizon of costs and benefits are especially important to politicians as the 
electoral cycle means they may not be in office for the long-term. Therefore,
63 Interview with Department of Energy ministers.
66 James Q. Wilson, Political Organization, 1973, chapter 16 as discussed in Dunleavy 
and O’Leary, Theories of the State The Politics of Liberal Democracy, pp. 110-11.
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Figure 7.6. Electoral Analysis 
Cost-Benefit Concentration and 
Time Horizon
Benefits Target Supporters (all cases)
Short-term Long-term
Costs Target Supporters 
- Concentrated or Dispersed
Short-term Do Nothing 1 Do Nothing 2
Long-term Be Very Careful 3 Do Nothing 4
Costs Target Opponents - Concentrated
Short-term Be Very Careful 5 Do Nothing 6
Long-term Be Careful 7 Be Careful 8
Costs Target Opponents - Dispersed
Short-term Be Careful 9 Be Careful 10
Long-term Act Fast 11 Act Fast 12
benefits which can be achieved in the short-term are the most attractive, so that the 
politicians in power can receive credit for the benefits. Conversely, costs which can 
be delayed beyond the next election are the most desirable.
The possible variations of the concentration o f costs and the time horizon are 
the key factors that determine how easy and how worthwhile a policy is to pursue. 
The concentration of costs means recipients cannot afford to ignore them and are 
better off taking on the costs of opposing the action. The more concentrated the costs, 
the less likely there will be a free-rider problem and the more likely opposition will 
be co-ordinated and effective. Should costs go to supporters, for example in a 
situation where costs are dispersed and the impact is subtle (boxes 1-4), it is only 
worthwhile to proceed if  they are felt in the long-term, and even then it is a risky
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strategy (box 3). If costs are targeted to opponents and concentrated, politicians need 
to proceed very carefully with the policy, especially if concentrated in the short-term, 
(box 5). If the benefits in this case accrue to supporters in the long-term, the policy 
is not worth the risk (box 6). However, i f  the effect o f the costs are felt by opponents 
in the long-term, the policy may be worth pursuing carefully (boxes 7 and 8).
When costs target opponents and are dispersed, collective action problems are 
raised and the risk of opposition is reduced, and therefore the appeal o f the policy 
increases. When the costs are felt in the short-term, there is still need for caution 
(boxes 9 and 10) but worth the risk because benefits go to supporters. When the costs 
are dispersed among opponents in the longer-term, this is the ideal situation for a 
party and the politicians should therefore act fast and implement the policy (boxes 11 
and 12).
The change in the Conservatives’ stance on privatization from one o f caution 
to one o f action can be understood as the movement between the boxes in Figure 7.6. 
The Conservative’s initial delay in privatizing the oil assets can be explained by the 
perception that there would be a high cost to the sales in the short-term. The 
government feared they would be caught in an oil crisis and suffer from oil shortages 
and high prices because they would not have control o f their own resources. At this 
point ministers feared that the costs o f privatization would be large in the short-term, 
and that they would be dispersed among both opponents and supporters (box 1 of 
Figure 7.6). DEn civil servants pointed to the weight ministers gave to public concern 
over control of the North Sea; as one stated: ‘Ministers saw that it would be 
politically indefensible to have North Sea oil and still suffer from an oil shortage.’67
67 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
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Despite Thatcher, Moore and Lawson’s retrospective claims that privatization 
was part o f the Conservatives* plan all along and ministers* claims that privatization 
was spelled out in the 1979 manifesto, there were only vague references to 
privatization at this stage,68 and the accounts of the decision making process for the 
sale o f BNOC and other early privatization by ministers and civil servants clearly 
reveal hesitation over the policy and an ad hoc beginning.69 Thus, even though 
David Howell acted as a policy entrepreneur developing the policy, there was initially 
no action.
There are several pieces of evidence that illustrate the government’s hesitation
and lack o f commitment to the policy. In 1980 Prime Minister Thatcher was
concerned about retaining national control of the North Sea and rejected a number o f
BNOC privatization options on these grounds at an important meeting o f the Cabinet’s
Economic Committee.70 A Conservative minister described the slow process in 1979
and 1980 o f finding a workable policy for oil privatization:
In 1980, no one was in favour o f selling oil assets. There was little 
support from other ministers or from Number 10. I could not even 
persuade Thatcher that it was a good idea. At that time no one had 
begun to see wider share ownership or privatization as the effective 
political weapon that it was.71
In 1981 Thatcher again hesitated either for political reasons or because o f the
68 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants and minister; and Conservative 
Party, ‘The Conservative Manifesto 1979,’ 1979.
69 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p.688; and S. Young, ‘The Nature of 
Privatisation in Britain, 1979-85,* West European Politics, Vol.9.
70 Interviews with Department of Energy ministers; and Lawson, The View from No. 11, 
p.217.
71 Interview with Department of Energy minister; also see Hansard Parliamentary 
Debates (Lords), 9 October 1980, vol.413, col.708-710; and ‘BNOC: Up for Grabs,* 
Economist, 4 October 1980, p.63.
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complications raised by BNOC executives, and through her control o f the legislative 
timetable, was able to prevent the proposed Bill from getting a slot to debate in 
Parliament that year.72
In addition, BNOC chairman Frank Kearton was replaced by an interim 
chairman in 1980 instead o f a pro-privatization chairman. According to other BNOC 
executives, the government had not yet decided what its policy was going to be.73 
Similarly, Denis Rooke was re-appointed as chairman o f BGC in 1980 by David 
Howell in part because privatization was not yet on the agenda.74 Civil servants 
reinforced the initial uncertainty and lack o f action. They thought that the 
denationalization o f BNOC was a fait-accompli when the Conservatives arrived in 
office. Instead, civil servants were surprised by the numerous alternative options that 
were considered including the sale o f exploration acreage and forward sales of oil.75
Most importantly, there was no structural evidence within the government of 
a privatization programme until 1982-83, and thus, until then, it was only a piece­
meal response to other problems. For example, the CPRS was not commissioned until 
1982 to review the ‘state monopolies’ and consider the case for returning them to 
private ownership. And the privatization unit in the Treasury was not set up until
72 Interviews with Department of Energy ministers and civil servants and BNOC 
executive; Boon Philips, ‘BNOC Shares Sale Runs Out of Time,* Times, 26 March 1981, 
p. 19; David Steel and David Heald, ‘Report: Privatizing Public Enterprise: An Analysis of 
the Government’s Case,* Political Quarterly, Vol.53, No.3, July-Sept 1982, p.333; and 
Veljanovski, Selling the State, p.65.
73 Interviews with BNOC executives and CPRS official.
74 Interview with Lord Nigel Lawson, 15 February 1994. Though others argued that 
Howell underestimated his ability to convince Rooke of the advantages of privatization. 
Interview with Department of Energy minister.
75 Interviews with BNOC executive, Department of Energy civil servants and minister.
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1983.76 Thus, most civil servants recognized that the privatization policy grew in
importance over time, while the more cynical thought that the Conservatives had
‘stumbled* upon it.77
By the early 1980s, the Conservatives realized that instead o f potential
immediate costs they realized they were in a situation where the costs would occur
in the long run and the benefits would accrue immediately (they were therefore no
longer in boxes 1-4). The primary change was in the structure o f the international oil
industry. As discussed in Chapter Four, the industry had become a free-market by the
end o f the 1980s making state-ownership less necessary and less effective. This was
clearly recognized by politicians and Nigel Lawson recalled discussing the reduction
in BP’s effectiveness:
She [Thatcher] recalled, or I reminded her, that during the original 
problems in the Middle East, it was easier to persuade Shell than it 
was BP, even though we had a majority shareholding in BP at the 
time.78
With potential costs to supporters minimized, the other important factors in 
the calculation became the short-term benefits of privatization to supporters and short­
term costs to opponents. The short-term benefits to supporters included, its 
contribution to MTFS targets and the promised economic revival,79 its visibility as
76 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside the Think Tank,, p.83; Riddell, The Thatcher Decade, 
p.92; Pliatsky, The Treasury Under Mrs. Thatcher, p. 110.
77 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
78 Interview with Lord Nigel Lawson, 15 February 1994.
79 Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, p.249.
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a successfully implemented policy and one that received international attention,80 and
its elimination of the need for the party to achieve its electoral promise of disciplining
the nationalized industries, which they had been unable to achieve thus far.81 As
such, privatization provided a morale boost to the party which had few policy
successes and was unable to agree on many aspects of economic policy.
The main attraction of the oil asset sales, however, was the cash benefit, and
all other objectives were secondary.82 Philip Shelboume, the chairman o f BNOC,
spelt out the government’s priority: ‘The government was even more keen to raise
money than we were.’83 This money enabled the government to maintain spending
and eventually offer tax cuts to their supporters. In addition, both Labour and the
Liberals opposed privatization, which as Nigel Lawson pointed out,
is not a bad thing because it helps to keep your own in line. If they 
think others are opposed, there must be a good reason to support it.84
80 Keegan, Mr. Lawson's Gamble, pp. 174-7; McAllister and Studlar, ‘Popular Versus 
Elite Views of Privatization,’ p. 174; and Wolfe, ‘State Power and Ideology in Britain:,' 
p.248.
81 Pliatsky, Getting and Spending, pp. 199-100; Hillman and Clarke, Geoffrey Howe, 
footnote p.82; John Redwood as quoted in C. Johnson, The Economy Under Mrs Thatcher, 
p. 154; and interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
82 Vickers and Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, p.428; Abromeit, ‘British 
Privatization Policy,' p.83; Dennis Swann, The Retreat o f the State: Deregulation and 
Privatization in the United Kingdom and the United States (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1988), p.316; and Dexter Whitfield, Making it Public: Evidence and Action Against 
Privatization (London: Pluto Press, 1983), p.39.
83 Interview with BNOC executive. Ironically, privatization was actually a U-turn in the 
Government's monetarist policy. The sales were an easy means to circumvent the fiscal 
constraints, which were set by the money supply targets which were the core of monetarism. 
However, because privatization was not presented as such, this contradiction was generally 
overlooked. Abromeit, ‘British Privatization Policy,’ p.84.
84 Interview with Lord Nigel Lawson, 15 February 1994; Keegan, Mr. Lawson's Gamble, 
pp. 174-7; McAllister and Studlar, ‘Popular Versus Elite Views of Privatization,' p. 174; and 
Wolfe, ‘State Power and Ideology in Britain,' p.248.
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In terms o f the oil privatization, the sales also enabled the Conservatives to 
direct benefits to specific supporters, namely the oil industry and the financial 
community. These were two groups o f traditional Conservative supporters, and two 
industries courted by the Conservatives. During the 1979 election campaign and into 
the Conservative’s first term, the management o f some private oil companies 
complained that BNOC was a time consuming and costly irrelevance, while others 
charged that BNOC was unfair and threatened their rights. As one observer noted, 
‘BNOC was doomed once the Conservatives came to power.’85 The Conservatives 
responded by declaring their opposition to the state owned oil company starting in 
1975.86
The support o f the oil companies was crucial to the Conservatives, but also
to any British government because development of the North Sea depended on private
investment and expertise. In the early 1980s, there was a lull in North Sea investment
(see Chapter Five). One way the Conservative government tried to encourage more
industry involvement was to guarantee less government involvement in the industry.
Nigel Lawson explained the oil companies reaction to the proposed sale o f BNOC:
They were pleased to see it [the privatization o f BNOC] in the sense 
that the Conservative government had only been in office for three 
years at that point and was unpopular so they had concerns in the back 
of their minds as to how a future Labour government might use 
BNOC. But because the rump remained and it was perhaps something 
a future Labour government could use it didn’t matter as much.87
Thus, the sale of BNOC was only an indication o f the Conservative’s intentions and
83 Interview with Department of Energy civil servants and CPRS official; and Middlemas, 
Power, Competition and the State, p.357.
86 Ronald Fox, ‘Oil Denationalization Pledge,’ Times, 19 September 1975, p.2.
87 Interview with Lord Nigel Lawson, 15 February 1994.
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did not address the most important factor for the oil companies, which was the tax 
regime.88 But because the oil companies push for lower taxes on oil from the North 
Sea clashed directly with the government’s need to address its financial problems, the 
sale o f BNOC was a much easier way to try and appease the oil companies.89 The 
retention o f the trading portion of BNOC, however, reveals the lower priority 
ministers assigned to appeasing the oil companies.
The financial press supported the government’s plans to sell its oil assets. A 
typical statement from The Economist, for example, described BNOC as ‘a 
free-spending drain on the public purse [which] was given excessive privileges by its 
socialist creators.’90 The benefits to the financial community were through 
privatization in general and not specific to the oil sales, as they helped the City o f 
London as well as advertising and public relations firms through a lean time.91 The 
payments for such services for the oil sales alone were at least £224 million (see 
Chapter Three, Table 3.1.).
In addition to the benefits to supporters, the oil sales also targeted costs to 
their opponents in the short-term. The Conservative’s privatization programme wrong­
footed the Labour Party, undermining their already weak opposition.92 Traditional
88 Interview with Britoil executive.
89 Robinson, ‘The Errors of North Sea Policy,* pp.29-30.
90 Economist, 12 June 1982, p.516; also survey of articles in the Financial Times and 
Economist from 1976 to 1987.
91 Chapman, Selling the Family Silver, pp.67-9; and Whitfield, Making it Public, p.39.
92 The Labour Party was fragmented and disorganized, which was exacerbated by the 
formation of a new party, the Social Democrats. This divided the opposition limited their 
effectiveness in Parliament, and according to some scholars, enabled the Conservatives to win 
the 1983 election. Pliatsky, Getting and Spending, p.214; Robert Skidelsky, ‘Introduction,* 
in Robert Skidelsky, ed., Thatcherism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988), p.26; ‘Labour
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Labour Party disagreement on the nationalization - denationalization issue made it a 
divisive issue within the Party and hampered the formulation of a convincing 
alternative programme.93 The fact that Labour ministers had been the first to 
privatize oil assets made it additionally difficult for the Shadow Cabinet to oppose the 
Conservatives’ policy on BP. One minister admitted that ‘the BP sale set the tone for 
the Conservative government in 1979, and it was hard to argue with the accounting 
practice we had set up, which also gave the Conservatives the grounds for further 
privatization.’94 Lawson also noted: ‘The previous Labour government had 
inadvertently paved the way with its 1977 BP share sale. So the official Opposition 
could hardly complain with much conviction.’95 Another minister recalled gleefully, 
‘the Conservatives taunted Labour with it later.,96
Disagreement in Labour’s ranks also emerged in public over the first Britoil 
sale. The shadow energy spokesman, Merlyn Rees, stated in November 1981 that a 
Labour government would buy back Britoil at its market price. Shortly thereafter, 
Tony Benn made a speech contradicting Rees* statement saying the government would
Party Fragmented,* Economist, 6 October 1979; Gamble, p. 108; Peter Jenkins, Mrs. 
Thatcher's Revolution, The Ending of the Socialist Era (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), 
pp. 102-129; Budge et at., The Changing British Political System, pp.70-1; Hugo Young, One 
of Us, pp.293-4; Prior, A Balance of Power, p. 153; and Ivor Crewe, ‘The Decline of labour 
and the decline of Labour: Social and Electoral Trends in Post-War Britain,* Essex Papers 
in Politics and Government, Number 65, September 1989.
93 Abromeit, ‘British Privatization Policy,’ p.72.
94 Interview with Labour minister.
95 Lawson, The View from No. 11, p.34 and pp. 199-200.
96 Interview with Conservative minister.
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confiscate Britoil.97 As Lawson described it: ‘The Conservative benches had been 
on the defensive for so long over unemployment and the economy that they were 
hugely cheered by Labour’s obvious discomfiture.’98 And though there was a trade 
union member on the Board of BNOC, there was nothing he could effectively 
achieve.99 In addition, the Conservatives were able to diffuse the effectiveness of 
Labour’s opposition against Enterprise Oil by recalling the fact that Labour had tried 
to separate the oil assets of the BGC so they could be given to BNOC in 1975, but 
the Labour government retreated in the face of BGC’s protests. Pointing to this 
attempt, the Minister of State for Energy Alick Buchanan-Smith asserted that even the 
Labour government found it questionable that BGC should be involved in oil 
exploration.100
Though privatization was used as a means to break a trade union stronghold 
in some cases,101 the trade unions were not a factor with the oil sales because trade 
unions were not prominent in the capital intensive oil industry. The employees of 
BNOC and BGC, however, proved to be strong opponents of privatization. The 
Conservatives sought to diffuse employee opposition by making employee ownership 
easy and profitable.102 A DEn minister pointed out:
97 Julian Haviland and Philip Webster, ‘Rees Threat to Resign Over Benn’s Oil Speech,* 
Times, 11 November 1981, p.l.
98 Lawson, The View from N o .llt p.212.
99 Interview with BNOC board member.
100 Bailey, ‘Unequal Shares in the North Sea,’ p.329; and Hansard Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons), 13 March 1984, col.343.
101 Lawson, The View from N o .ll, p.437; Ranelagh, Thatcher’s People, p.223; and 
Dobek, ‘Privatization as a Political Priority,’ pp.36-38.
102 Madsen Pirie, Micropolitics (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1988), pp. 187-93.
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There was never any representation from the work force to be 
nationalized again. In fact many employees increased their share. To 
ensure that the British people got a reasonable way to participate, we 
made a special provision for those who worked in the industry, and 
limited the percentage holding by institutions.103
Realizing the short-term benefits yet fearing some o f the costs were
concentrated towards their opponents (boxes 5 and 7 o f Figure 7.6), the
Conservatives decided to proceed cautiously but sought to avoid criticism wherever
possible. The sensitivity o f Conservative ministers to public opinion is evident in
many o f the specifics o f the sales, as strong opposition was purposely avoided,
specifically measures that threatened security of supply.104
The largest public outcry against privatization occurred when a radical CPRS
report was leaked to the Economist. The public outcry over severe privatization
measures, including privatizing the National Health Service, caused the Conservatives
to recoil. Hugo Young, a newspaper reporter at the time, described the Cabinet
debating the options:
After three years of intense unpopularity [overall], they could not 
persuade themselves there was any wisdom in even privately discussing 
a serious assault on such sacred parts o f the British way o f life as 
health and public education.105
Because the CPRS report was so politically unpopular, Thatcher denied ever
requesting or considering it.106 When extreme measures were proposed, the intensity
103 Interview with Department of Energy minister.
104 Interview with Department of Energy minister and civil servant; also see Adrian 
Hamilton, ‘Mr. Lawson Starts the Big North Sea Sell Off,* Times, 20 October 1981; Lawson, 
The View from No. 11, p.217; and interview with Lord Nigel Lawson, 15 February 1994.
103 Hugo Young, One of Us, p.302.
106 Keegan, Mrs. Thatcher's Experiment, p. 193. However, Thatcher argued it was never 
even considered: ‘The CPRS prepared its own paper...which contained a number of very 
radical options that had never been seriously considered by ministers or by me...I was
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o f middle-of-the-road opinion was raised, and proved to be a constraint to
privatization. The concern over how privatization was implemented and the reaction
to the CPRS report indicated that politicians were responsive to public opinion and
were not free to implement an elite agenda.
With the potential for such public outcries in mind, the government sought to
avoid raising any of the privatization issues outside o f the region o f acceptability.
Responding to strong public concern for security of supply for oil, the government
adapted its privatization methods accordingly. The government split BNOC and only
sold the production portion, thus retaining the trading operation and the participation
agreements and royalty in-kind arrangements. As a DEn civil servant pointed out,
‘queues for petrol were the quickest way to lose office. BNOC gave a guarantee [of
supply].’107 On a more personal level, a civil servant related a story involving the
Secretary o f State for Energy, David Howell:
There was a hiccup in supply in 1980, with the result o f local 
shortages. Howell found this very embarrassing with a North Sea oil 
surplus. At the time, Howell went to fill up his car in a local garage 
in Wales, where the owner came over and said: "Not a very good start 
Mr.Howell.1,108
The civil servant thought this experience was what convinced Howell to retain the 
participation agreements, the thinking being the situation could have been worse 
without the agreements.109
Another measure was to create a ‘golden share,’ which would allow foreigners
horrified by this paper. As soon as I saw it, I pointed out that it would almost certainly be 
leaked and give a totally false impression.* Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, pp.276-7.
107 Interview with Treasury civil servant.
108 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
109 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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to buy BNOC shares, yet prevent them from gaining a controlling share.110 As one
minister explained,
a golden share was put in to protect British interests, to prevent the 
takeover by a foreign power. You couldn’t do this today because o f  
European Community (EC) regulations. We were not worried about a 
US takeover, but rather German or French, ie through Demenex, Elf,
Total or Petrofina.111 (See discussion in Chapter Three)
From BNOC’s perspective, one executive explained,
golden shares are political measures. Even though I have worked on 
many privatizations since, we still don’t have it right, don’t know if  
they really do anything. At that stage [when asset sold] free market 
forces should work. But they [golden shares] were the vogue, the 
fashion.112
One Britoil executive complained that the golden share was a last minute response to 
political concerns and was not worked out, and therefore later proved to be the cause 
of major problems for the company as it faced takeover bids from BP and Atlantic 
Richfield (see Chapter Three).113
Another response was to re-enact the assurances agreed with oil companies in 
the wake o f the 1974 oil crisis.114 In July 1985, the Financial Times published a 
letter from BP to the government, assuring the government that they would meet UK 
demand, providing they could raise prices as necessary. The Secretary o f State for 
Energy would only say that ‘the arrangements between the government and oil
110 ‘Government to Retain 49% of State Oil Assets,’ Times, 21 October 1981; 
‘Government to Retain 49% of State Oil Assets,’ Times, 21 October 1981, p.l; and ‘No Bar 
to BNOC Sale,’ Times, 3 February 1982, p. 13.
111 Interview with Department of Energy minister.
112 Interview with BNOC executive (McCall); also see Lawson, The View from No. 11, 
pp.780-82.
113 Interview with Britoil executive.
114 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
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companies are confidential.’115
The evidence suggests that the decision to sell the oil assets was a pure 
political calculation, rather than one due to ideological conviction or economic 
efficiency goals. Civil servants reinforced the political nature o f the decision: ‘The 
government kept BNOC out of political convenience, not any conviction.’116 Others 
pointed out that there was no quantitative analysis on how BNOC ensured security of  
supply or the impact of a sale. It was a matter of political perception.117 In addition, 
the government’s sales were expedient. They only sold the companies that were easy 
to sell, particularly those already operating as private companies, rather than those 
which were public monopolies or met any ideological criteria. With huge 
consequences for the future, civil servants also felt that the sales were undertaken 
without any thought to the regulatory implications.118
With the case o f BP, by 1983 the government realized that instead o f having 
costs concentrated in the short-term (box 9), they were in the ideal case where the 
majority o f costs are dispersed and spread over the long-term, while the benefits are 
concentrated and immediate (box 11), in which case they should and did act fast. The 
financial distribution of costs and benefits for the BP case is illustrated in Figure 7.7. 
The government received almost £7 billion by 1987 in share sale proceeds while they 
would have had to wait until at least after 2005, 17 years later, for BP’s dividend 
proceeds to have exceeded the sale proceeds. This is also a conservative estimate
115 Interview with BNOC executive; and Lawson, The View from N o.ll, pp.780-82.
116 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant.
117 Interviews with Department of Energy civil servants.
118 Interviews with BNOC executive, Department of Energy civil servants; and Garner, 
‘British Airways and British Aerospace,’ pp.22-3.
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Figure 7.7.
because this graph does not take into account the net present value of money, the 
benefit of having cash in hand versus the promise of future revenues, which is 
especially important for oil companies whose dividends are not guaranteed. Thus, the 
costs of privatization were propelled into the future - after most of the current 
politicians would have retired.
The alternative explanation for the Conservative politicians’ actions is that they 
were preference shaping, implementing policies to shape demand and increase 
Conservative support. Conservative politicians, in fact, claim that they shifted public
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opinion to favouring privatization, for example, Nigel Lawson claimed: ‘Wider share 
ownership was an important policy objective and we were prepared to pay a price for 
it .’119 For example, in the sale of Enterprise Oil, the government turned down 
offers o f a trade sale of BGC’s oil assets. They decided to float the company on the 
stock exchange because, according to one civil servant, the ‘Conservatives had the 
view that capitalist shareholders would not vote for Labour.’120 That being said, the 
sale was not widely advertised and no effort was made to target new shareholders.
The limit to the Conservatives’ commitment to wider share ownership was 
demonstrated over Howell’s suggestion to give all UK citizens shares in BNOC. No 
one in the party was prepared to support this proposition.121 There are in fact 
several general advantages to ‘people’s capitalism’ noted by academics, including; 
building-up a capital market, wider-share ownership, a wider constituency than a tax- 
cut, state-owned industries having more autonomy, relieving the state o f future 
investment burdens, and that individuals can choose their own portfolio o f risk.122 
Yet these advantages were rejected by the Conservatives, which indicates that their 
primary motive was the cash up front and rewards to Tory voters rather than long­
term electoral gain. As one minister explained, based on his experience in the United 
States:
The link in the US was that the owning class voted more 
conservatively. This was way underestimated by those who wanted to
119 Lawson, The View from N o .ll, pp.237-8 and p.201; and interview with Conservative 
minister.
120 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant; and Lawson, The View from 
N o.ll, p.757.
121 Lawson, The View from N o.ll, p.218.
122 Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises, pp.336-7.
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give it away. The link was between private share-owners and 
Conservative voters.123
The electoral impact of privatization, in terms of converting Labour to 
Conservative voters was not felt until the 1987 election, and then it was an estimated 
shift o f only 1.6 per cent, controlling for the range of socioeconomic factors 
correlated with privatization.124 A key reason why the Tories* policy stance 
converted relatively few voters was that many o f the new shareholders already 
supported the Conservatives.125 And while the number o f shareholders in Britain 
dramatically increased from 5 per cent of the electorate in 1979 to 23 per cent in 
1989, shareholders remained a minority o f the population.126 Even after the 1987 
election, the median voter was not a shareholder. Thus, privatization might better be 
seen as a policy which rewarded loyal Conservative supporters rather than one which 
converted voters close to the median.
Determining the Conservatives’ Position on Privatization 
Once the costs and benefits were favourably assessed and the Conservatives 
adopted privatization, the position and intensity of Conservative voters* opinion on 
privatization determined the party’s position. Rather than using the directional theory 
of voting which emphasizes the role o f elites to determine positions and then predicts 
voters’ response, or the median voter model which only takes into account proximity
123 Interview with Conservative Minister.
124 McAllister and Studlar, ‘Popular Versus Elite Views of Privatization,* p. 173.
125 Oonagh McDonald, Owning Your Own: Social Ownership Examined (London: Unwin 
Paperbacks, 1989), p.8.
126 McAllister and Studlar, ‘Popular Versus Elite Views of Privatization,* p. 166; and 
Chapman, Selling the Family Silver, p. 8.
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of position, I suggest an alternative way of incorporating position and intensity as a 
means of creating demand for a policy. Adapting Figure 7.2’s picture of overall voter 
demand for privatization, I extrapolate and incorporate additional descriptive evidence 
and hypothesize the distributions of position and intensity on privatization of 
Conservative voters (see Figure 7.8).
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Figure 7.8.
The majority of Conservatives, like the overall population, were closest in 
position to the status quo, though there were many who favoured more 
denationalization (dotted line). In terms of intensity (crossed line), those at the neutral 
position did not feel strongly about the issue (point A), while those favouring more 
denationalization felt more strongly (point B). The intensity of those at the extreme 
position declined, possibly because being outside the region of acceptability (to the 
right of solid line) they perceived their position to be unrealistic.
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Instead of parties’ arbitrarily moving to an extreme position, there is an 
interchange between voters and candidates. Voters can influence policy positions by 
threatening to vote against it or by threatening to vote according to another issue, 
which is more likely when intensity is low. Therefore, when determining the most 
advantageous position to select, politicians must take into account how many voters 
occupy a position and how intensely they feel about the issue. By simply multiplying 
the position by the intensity, I determine the electoral impact o f a position (bars in 
the background). The highest point of the bars is where the most voters will vote 
according to this issue. At the lower points in the bar either the intensity is less so 
some voters will select another issue or the intensity is stronger but there are 
insufficient numbers o f voters to make the radical position worthwhile. Outside the 
region of acceptability, gains in extreme votes are cancelled out by negative votes 
from the center.
The Conservative party started close to the median position in 1979. As they 
realized the benefits from the policy, which involved the cost-benefit analysis above, 
and the existence of strong opinions among Conservative voters, they moved to a 
more extreme position (point C). A high degree o f intensity from the extreme position 
holders led politicians further to the right. For example, Lawson records his 
amazement and relief at receiving a standing ovation at the 1982 Conservative party 
convention after changing the subject of the energy debate from rising gas prices 
(which were receiving heavy criticism) to the privatization o f Britoil.127
Conclusion
127 Lawson, The View from No. 11, p. 176.
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Privatization in Britain can be divided into three phases: In the first phase, the 
policy was possible but was only moved along by policy entrepreneurs. In the second 
phase, the government was committed to the policy but only proceeded on a case by 
case basis according to the costs and benefits. In the third phase, privatization was 
accepted in general terms and evolved into an ideological project in its own right. The 
oil asset sales occurred during the first two phases, while most explanations of 
privatization focus on the third. Therefore, I argue that the traditional explanations 
of privatization are less helpful for this case.
The public demand for privatization was weak and uncertain over time. 
Opposition was greater to specific privatizations than to the concept in general over 
which the population was fairly evenly divided. Because privatization did not figure 
highly on any of the voters’ rankings of issues, it did not feature in their voting 
decisions. It was low intensity rather than the parties* failure to offer sufficient 
stimulus, as the directional theory predicts, which explains the low public demand. 
Voters did not feel strongly about the privatization o f the oil assets, in part because 
the policy did not affect them directly. The government, therefore, could proceed 
without electoral risk. This low intensity and lack of concern gave the political parties 
a wide range for choice in terms of developing the privatization issue and selecting 
their policy position.
Rather than being a ‘lottery’, I argue that these decisions were determined by 
specific supply-side factors, namely personal political advantage and party political 
demand. The effect of these two factors is illustrated in Figure 7.9. Personal political 
advantage was an important factor in both because a policy entrepreneur was 
important to the development and promotion o f the policy. Within party political
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advantage, the distribution of 
costs and benefits in the short 
and long-term determined 
whether privatization was 
worthwhile to adopt at all, 
while the distribution o f  
position and intensity of 
Conservative party members 
determined the optimal position 
for the government to select.
In terms of policy options, the political parameters faced by the government 
can be illustrated in Venn diagrams where policies to raise taxes, increase the budget 
deficit and sell assets are represented by points A, B and C respectively (see Figures 
7.10, 7.11 and 7.12). The parameters included public demand, personal credibility 
and electoral success as represented by circles 1, 2 and 3 respectively. In 1974, the 
issue o f taxes and budget deficits were not intensely held issues, no politician had 
staked their career on them and there were no severe electoral risks for selecting any 
of the policies. As a result, the options available to politicians were large (points A,
B and C are in all three circles), as represented in Figure 7.10. In 1977, following
the 1976 balance of payments deficits and the IMF crisis, politicians could not afford 
to allow a repeat situation, therefore, an increase in the budget deficit due to electoral 
considerations was no longer possible, (point B excluded from circle 3), as illustrated 
in Figure 7.11. Similarly, due to the already high tax rate, Labour politicians feared 
they would face electoral punishment by raising taxes (point A is no longer inside
Supply Factors
Personal Political Advantage
Policy Entreprenuer
Position Agenda
Policy Intensity
X
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
/
Policy Political Advantage
Figure 7.9.
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circle 3). Thus, o f the three options 
only asset sales remained possible 
(only point C remains in the 
intersection o f three circles).
By 1982, the situation had 
changed again with the election of the 
Conservative government in 1979. 
Public opinion continued to allow 
politicians a wide range of options, 
but the Conservative leadership had 
staked their career credibility on their 
economic policy, including no new 
taxes while reducing the budget 
deficit. As such, they also faced 
electoral risk if  they strayed from 
these commitments. Thus, only an 
asset sale was possible (point C is the 
only option inside circles 2 and 3 and 
the only option that remained in the 
intersection o f the three circles), as 
illustrated in Figure 7.12.
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Chapter Eight: Explaining State Disengagement
Most scholars o f politics, from whatever their viewpoint, have assumed that 
states and governments grow larger over time, and that it is normal, logical and 
‘rational* for those who control government power to seek to push outward their 
scope o f influence. Pluralists see groups, including bureaucrats, as always demanding 
more services and government responding by building greater capabilities to meet 
these demands (Dahl, 1961; Halperin, 1974). Elite theorists assume that the state is 
a means for elites to enhance or protect their position and thus expect elite demands 
to increase the scope of the states (Mills, 1956). Public choice theorists, whether 
focusing on the bureaucrat or the politician, have assumed that public officials have 
self-interested reasons for increasing the size o f the government (Niskanen, 1971). 
Even from the perspective of international relations, scholars have accepted the 
realists* premise that states are power maximizers continuously seeking to increase 
their wealth and control, and thus their size (Keohane, 1984; Waltz, 1954 and 1979). 
This includes scholars from the international political economy perspective who 
regard states as only one of many actors in the international arena (Strange, 1985; 
Krasner, 1985).
Though it is not necessarily intrinsic to these theories, the government growth 
assumption has persisted.1 In part, this can be understood by the fact that most 
governments have steadily grown, especially since World War II, the period in which 
most o f these theories were developed. There has thus been no reason to question the 
growth assumption. In fact, government growth seemed to be the one constant that
1 Hood, ‘Stabilization and Cutbacks,*p.43-5.
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political theory had to be able to explain. The idea and practice o f ‘rolling back the 
frontiers o f the state’ which developed in Britain under the Thatcher government, and 
the effort to disengage government from many spheres of economic and social life, 
initially raised few doubts about the fundamental premise. A common first response 
was to be sceptical about whether anything had really changed.
But the longer and more complete a process of state disengagement becomes, 
the less plausible it is to suppose that nothing o f substance has happened, and the 
more important it becomes to examine the possibility that public officials, groups, 
elites or states have acted to reduce state power or influence in a long-term way, and 
therefore have in some sense behaved counter-intuitively. The British government’s 
oil asset sales apparently provide just such a case. They stretched over a ten year 
period, involved 9 separate sales, and affected assets valued by the private market at 
£8.5 billion. The sales were a particularly final and once-for-all method o f readjusting 
government’s role in the energy sector: the scale o f receipts made it virtually 
impossible for any future government to rebuild any equivalent asset portfolio without 
changing the whole basis of government/market relations in the UK. The sales were 
also a serious undertaking in terms of their transaction costs, conservatively estimated 
at some £223 million.
Because the underlying assumptions of most theorists are inconsistent with 
these facts, it is important to stand back somewhat from the theories and the detailed 
narratives reviewed so far, and briefly re-piece the jigsaw of multiple causes 
involved. Table 8.1 summarizes the general motivations for selling an asset, which 
can be divided into two categories: financial and functional. Though this list is 
derived from governments selling state assets, perhaps it can more readily be
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understood using the analogy of a professor with a ten year old automobile.
Table 8.1. Why Sell an Asset?
Financial Functional
Expensive to maintain Asset changed in terms of: 
size
capabilities
output
and therefore no longer provides 
necessary service
Becomes a financial liability
Needs change in terms of:
political
ideological
social
and therefore asset no longer 
necessary
Need the money
Better alternatives available
Other arrangements offer greater 
returns
While there are many reasons why the professor might reconsider ownership 
of a ten year old car, there are only a few specific reasons why she should actually 
sell it. Initially, financial reasons might motivate a sale. For instance, the car is 
expensive to maintain because it breaks down so often, or it has become a financial 
liability as the make and age of the car increase the likelihood o f accidents which 
have repercussions in the form of an enormous insurance liability. In other scenarios,
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she needs money for more important priorities, such as to pay her landlord who has 
been knocking on her door for the last week, or she has realized that leasing a car is 
more economical. In addition to financial motivations, there are also functional 
reasons why a professor might sell her car: Either the asset has changed so that it no 
longer provides the same service, or her needs have changed and she no longer needs 
the same service or a better alternative now exists. For example, the car has become 
so run-down it is no longer the reliable mode o f transportation it once was, or the 
professor has grown out of her idealist beliefs and a ten year old Russian Lada does 
not fit with her new conservative image. A final possibility is that the public transport 
link from her home to university has recently been completed and the 45 minute drive 
can now be done in 20 minutes on the underground. Of course, she will act faster to 
dispose o f the car the more she needs the money or the more embarrassing it is to 
have a Lada parked in her driveway.
Given these numerous ‘rational* reasons to sell an asset in general, I now turn 
to the evidence o f this case and review which rationales applied to the sales of BP, 
BNOC and BGC’s oil assets from the perspective o f the four levels o f influences 
analyzed in this paper: International, company, bureaucracy, and political process. 
I first examine the international level and consider the theoretical implications for 
using this level for domestic policy decisions. Then I turn to the domestic actors, the 
managers o f BNOC, BGC and BP, the civil servants and then the elected politicians 
and review their role in the asset sale decision. In the third section, I consider some 
broader implications of this analysis, first for understanding or predicting the extent 
of privatization in other contexts, and second for improving the efficiency of 
government bureaucracies. I then conclude by returning to an overview of this case
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and the implications o f a multi-level approach.
8.1. International Factors in State Disengagement
At the international level I argued, in contrast to the realists, that rather than 
determining a state’s behaviour, international factors set parameters to politicians’ 
policy choices. With two variables, an aggregate political variable and an economic 
issue specific variable, it is possible to predict a country’s vulnerability to 
international pressures in different cases. In Britain’s case, it was clear that the British 
government would be more susceptible to international financial pressures than 
international oil pressures. In fact, pressures on Britain’s finances in the form o f the 
1976 IMF crisis were the only international forces that directly affected the 
government’s decision to sell its oil assets. Changes in the structure o f the 
international oil industry from a cartel to a free-market industry did not force the 
sales in the late 1970s or the 1980s, but they were significant in that they diminished 
the consequences o f relinquishing ownership and this made the sales possible. In 
response to neo-liberal claims, the third variable examined in this case was Britain’s 
membership in the EC and the IEA. The evidence revealed that the international 
organizations per se had little effect on the government’s decision to sell its oil assets. 
The interdependence that led to the creation of the organizations, however, was an 
important factor. The economic links can be revealed through issue analysis, rather 
than specific organizational studies, as was the case with the IMF in the financial 
issue analysis.
Recalling Table 8.1, the international level was the primary determinant o f the 
government’s functional motivations for selling its oil assets. In the case of Britoil,
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Enterprise Oil and Wytch Farm and BP, and even in the case o f winding down 
BNOC’s trading operation, the changes in the structure of the international oil 
industry were such that the services that the oil assets provided were no longer needed 
in Britain. Specifically on the demand side, as the global oil industry became 
increasingly controlled by the free-market, numerous sources o f oil were developed 
and state-ownership was no longer necessary to ensure security o f supply. On the 
supply side, the changes were such that BNOC trading and BP were no longer able 
to provide the services they once did. Due to the extent o f free-market competition, 
a single state could not influence oil prices through a state trading company, 
especially a relatively small company like BNOC and with Britain’s relatively modest 
reserves. Similarly, though BP could once be relied upon to favour Britain, as the 
company sought to adapt to the changing international structure, it was no longer 
possible for BP to discriminate between customers.
The approach used in this case contributes to general knowledge o f the role 
international factors play in policy-making analysis, but it also contributes to 
understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of international relations theory. This 
case suggests that international factors can be incorporated as setting parameters in 
the same way that institutional public choice theorists have considered domestic 
institutions. While this seems especially obvious in cases of privatization, which is 
often referred to as part o f an international trend, international factors are also useful 
in general to domestic policy-making analyses. This case, in fact, helps to illustrate 
how few truly ‘domestic’ issues there are, especially for states in weaker international 
political and economic positions.
In terms of broader international relations theory, the British oil asset sales
281
question one o f the basic assumptions regarding the state. International relations has 
evolved beyond realism to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, as well as other avenues 
such as international political economy (IPE). But in the two mainstream areas, neo- 
realism and neo-liberalism, the central assumptions have remained - the state is the 
primary actor, the international system is basically anarchic and states seek power. 
This case, with many others in the IPE genre, shows that there are important issues 
which a state-centred approach cannot adequately address.
The most fundamental criticism of the neo-realist approach is that they treat 
the state’s preferences as a given. They assume that the agents and actors o f the state 
are unitary, only the state’s capabilities affect the system, and that international 
institutions play a minimal role (Krasner, 1985). Neo-liberals only challenge the latter 
two problems and argue that factors such as interdependence and institutionalization 
o f international rules (international organizations or regimes) are also important. 
Indirectly they question the pre-eminence o f the state, but they do not deny that it is 
an important international actor.2 Only IPE scholars have pointed out that there are 
other actors such as firms and groups and other constructs such as markets that 
matter.3 Some also highlight the complexity o f the state and show that it is not a 
homogenous actor but rather a compilation of political parties, interest groups, 
politicians and voters.4 This re-definition of the state cannot be understated; its 
significance has far-reaching implications.
2 Krasner, International Regimes.
3 Strange, States and Markets; and Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
4 Milner, Resisting Protectionism; Cohen, ‘European Financial Integration and National 
Banking Interests’; Frieden, ‘Invested Interests’; and Golich, ‘From Competition to 
Collaboration.’
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By focusing on the state as a homogeneous, rational actor, we miss out on 
other actors and explanations. For example, states with different parties in power will 
have the same capabilities and face the same international parameters, and therefore 
have many of the same policy choices. But where there is room for choice, outcomes 
may be different because politicians have different constituents, different party 
structures and different political strategies. These factors affect their policy choices, 
which in turn affect the state’s resources. In the British case, the change o f the party 
in power - and the ensuing interests and strategy changes - resulted in the complete 
sale o f the state’s oil assets and a re-definition of the state’s position.
The effect o f changing this one assumption is also evident from the difference 
between the findings in this study and those o f Merrie Gilbert Klapp, who accepts the 
statist’s assumptions, including that states have definable interests unique from 
society.5 The first difference is over what determines the desirability o f state 
ownership. She argues that governments become involved or not in the oil business 
due to changes in the role of the state, that is, because o f a change in the state’s 
position vis-a-vis private domestic and foreign interests (p. 130-1), whereas I argue 
that governments become involved or not in the oil business due to changes in the 
international oil industry, from a cartel to a free market, as well as other domestic 
factors. Whether a state becomes stronger or weaker versus domestic and 
international interests does not seem to explain why states at very different stages o f 
development became involved in the oil industry during the past 70 years. The 
changes in the international structure of the oil industry better explain the ownership 
trend. When the oil industry was a cartel, there were monopoly rents to be gained
5 Klapp, The Sovereign Entrepreneur, p.38.
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through ownership and loss of security if ownership was not possible. Thus, in the 
face o f the majors’ monopoly and OPEC’s cartel, state ownership of companies 
continually increased. However, once the industry structure shifted to a free-market, 
the gains from ownership were not as great nor were the security costs o f foregoing 
ownership - and the privatizations began.
The second difference is over causes of state ownership. Klapp argues that: 
‘The ownership of industry will depend, in the long run, not on ideological 
preferences but on struggles for wealth between great organizations - states, 
multinational corporations, and domestic companies.’(p. 15) While she admits that 
states have internal disputes, she argues that they maintain distinct national interests. 
By contrast, I argue that states are not homoger^us and that politicians, not states, 
seek advantage and power. Similarly, MNCs and domestic companies are not 
homogeneous blocks. The struggle for power, however, is not limited to these 
groups; politicians, consumers, taxpayers, voters, oil competitors and 
environmentalists are all political actors able to influence outcomes. The policy 
outcomes depend on who is in the winning coalition, as well as other parameters such 
as the bureaucracy and voters. Establishing the relative strength between Klapp’s 
three groups does not have the same predictive power.
Finally, and not surprisingly, our predictions also differ. Klapp predicts that: 
‘the current still runs in the direction of state entrepreneurs and that privatization, at 
least as far as oil is concerned, is no more than a diversion.’(p. 15) By contrast, I 
argue that privatization is perfectly sustainable as long as the free-market in oil 
remains. Klapp assumes that all states have an autonomous interest in the ownership 
of oil (p. 131), but outlines no underlying logic showing that this should be so. I argue
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that better predictions can be made by examining the situation from the opportunities 
offered by the international system, such as a monopoly or free-market oil industry, 
as well as the domestic demands of consumers and voters. In this way we can gain 
a better understanding of why governments chose ownership of oil companies in some 
cases and regulation in others. In fact, control over industries can be ensured through 
numerous means including: competition policy, regulatory policy, regional policy, 
employment and training policy, industrial relations policy, policy for high technology 
industries, trade policy, public procurement policy, planning and environmental 
policy, energy policy, and corporate tax policy.6 Klapp’s broad predictions do not 
seem to accept that these alternatives to ownership are sufficient; whereas I argue that 
in many cases they are, in fact, politically preferable.
Governments* reactions to foreign ownership provide an interesting and 
specific test for these two approaches. Foreign ownership of major assets is a 
sensitive issue in any country and highlights exactly how the national government 
evaluates the benefits of domestic control. As an industrialized country with a well 
developed international financial market and a sizable number of domestic investors, 
Britain did not face the same financial constraints as many less developed countries. 
Even so, the domestic British market was not large enough to completely absorb the 
BP share offerings in 1977, 1983 or 1987, so tranches of each offering were placed 
overseas. The issue of foreign ownership was not controversial, however, until the 
1987 stock market crash when the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) acquired over 20 
per cent o f BP’s total shares. Until then, foreign investors were most likely to be
6 Vickers and Wright, ‘The Politics of Industrial Privatisation in Western Europe,* pp.26-
7.
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from other industrialized countries with similar beliefs in the free-market system. No 
matter who held the shares, the market mechanism would function, providing efficient 
allocation o f oil. When the KIO began to seek a controlling interest in BP, however, 
the government realized that, as the arm of an oil producing country, KIO might seek 
monopoly advantages. A BP controlled by KIO might also fail to respond to Britain’s 
oil demands. The subsequent actions of the British government might support Klapp’s 
claim that relinquishing ownership is a blip in history. If the British government had 
irrevocably decided not to own its oil assets, why should the Kuwaiti government, 
through the KIO, not take advantage of the opportunity to expand its own oil assets?
The Thatcher government, however, did not re-purchase the shares. Contrary 
to their free-market policy stance, they intervened using other instruments, forcing 
the KIO to divest from BP. These actions can be best explained as nationally-elected 
politicians responding to public demand. The public outcry and the perceived short­
term costs of hostile interests controlling one of Britain’s major oil suppliers caused 
significant public demand for a government response. Klapp’s argument suggests that 
even a ‘weak* state would re-gain ownership, but the government used alternative 
tools available to ensure BP’s independent status. KIO was not the only example of 
the British government intervening to protect the interests o f its former assets. The 
government also prevented the British mining conglomerate RTZ from taking over 
Enterprise Oil in 1984, and prevented a U.S. oil company take-over o f BNOC in 
1988, though it allowed BP to do so subsequently. Realists, by insisting on seeing the 
state as a unitary actor with distinct interests, blur our view of the real motivations 
and actors in policy-making.
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8.2. The Domestic Actors’ Calculus
This section reviews the motives of the domestic actors involved in the 
decision-making process, and then examines which factors were included in the 
calculus for each sale.
The Three Main Actors
At the Company level, by examining the level o f organizational autonomy, 
financial independence, and success in achieving the company’s mission, it was 
possible to explain the differing actions o f BP, BNOC and BGC. Because BP was 
organizationally autonomous and financially independent, it sought to maintain that 
status. Due to its considerable size and financial success, BP was effective in 
persuading the government to sell its holding. By contrast, BNOC and BGC depended 
on government ownership for their national interest mandate, which they resented 
losing. But as autonomous and independent companies, they also resisted any measure 
that would split their companies. Due to its enormous size and financial success, BGC 
was effective in delaying the sale of Wytch Farm for over two years, but ultimately 
could not stop either of its oil assets being sold. BNOC was the least successful in 
defending its interests as the government was able to appoint a new company 
chairman favourable to privatization.
Opposition from the managers o f nationalized industries can most easily be 
avoided by replacing the top executive with a manager who does not have any 
allegiance to the company and is favourable to the government’s change in policy. If 
that is not possible, or if  opposition continues, the most effective means to appease 
concern and gain cooperation is to sell the company in one piece. Though this may
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undermine attempts to increase competition and efficiency in the case o f monopolies, 
it will normally increase the value of the company as well as the proceeds to the 
government. Because a government’s time horizon is only the next election, measures 
that facilitate a sale so that it is achievable during the party’s time in office are most 
desirable, and the consequences of a private monopoly will immediately be no 
different than a public monopoly. Only in the long-term will disregard for the public 
interest become apparent, and measures can be implemented subsequently to break 
the monopoly.
At the Bureaucracy level, British civil servants were motivated by interesting 
work that was defined in part by the career opportunities that privatization presented. 
One traditional public choice view of bureaucrats is that they are budget-maximizers. 
Depending on whether there is movement within the bureaucracy and whether 
bureaucrats choose to act individually or collectively, though, three other types of 
action are possible: self-maximizing, bureau-shaping and career-maximizing. This 
traditional view is especially misguided because collective action is rare. In this case, 
because British civil servants moved between divisions and departments regularly, 
their allegiance was to the central government rather than to a particular department 
or division. Thus, their interests focused on interesting work and career advancement 
rather than defending the functions of their current division or department.
A strong/weak department - personal affect typology explains why collective 
action was possible in strong departments where policies were perceived negatively; 
otherwise individual strategies were more rational. Because the structure o f the British 
civil service was so secure, very few policies were interpreted by civil servants as 
personally negative. Collective action, therefore, would have been unusual. And
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because the Department of Energy was a relatively weak department, the lack of 
collective action in this case is not surprising. However, the fact that collective action 
was evident in the Treasury suggests that civil servants do react when they perceive 
a policy shift that threatens them personally and that they are capable o f doing so. It 
also suggests that there are more ways to react in a stronger department; no other 
department, for example, could realistically promote sales o f other departments* 
assets.
At the Political Process level, traditional public choice models, such as the 
median voter model, focus on the demand for policies and predict that politicians will 
select policy positions that appeal to the largest number o f voters. This case lends 
support to the view that, for some issues, there is no strong demand and policy 
decisions are made primarily according to supply factors. In the case o f privatization 
in Britain there was little demand in the early stages of policy development. The 
deciding factors were, therefore, from the supply-side: personal political advantage 
and electoral political advantage. Privatization provided the ideal electoral advantage 
where benefits were concentrated towards Conservative supporters in the short-term 
and costs were dispersed in the long-term. Originally the Conservative leadership 
hesitated about selling oil assets, fearing they were in the disadvantageous position 
of threatening concentrated short-term costs to supporters and opponents alike. But 
a policy entrepreneur emerged to push the policy through the early stages o f internal 
resistance and emphasized that there would be no short-term costs from the sales, that 
ownership o f oil assets would not change Britain’s oil situation, even in a crisis, and 
that the proceeds from the sale would provide immediate cash to distribute to 
supporters. Once they accepted this distribution of costs and benefits in the short and
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long-term, the Conservative leadership proceeded quickly.
When looking at the three sets of domestic actors, company managers, civil 
servants and politicians, their reactions towards privatization were quite different. The 
managers o f BNOC and BGC were opposed while the managers o f BP were 
enthusiastic. The civil servants in the DEn were initially sceptical but were 
cooperative while those in the Treasury were eager. Among the politicians, most were 
initially reluctant while a few policy entrepreneurs were enthusiastic. These variations 
can be explained by the differences in the actors’ constraints, but also by their goals 
and motivations. The importance of looking closely at constraints is illustrated by the 
variations just between the managers of BP and BNOC. Both were state-owned oil 
companies and yet their reactions to privatization were completely different. Thus, 
even slight variation in structure can produce widely different outcomes. This also 
highlights the problem of assuming bureaucratic structures to be similar, not only 
between countries, but within them - as many public choice theorists do.
Despite the differences, calling attention to the constraints reveals new sets of 
generalizations about actors: They seek to maximize their utility in the short-term, 
and their strategies are influenced by both the constraints of the institutions in which 
they function and by their own capabilities. In other words, neither constraints nor 
individuals are generic. Individuals pursue goals as they become possible within the 
existing structures, and as they are able. For example, a civil servant in a flexible 
bureaucracy who is not an effective manager may choose to stay in their current 
bureau or department and not seek promotion. As a result o f this choice, the civil 
servant will then pursue self-maximizing strategies in that department. Without 
knowing the structure of the bureaucracy and the individual’s abilities, it is difficult
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to predict such behaviour. Only upon careful examination o f actors and their 
particular constraints can we understand their actions.
The Calculus
In deciding to sell the oil holdings, all three sets of actors as public officials 
can technically be described as decision-makers. But in this case, only the politicians 
were able to make the final decisions to sell assets, albeit under the influence not only 
of the company managers and civil servants, but also o f public demand as well as 
international pressures. The influences and thus the explanation for each privatization 
differ.
The numerous political reasons for selling each oil asset are summarized in 
Table 8.2. The reasons were surprisingly similar, though the priorities in each case 
differed according to the company and other external pressures. For the oil assets 
sales, the financial motivations were pre-eminent. The need for money was of 
primary importance to the government and the attractiveness o f a sale was enhanced 
because the politicians could raise large amounts of money immediately. According 
to political short-term calculations, this was a more advantageous financial 
arrangement than the returns in the form of profits and dividends spread over the 
longer term. In the case o f BNOC’s trading operations, while there was no option to 
sell the organization, the financial liabilities that it represented were the trigger to 
motivate politicians to close it down.
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Table 8.2. Political Motivations for Selling Oil Assets
Britoil BGC’S Oil 
Assets
BP BNOC
Trading
Party
Political
Financial
need
Financial
need
Financial
need
Financial
liability
Other
arrangements 
offer greater 
returns
Other
arrangements 
offer greater 
returns
Other
arrangements 
offer greater 
returns
Ideologically
inconsistent
Ideological
inconsistent
Ideologically
inconsistent
Expensive to 
maintain
Personally
Political
Inconsistent 
with image
Inconsistent 
with image
Inconsistent 
with image
Inconsistent 
with image
Prestige 
from sale
Prestige 
from sale
Prestige 
from sale
Functional motivations were also important. In the case o f BNOC and BGC, 
the Conservatives’ needs had changed so that state-ownership was no longer 
consistent with their free-market ideology nor their image as champions o f the private 
sector and small government. There was also a better alternative available than state 
ownership, namely private ownership and the ensuing prestige from the sale and from 
governing over a larger private sector.
Though the factors in each case were similar, the priorities differed. In the 
case o f Britoil, the personal prestige factor for Nigel Lawson was the most important 
factor, followed by the fact that a sale offered an immediate cash return whereas 
continued ownership meant variable profits into the future. Of underlying importance
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was the government’s need for money, as well as the way it fit with the 
Conservative’s free-market ideology and the Conservative leadership’s image as 
defenders o f the private sector.
In the case of BGC’s oil assets, the most important factor was the improved 
financial arrangement that privatization offered. It was superior in terms o f immediate 
cash up front, and because the sales also reduced the strength o f the remaining BGC, 
an important objective for the government, which had been frustrated in its struggle 
to control BGC’s profits. The political prestige from the sales was also important, 
though not realized in the Wytch Farm case because of the long duration o f the sale. 
As in the Britoil case, the need for money and the inconsistency in both ideology and 
image were important as secondary factors.
The BP case is more complicated because there were several sales, though 
they can be divided between the Labour’s 1977 sale and the subsequent sales by the 
Conservatives. For the 1977 sale, the most important factor was the need for money 
and the fact that the sale would raise immediate cash without lessening the 
government’s control over the company. Raising money in this way was more 
consistent with Labour’s image than cutting spending. The maintenance expenses and 
the prestige, however, were not factors in 1977. For the Conservative’s sales, in 
contrast, the prestige was of primary importance, as were the enormous proceeds up 
front. The expense of maintaining a stake in BP was also important. Though the 
image o f having companies under state-ownership was a factor for the Conservatives, 
ideological consistency was not an issue as it was in the other cases because BP was 
not subjected to government intervention and was already functioning efficiently in 
the private sector.
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Finally, the case of the BNOC trading operations offers a slightly different 
perspective. Though the trading operation did not fit with the Conservatives’ free- 
trade ideology nor with their image o f themselves as efficient managers, there were 
overriding factors that made the operation worthwhile to maintain, such as national 
security. But as the company began to lose money, which in turn had to be covered 
by grants made expressly by Parliament, it highlighted the incompatibility o f BNOC 
with the government and hastened its demise.
8.3. Broader Ramifications
While the findings are understandable for this case, the real test is whether 
they can be applied to cases beyond privatization in Britain. Extrapolating from the 
findings, I create a list o f probing questions to reveal whether these factors exist in 
other countries and therefore whether privatization is likely. It might be objected, 
however, that privatization is an unusual governmental policy. To investigate whether 
the more general findings of this case have broader applications than just 
privatization, I apply them to a current discussion on ‘reinventing government.’ From 
these two explorations, I reconsider the overall findings o f this case and the 
usefulness of this approach.
Empirical Implications for Other Privatizations
If adding the pieces together to explain privatization is a truly viable approach, 
it should be able to identify general conditions under which privatization is likely to 
occur.7 A series of general questions can be asked of any country which can
7 Savas, Privatization, p.278-9.
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determine whether and when privatization is a realistic policy outcome (see Table 
8.3). I apply the questions to the specific case o f Argentina’s energy privatizations, 
and then to perceptions o f an international privatization trend.
Table 8.3. Anticipating Privatization
1. Does the country have assets that can be sold?
2. Due to international or political pressures, does the government 
need money quickly?
3. Will the company managers cooperate, and if  not, does the 
government have means to circumvent them?
4. Will the bureaucrats in the relevant departments cooperate, and if  
not, does the government have the means to circumvent them?
5. Can the governing party implement the sale without electoral 
punishment, i.e. is public opinion opposed and intense on the 
issue?
6. Are there other options that will provide greater political 
advantage for the politicians in power?
My findings in the British case of privatization o f oil assets revealed that there 
were many layers o f obstacles to privatization. The questions in Table 8.3. are 
designed to reveal whether obstacles exist in other cases. While not designed to 
discover the intricacies that contributed to our understanding o f the British case, these
295
questions may be useful in obtaining a first approximation assessment.
A ‘no* to any one of these six questions can prevent privatization from 
occurring. The first pre-condition for a sale is whether there is anything to sell. In 
some countries the government never created or nationalized industries, therefore 
there is little to sell. In other countries where financial markets are small and 
undeveloped, having something to sell means having assets that are attractive to 
international investors. The second question determines whether there is a pressing 
need for money. If time is not crucial, there may be other more feasible options. 
Question 3 focuses on the managers o f the state-owned industries. Privatization can 
proceed only if  they cooperate or the government has the means to override or 
replace them. Question 4 addresses a similar consideration in regard to the 
government’s civil servants; privatization can only proceed if  they co-operate or the 
government has the means to circumvent or replace them. Question 5 considers the 
electoral implications of a sale. If the public is opposed on the grounds o f national 
interest, strategic security, financial or even sentiment and votes accordingly, 
privatization is not worthwhile for a politician to pursue and the policy will halt. 
Finally, if  politicians have other options which provide greater personal or party 
political advantage, they will be selected instead o f privatization. Over time, questions 
3 through 5 may be altered by political means, which is part of the job o f a political 
entrepreneur. The other questions depend on structural factors and alternative options 
which for the most part are external to the political process.
To explore the usefulness of these questions beyond the case o f Britain, I 
apply them to the case o f Argentina, one o f the few cases where a government has 
decisively moved on and successfully completed an extensive privatization
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\programme, including its energy assets. In fact, it is the only government besides 
Britain to completely dispose o f its oil assets.8 Argentina’s energy assets include 
Hidronor, the country’s principal hydro-electricity generator, YPF, the national oil 
company, and the federally held gas and electricity companies. Equally remarkable 
is the fact that these energy assets were sold in 15 months, from March 1992 to July 
1993 and raised $6.65 billion.9
The Argentinean case passes the six hurdles for privatization: The answer to 
question 1 is that as a developing country, Argentina’s energy industry was one of the 
few state-owned resources that would sell. Because the government o f Argentina in 
1990 was facing 200 per cent inflation and a fiscal deficit o f 22 per cent of GDP, the 
answer to question 2 is that they needed money quickly, particularly foreign 
exchange, in order to repay their international debt and to stabilize their shaky 
economy.10 With a small indigenous investment market, Argentina could only sell 
assets that were attractive to international investors. On question 3, the Argentinean 
government demanded safeguards including investment and other requirements from 
the investors, so that ministers argued that they were able to ensure Argentina’s 
energy security. On question 4, the government was able to overcome management 
opposition to privatization by hiring an oil industry veteran from the private sector 
expressly to oversee the privatization of YPF.11 In relation to question 5, President
8 There are, however, a few countries whose governments never owned their oil assets, 
such as the United States.
9 John Barham, ‘International Company News: Argentina Sells Energy Group in Three 
Units,’ Financial Times, 12 July 1993, p. 19.
10 David Mulfor, ‘Argentina Privatizes Oil and Vitalizes Stock Market,’ Wall Street 
Journal, 12 November 1994, p.A15.
11 Mulfor, ‘Argentina Privatises Oil and Vitalizes Stock Market,* p.A15.
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Carlos Menem, with the powers o f the Presidency behind him, was able to overcome 
any opposition from government bureaucrats.12
On question 6, the government was able to avoid electoral punishment by 
convincing the public in two distinct ways that the sales were economically essential. 
First, the government bought the support o f the politically important old age 
pensioners by allocating a substantial portion of the share offerings to them in order 
to make good billions o f dollars in unpaid bills. There may be electoral repercussions 
in the future, however, because 30-35 per cent o f the shares were subsequently 
purchased in the market by foreign investors.13 Second, the government argued that 
the sales were crucial to the country’s economy. Privatization ended $2.1 billion 
annual subsidies to nationalized companies; generated additional taxes from some 
companies now operating profitably in the private sector; transferred $1.5 billion in 
liabilities to the private sector; added $5.4 billion in cash to the Treasury, and 
enabled them to retire $12.5 billion in government debt through equity swaps.14 
Because the Argentinean Constitution allows Presidents to serve only one term in 
office, Menem did not have electoral considerations to weigh, and thus he could 
pursue the policy without repercussions. He is, however, now making moves to alter 
the Constitution to allow himself another term. Answering the last question, number 
6, in terms of personal political advantage, Menem has been widely credited with 
stabilizing the economy. This achievement cannot hurt his future career aspirations
12 David Battman, ‘Survey of Oil and Gas Industry: Liberalisation Pay Off,* Financial 
Times, 13 December 1993, p.33.
13 John Barham and Damian Fraser, ‘International Company News: Argentina Pins Hopes 
on YPF Offer,’ Financial Times, 25 June 1993, p.25; and Mulfor, ‘Argentina Privatizes Oil 
and Vitalizes Stock Market,’ p.A15.
14 Stephen Fidler, ‘Survey of Argentina,’ Financial Times, 27 May 1993, p.36.
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and may be the impetus needed to alter the Constitution and grant him another term 
in office.15
Looking beyond the case of Argentina, despite the Economist*s claim that 
‘Everybody’s doing it,’ privatization has in fact been a limited phenomenon. Many 
states have considered sales and other means to reduce the size o f their government. 
And many leaders have proposed such actions, but few have been implemented. 
Given the multiple and complex conditions affecting the privatization decision, as 
represented by the hurdles in Table 8.3, it is surprising that so many governments 
have chosen privatization at all and have been able to implement their privatization 
plans.
A review of the countries mentioned in Chapter One as part o f the 
privatization phenomenon shows that very few have actually completed major sales. 
For example, Turkey has raised $1.7 billion primarily through sales o f minority 
stakes, often in companies already in the private sector.16 Pakistan was scolded by 
its international donors over the lack of progress on its privatization programme, 
which was only begun in 1991 with small disposals and the sale o f 51 per cent o f a 
large company, National Fibres Ltd.17 Belgium privatized its first asset in October
1993, a network of insurance and banking branches; even then the government sold 
only 49.9 per cent of the company.18 Spain has just slowly started to sell state
13 Fidler, ‘Survey of Argentina,’ p.36.
16 Anne Counsell, ‘Survey of Turkey,’ Financial limes, 15 April 1994, p.V.
17 Farhan Bokhari, ‘Survey of Pakistan,’ Financial Times, 18 September 1992, p.IV; and 
Farhan Bokhari, ‘Pakistan to Ask Donors for Pounds 1.7bn,’ Financial Times, 23 February
1994, p.4.
18 Andrew Hill, ‘Survey of Belgium Banking and Finance,* Financial limes, 25 
November 1993, p.IV.
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assets, such as 13 per cent of Repsol, the energy group, and 25 per cent o f the state- 
owned banking corporation.19 In Mexico by 1992, the government sold the 18 banks 
which were nationalized in 1982, which raised the substantial sum of $12.4 billion.20 
The Mexican government, however, has not touched the more traditional state-owned 
industries. For example, President Carlos Salinas at Pemex’s recent 54th anniversary 
stated: ’The property of oil stays uniquely and firmly under the control o f the 
Mexican state.’21
Even those countries heralded as exceptional cases still maintain state
ownership. Malaysia, for example has been highlighted by the Financial Times:
Where others have talked, Malaysia has acted. For the last decade, the 
government has embraced privatization with an enthusiasm rarely 
matched elsewhere.22
Over the last ten years, the sales have targeted 54 organizations. But o f the major 
government corporations, only portions have been privatized, such as 23 per cent of 
Tenaga Nasional (the state electricity utility) and 30 per cent of the Malaysian-based 
Mitsubishi-type Proton cars.23 Similarly, Hungary has been touted as the most 
successful Eastern European country in implementing privatization, as the government 
has sold 15-20 per cent o f the state’s holdings. But their programme has now come
19 Tom Burns, ‘Survey of Spain, Banking and Finance,’ Financial Times, 23 June 1993, 
p.V.
20 Fidler, ‘Survey of Mexico,’ p.III.
21 Damian Fraser, ‘World Trade News: Mexico Faces Hard Choice in Keeping Oil Out 
of NAFTA,* Financial Times, 11 June 1992, p.3.
22 Victor Mallet, ‘Survey of Malaysia,’ Financial Timesy 28 August 1992, p.VI.
23 Mallet, ‘Survey of Malaysia,’ p.VI.
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to a standstill with the state still holding a substantial portion of industry.24
Most countries cite the need for obtaining money quickly as a reason for 
privatization. In Turkey, Belgium and Spain, the need to curb growing budget deficits 
and restore policy credibility were key trigger factors.25 Many cash-starved 
governments, of course, do not have the other conditions necessary to privatize. This 
evidence supports my contention that an obstacle to any o f the six conditions is 
sufficient to prevent privatization. The most common obstacle comes from the 
electoral unpopularity of government withdrawal (question 6). In India, Turkey, 
Hungary, Argentina, Columbia, Peru, Venezuela, Nigeria and Ghana, the threat of 
electoral punishment was mentioned as a serious obstacle to privatization. Thus 
opposition is often in forms more extreme than those found in Britain, including 
terrorism, coups, and threats from powerful opposition parties to re-nationalize any 
assets - factors which have the double effect o f also discouraging investors.26 Of 
course more in-depth analyses are needed to reveal the reasons why these obstacles 
exist and how they might be overcome. But these 6 questions appear to be a useful 
guide in identifying the sources of obstacles to privatization across countries.
24 Nick Clegg, ‘Hungary’s Privatisation Falters After Flying Start,’ Financial Times, 19 
October 1993, p.4.
25 John Murray Brown, ‘Turkey Plans Big State Sell-Off,* Financial Tunes, 11 February 
1993, p.3; Hill, ‘Survey of Belgium Banking and Finance,* p.IV; and Bums, ‘Survey of 
Spain, Banking and Finance,* p.V.
26 Nick Clegg, ‘Hungary’s Privatisation Falters After Flying Start,* Financial Times, 19 
October 1993, p.4; John Murray Brown, ‘Turkey Plans Big State Sell-Off,’ Financial Times, 
11 February 1993, p.3; Tony Hawkins, ‘Survey of Africa,* Financial Times, 1 September 
1993, p.XI; Kunal Bose, ‘Survey of India,’ Financial Times, 30 September 1993, p.XI; and 
Sheila Jones, ‘Survey of Turkish Finance and Industry,’ Financial Tunes, 25 November 1993, 
p.V.
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Considerations for Optimal Government
Scholars have been concerned with the design of an optimal political structure 
for thousands o f years, and the search continues.27 As a means to broaden the 
findings in this case of privatization, I consider the results with reference to a 
currently influential book on changing bureaucracy in the United States, Reinventing 
Government by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, which is now being read and 
discussed by politicians and civil servants in Britain.28 The evidence from this case 
suggests that the changes being proposed by Osborne and Gaebler may be more 
complex than they imply. As this case study shows, even slight differences in 
institutional structure, motivations or actors’ assessment of change can cause a wide 
range o f outcomes. In a recent interview, David Osborne emphasized that the changes 
rest on carefully defining bureaucracies* business, mission, and customers.29 
Evidence from this case supports their contention, but also reveals how difficult an 
accurate definition is to create. A generalized approach may negate the intended 
effect.
The example Osborne and Gaebler herald as a success illustrates my point. A  
unit within the U.S. Department of Defence in charge o f all defence installations has 
simplified its charter to a one page sheet that defined their business, mission and 
customers: 4To provide for our customers - the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen
27 Richard Auster and Morris Silver, The State as a Firm: Economic Forces in Political 
Development (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), p .l.
28 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial 
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (New York: Addition-Wesley, 1992).
29 Todd Carver and Albert Vondra, ‘Reinventing the Business of Government: An 
Interview with David Osborne,’ Harvard Business Review, May-June 1994, p. 133.
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Vwho defend America - excellent places to work and live, and excellent base 
services.’30 In the words of the Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Defence of 
Installations, ‘our policy is to provide excellent barracks, not minimum barracks.’31 
By identifying the army personnel as their customers, it is easy to see how their job 
is simplified and satisfaction is readily measured. The drawbacks o f such an 
approach, however, are that the taxpayer may be paying for higher standards than 
they think are appropriate and the local communities may not be receiving the 
consideration they should while the unit’s loudest customer is getting more new 
accommodation, which does not meet the overall definition o f good government. 
Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to the department’s direct contacts, 
recognizing that they may be separate from whom they are meant to serve.
Applying Osborne and Gaebler’s streamlined mission to the Oil Division of 
the Department o f Energy, the objective might be to provide for efficient licensing 
and regulation of the North Sea. If their customers are identified as the oil companies 
though, which is effectively the case at present, the meaning o f efficient will be quite 
different than if  the customers are British oil consumers or tax payers. There is no 
right answer and these decisions are not easy to make. Most importantly, if  the 
decision is left to the civil servants, they may select the group with whom they come 
into the most contact and who are most able to complain to their political masters if  
they are displeased.
Osborne and Gaebler do recognize that setting up corresponding structures and
30 Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, p. 134.
31 Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, p. 135.
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rewards are necessary in order to sustain the desired changes.32 But these points too 
need careful attention. As the finding is this case highlighted, civil servants have 
distinct sets of motivations. Therefore, some of Osborne and Gaebler*s 
recommendations that are adapted from business are not likely to work with civil 
servants. For example, they suggest that introducing competition into the bureaucracy 
and holding out deregulation as a reward for individuals will improve performance. 
But civil servants who have purposely chosen government service because it offers 
a secure environment may not respond as Osborne and Gaebler suggest. In fact, such 
measures may decrease the sense of being part of the government policy-making and 
reduce access to ministers, thereby diminishing two o f the main factors that make 
work ‘interesting* for civil servants, and in turn reducing their incentive to cooperate 
or even stay in the civil service. The structure would then compete with the private 
sector for employees, and attract civil servants on the basis o f salary on which the 
government is notoriously uncompetitive. Instead, a superior’s recognition or 
additional responsibilities may be simple measures that will more directly achieve the 
goals of greater efficiency and higher quality service. These changes will be most 
effective in flexible bureaucracies where individuals are career-maximizers and thus 
responsive to interesting work and career advancement opportunities.
Other suggestions that may have unintended effects are the de-centralization 
of government, and the allocation of more power to those dealing directly with the 
public.33 In an extreme sense, this is what the British government has been creating
32 Carver and Vondra, ‘Reinventing the Business of Government: An Interview with 
David Osborne,’ p. 140.
33 Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, Chapter 9.
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with quasi government agencies. Such de-centralized units would presumably have
permanent staffs and organizational autonomy yet little financial independence. As
such, the officials would not have the option to move to other governmental
departments. Using the findings of how civil servants in inflexible bureaucracies and
managers in state-owned industries act, it is possible to hypothesize that the officials
will be very committed to their organization and seek to increase the organization’s
financial independence as part of a strategy to direct the agency’s resources to
increase their own well being. They will also pursue other self and budget
maximizing strategies to enhance their current situation, but will be concerned with
the long-term implications of their actions because they may still be there and called
to responsibility in the long-term. They will proceed without regard for broader
governmental implications, such as expense or conflict with other departments,
because those are beyond their realm of responsibility.
Studies such as Osborne and Gaebler*s focus on bureaucracies, when instead
the real problem is the short-term horizons of their political leaders. As Neal Peirce,
a leading U .S. columnist on state and local government notes:
Indeed, there are not a few cynics who say that legislature and future 
planning mix like oil and water. The reasoning is that legislators’ lives 
revolve around the election cycles. Politics forces them to be 
preoccupied with district and regional problems, to go for fast short­
term payoffs instead of thinking and acting long-term.34
Neither bureaucrats themselves nor reform of the bureaucratic system alone can
transform short-term policies into efficient and effective long-term practices.
Even though these studies highlight the importance of leadership, they do so only in
34 As quoted in Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, p.235.
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connection with motivating bureaucrats.35 The problem is more than just 
bureaucratic leadership; it is the policies that bureaucrats are given to implement. And 
politicians have little incentive to change this situation as they have been successfully 
elected under the current system.
Though considerable thought has been given to this problem, there are few 
satisfactory solutions.36 The findings from this British case study suggest three areas 
where more work can be done on long-term political accountability. These include 
the role o f policy entrepreneurs, how to bring forward the long-term costs of 
politicians’ party political calculations, and how to improve the quality o f public 
demand to incorporate long-term needs.
Conclusions
A government voluntarily relinquishing control of valuable national assets is 
not a rational act - at least when examined as a whole from the macro-level. But 
when the act is broken down into pieces, and factors are isolated at different levels 
of analysis, the pieces o f the process can be understood as rational. Incorporating 
several aspects of the micro-level is important as a one dimensional analysis is 
insufficient. For example, normally policy entrepreneurs are politicians, or leaders 
of interest groups (Olson, 1971). But by only focusing on the politicians, it is possible 
to miss the fact that policy entrepreneurs can also be business executives and officials
35 Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, p.235-49; and John Dilulio, Gerald 
Garvey and Donald Kettl, Improving Government Performance: An Owner’s Manual 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993).
36 Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, p.235-49; and Osborne and 
Gaebler, Reinventing Government, p. 136-44.
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in international organizations, as BP managers and the IMF top officials were during 
the 1977 BP sale. The changes in structures from the international level to the 
company level to the bureaucracy all were able to affect the policy outcome. This 
illustrates that it is not possible to predict rational policy outcomes from a macro­
level, as these level-specific factors resist generalization.
In their own way, each set of actors along with the changes in the 
corresponding structures set the parameters for the government’s decision to sell its 
oil assets. The connection of these influences can be illustrated with Venn diagrams 
where each circle represents the overlap of factors at its level. Thus, circle 1 
represents the area where the parameters from the international economy overlapped 
with the international oil industry and membership in international organizations. 
While the levels and influences exist in three dimensions, imagine them being placed 
on top o f each other as if  looking down from the top o f a funnel. The location of 
these parameters are illustrated for 1974, 1979 and 1982 (see Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 
8.3). Circles 1-4 in descending size respectively represent the combined factors o f the 
international, company, bureaucracy and political process levels. The points represent
specific policy options: point A to 
increase taxes, point B to increase the 
budget deficit and point C to sell oil 
assets.
In 1974, just after the 1973 oil 
crisis and before North Sea oil was in 
production (and before BNOC was even 
created) the structures o f the international
Combined Policy
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oil industry and public demand were such 
that a sale o f oil assets was not possible 
(as represented by the exclusion of point 
C from circles 1 and 4) as represented in 
Figure 8.1. In 1977 the situation had 
changed so that asset sales were within the 
international and policy parameters while 
the option o f a budget increase was 
prevented by the IMF and the 
international financial community (point B 
excluded from circle 1), while a policy of 
new taxes was restricted by domestic 
political opposition (point B excluded 
from circle 4), as represented in Figure 
8.2. An asset sale was thus the only one 
of the three policies possible (only point C 
in overlap o f circles 1-4). In 1982, again the options changed, where all three options 
were possible at the international, company and bureaucracy levels (points A, B and 
C in circles 1-3), but only assets sales fit the Conservative’s political supply-side 
factors (only point C in circle 4), and again, an asset sale was the only one o f the 
three policies possible (only point C in overlap o f circles 1-4) as represented in 
Figure 8.3.
Looking at all four levels provides a much richer and more accurate
understanding of the purpose and the effect of asset sales in Britain. Though the
Combined Policy
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multi-level approach is perceived as the struggle of the modem political scientist, the
importance of including layers of analysis is not new. In fact, returning to the original
study o f states as actors, closer examination reveals that Thucydides greatest
contribution with The History o f  the Peloponnesian War may be the importance of
multiple perspectives to enhance knowledge about politics, and his legacy to realists
may be misinterpreted. Laurie Bagby and others have argued that Thucydides*
emphasis on the state has been over emphasized and that scholars have ignored the
depth o f his account which includes significant recognition o f the role o f specific
national and individual factors.37
While many authors have made laundry lists o f factors that cause privatization,
few if  any are melded into coherent theories.38 By incorporating constraints more
systematically into our analysis of individual actors, hopefully I have moved beyond
March and Olsen’s first step:
The institutionalism we have considered is neither a theory nor a 
coherent critique of one. It is simply an argument that the organization 
of political life makes a difference.39
Adopting a public choice framework and focusing on the individual while also
assimilating the constraints they face at four levels, I propose a more systematic way
of incorporating several variables at the same time. This approach also suggests a
logic for focusing on the most significant policy determinants. Though losing the
37 Laurie M.Johnson Bagby, ‘The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International 
Relations,* International Organizations, Vol.48, No.l, Winter 1994, pp.131-53.
38 Vickers and Wright, ‘The Politics of Industrial Privatisation in Western Europe’; 
Sulieman and Waterbury, ‘Introduction: Analysing Privatization in Industrial and Developing 
Countries’; Heald, ‘The United Kingdom: Privatisation and its Political Context*; Dunleavy, 
‘Explaining the Privatization Boom*; and E.S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better 
Government (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987).
39 March and Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism,’ p.747.
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parsimony of a single level analysis, this approach retains consistency by focusing on 
the individual unit throughout. The depth o f understanding gained in the trade-off is 
worthwhile, as no other approaches have satisfactorily explained state disengagement.
This case of Britain’s oil asset sales has also demonstrated that despite much 
work in the field of public choice theory, some o f the basic assumptions still need to 
be refined in order to recognize that bureaucrats are not just budget-maximizers in 
pursuit o f pecuniary benefits, but rather that they also value other goods such as 
interesting work, and that they pursue career-maximizing strategies. Furthermore, it 
must be emphasized that policies are led by supply as well as demand factors. This 
case reveals that there are still important areas that have not been fully addressed, 
including the role of international factors, the role played by the managers of 
nationalized industries, the use of individual strategies by bureaucrats, and the 
contribution of political supply-side factors make to policy-making, including policy 
entrepreneurs, cost-benefit analyses and demand o f party supporters.
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Appendix I: Chronology of Events
1908: Oil is discovered in Persia by a syndicate o f the Burmah Oil Company, the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)
1911: United States Supreme Court orders the dissolution o f Standard Oil Trust
1914: The British government purchases a majority holding in APOC
1914-18: World War I and the mechanization o f the battlefield
1920-23: The British Government considers selling its holding in APOC
1922-28: Negotiation of the "Red Line" and the "As-Is" agreements
1932-33: Shah Reza Phavli cancels Anglo Iranian Oil Company’s (AIOC) concession; 
AIOC wins it back
1934: AIOC and Gulf gain joint concession in Kuwait
1938: Mexico nationalizes its oil companies
1939-45: World War II
1950: Fifty-fifty (participation) agreement between Aramco and Saudi Arabia 
1950: Mohammed Mossadegh nationalizes AIOC assets in Iran 
1951-53: Korean War
1953: Mossadegh is overthrown and the Shah returns to power. The management of 
Iraqi oil operations is contracted to an international consortium and AIOC 
obtains a 40 per cent majority stake
Reports surface that the Conservative government is to dispose o f its 56 per 
cent holding in AIOC
1956: Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt announces the appropriation o f the 
Suez canal
1957: European Economic Community established
1960: Organization o f Petroleum Exporting Countries founded in Baghdad
1964: First round licenses are awarded for exploration in the North Sea by the 
Department of Trade and Industry
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1965: British Petroluem (BP) discovers gas in the North Sea 
1965: Britain imposes sanctions against Rhodesia 
1967: Six Day War, Suez Canal closes
1967: Government’s shareholding in BP drops below the 50 per cent mark to 48.2  
per cent
1968: Oil is discovered on Alaska’s North Slope
1968: Prime Minister Harold Wilson announces the end of British military presence 
in the Persian Gulf, completed by 1971
1969: Oil is discovered on the Norwegian side o f the North Sea
1970: Oil is discovered on the British side of the North Sea by BP
1972: Gas Act creates the British Gas Corporation from the Gas Council
1973: Britain joins the European Community
1973-74: AOPEC countries cut back supplies to the United States and the Netherlands
Shell and BP refuse to give Britain preferential treatment in the supply o f oil
1974: The Department o f Energy is established
International Energy Agency is founded
1975: Government’s shareholding in BP increases from 48 per cent to 68 per cent 
through the purchase of Burmah’s holding in BP
First North Sea oil lands in Britain
1976: The British National Oil Corporation is established
1977: First sale o f oil assets: British government sells 17 per cent in BP, reducing 
its shareholding from 68 per cent to 51 per cent
1979: Government sells another 5 per cent shareholding in BP, reducing its holding 
to 46 per cent
Iranian revolution - Shah Reza Pahlavi goes into exile and Ayatollah 
Khomeini takes power
1980: Iraq launches war against Iran
1981: British oil production in the North Sea surpasses domestic consumption
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1982: OPEC agrees to first quotas
BGC is instructed to sell its stake in the on-shore oil field, Wytch Farm
Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act enabled the government to sell BNOC and 
BGC’s oil assets
BNOC split: production half becomes Britoil, 51 per cent is sold to the public 
1983: Britain becomes the sixth largest oil producer in the world 
BGC’s oil assets are sold as Enterprise Oil
Government sells another 15 per cent shareholding in BP, reducing its holding 
to 31.5 per cent
1984: BGC’s interest in Wytch Farm is finally sold
1985: Government sells remaining stake in Britoil
BNOC is disbanded, replaced by the Oil and Pipelines Agency
1986: Oil price collapses
1987: Government sells its remaining shares in BP in the midst o f the October stock 
market crash
1988: BP takes over Britoil
Cease-fire in Iran-Iraq War
1993: Department of Energy re-merges with the DTI
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Appendix II: The Bradbury and Bridges Letters
The Bradbury Letter
Treasury, Whitehall, S.W.
20th May 1914
Gentlemen,
With reference to the Financial Agreement which has been duly settled on behalf o f  
His Majesty’s Government and sent to you company for signature, I am directed by 
the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury to offer the following 
observations regarding the provisions of the amendments proposed to your Articles 
of Association:
1. By the Article 91A it is provided than an ex officio director shall have the right 
to negative any resolution which may be proposed at a board or committee meeting, 
but that the other directors, or a majority o f them, shall have the right to appeal there 
from to His Majesty’s Government, which, for the purpose o f the Article, is defined 
as meaning the Treasury and Admiralty. His Majesty’s Government, which, for the 
purpose o f the Article, is defined as meaning the Treasury and the Admiralty. His 
Majesty’s Government are of opinion that it would not be prudent, or, indeed, 
practicable, to qualify the generality o f the right o f veto. On the other hand, it is felt 
that the ordinary directors (meaning by that expression the directors other than the ex 
officio directors), and incidentally the members of the company, should have some 
safeguard in the matter. It is thought that the right which is to be given by the new 
Article to the ordinary directors o f appealing to the two Departments will afford the 
requisite safeguard. The ordinary directors will, by appealing to the Departments, be 
in a position to ensure in regard to any particular question that the right o f veto is not 
exercised until the question has been considered and adjudicated upon by the 
Departments.
I am to add that His Majesty’s Government do not propose to make use o f the right 
of veto except in regard to matters of general policy, such as -
(1) The supervision of the activities o f the company as they may affect questions of  
foreign, naval or military policy;
(2) Any proposed sale o f the company’s undertaking of proposed change o f the 
company’s status;
(3) The control o f the new exploitation, sites o f wells, etc.;
(4) Sales o f crude or fuel oil to foreigners, or such exceptional sales to other persons 
on long contracts as might endanger the due fulfilment o f current Admiralty contracts;
and that their interference (if any) in the ordinary administration o f the company as 
a commercial concern will be strictly limited to the minimum necessary to secure
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these objects. Further, in the case o f any such interference, due regard will be paid 
to the financial interest o f the company is which, under the proposed arrangements 
the Government have themselves so large a stake.
While His Majesty’s Government are not prepared to enter into any binding 
agreement in regard to the exercise o f the veto, you are at liberty to treat the above 
as an assurance as to the general lines upon which they will act in the matter, not 
only in regard to the Anglo-Persian Company, Limited, but also in regard to the 
subsidiary companies.
2. By the word added to Article 96 it is provided that the ex officio directors shall 
be members o f every committee o f the board. His Majesty’s Government do not 
however, contemplate that both the ex officio directors should always be present at 
committee meetings. Occasions may arise when it may be desirable that both the ex 
officio directors should be present, but as a general rule the presence o f only one of 
them would be necessary. Indeed, at some meetings it may not be necessary that 
either o f them should be present.
3. You are at liberty to make such use o f this letter as you may think fit at the 
proposed meetings of the shareholders.
I am, Gentlemen,
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) John Bradbury
Messrs. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited 
Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London E.C.
(As reprinted in Hansard, House of Commons 1928-29, 26 March 1929, Vol.226, 
col.2263-4.)
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The Bridges Letter
12 April 1951 
Gentlemen,
I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of H.M. Treasury’s concern to recent 
developments in Persia and their possible effect on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 
H.M. Government have in mind not only their own large financial interest in the 
Company, but the vast importance o f the Company’s operations to the economy o f  
the United Kingdom, and indeed to the Sterling area as a whole.
The relationship between H.M. Government and the Company forms the subject of  
the letter sent by Sir John Bradbury to the Company on the 20th May, 1914, 
following the signature o f the Financial Agreement between H.M. Government and 
the Company of the same date. H.M. Government do not feel that it is necessary to 
amend the terms of Sir John Bradbury’s letter. While recognizing the close co­
operation that has existed between H.M. Government and the Company, they feel 
sure that the Company will appreciate that it is more than ever necessary, particularly 
in the present critical circumstances, for H.M. Government to be kept in close touch 
with the development o f the Company’s general policy and above all that there should 
be mutual consultation in good time, and at the appropriate levels, about any 
developments likely to effect substantially the Company’s position in Persia or in 
other territories where it has a concessionary interest.
I am, Gentlemen,
Your Obedient Servant,
(signed) Edward Bridges
(As reprinted in Hansard, House of Commons, 16 February 1977, Vol.926, col.270-
i.)
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Appendix m : Research Methods
Although there is a wealth of writing about privatization in Britain, most has 
focused on the economic advantages and disadvantages o f privatization rather than the 
political rationale. As such, there has been little concern for how the sales were 
decided and implemented and who was involved. Many authors who have written on 
privatization have focused on the later stages o f the policy and have relied on 
published governmental reports and newspaper accounts as source materials, their 
conclusions are not as focused or detailed as the account here.1 To avoid this 
shortcoming, much of the information gathered for this study comes from over 50 
interviews with those involved in the sales including oil company executives, civil 
servants and politicians. Since many of the details were never previously made public, 
the interviews were invaluable both for ascertaining a record o f what actually 
happened and who was involved, and for the opinions, perceptions and motivations 
of the various actors.
I started my study with a review of secondary sources as well as government 
and company documents, and began my interviews at the end o f the first year. In 
tandem with my data collection, I developed the theoretical side o f the thesis. While 
the theoretical part was firmed up more quickly than the factual, it was important to 
develop the two concurrently, as the theoretical suggested new avenues to pursue 
while the factual suggested ways in which the theoretical needed to be reconsidered.
1 Nelsen {The State Offshore Petroleum, Politics and State Intervention) however includes 
32 interviews with British civil servants and oil company executives in his comparison of 
British and Norwegian oil policy; and Klapp {The Sovereign Entrepreneur) interviewed 150 
officials in four countries.
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Interviews:
My plan for the interviews was to start with the retired and less senior oil 
company executives and then move to the more senior and presumably busier and 
then repeat a similar cycle with the civil servants and politicians. Using lists of board 
members and company and departmental organizational charts, I identified those most 
likely to be involved in the privatization of the British government’s oil assets, 
obtained their biographies and addresses from Who's Who and began to contact them. 
In each case, I sent a letter explaining who I was, the focus o f my research, and why 
it was that I wanted to speak with them in particular, mentioning any relevant 
connection, such as a recommendation from a previous interviewee or their being an 
LSE governor. If I had a phone number, I would follow up the next week, which was 
the most effective technique. If I did not have a telephone number, I had to wait for 
a reply, which was more likely to be negative; 7 o f the 12 written replies were 
negative whereas only 9 o f the 58 telephone contacts were so.
Fortunately, through the good offices o f a friend, I was afforded the 
opportunity to speak to the former chairman of BP, Sir Eric Drake, at the end o f my 
first year o f research. He was immensely helpful with the background and players, 
and gave me referrals to several other BP executives. This made the next round of 
BP executives more accessible than they might otherwise have been. Once 
establishing a critical mass of interviews, I was able to parlay them to a total o f 53 
interviews from October 1991 to March 1994.
It was normally most convenient for the interviewee to meet at their premises, 
which entailed quite a bit o f travelling throughout London, and beyond. Though I did 
conduct four telephone interviews, I found that a meeting in person was much more
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fruitful in terms of the time they would devote to the subject and the depth o f the 
conversation, and was therefore worth the extra effort. I was pleasantly surprised by 
the generosity of the interviewees, both in terms o f time and information as well as 
the occasional tea or lunch. I also found that the further I had to travel, the greater 
the reward, with the most special being an ox-tail lunch with Philip Shelboume in 
Salisbury, one year prior to his death. I met with as many retired officials as possible, 
as they had more time and were an invaluable source o f background information. This 
later enabled me to focus on critical person-specific questions when meeting with 
busier executives or officials.
Prior to each interview, I compiled a list o f approximately 10 specific 
questions directly related to the interviewee’s experience. The most effective way to 
begin, however, was to ask about their general background. Often the interviewee 
would have a version o f the company or the government’s general oil policy or 
privatization that they wanted to tell, and after conveying this context they became 
more comfortable answering questions. Most o f the interviewees saw the oil asset 
sales as a particularly important time in their careers and for government policy and 
yet, in many cases, they had not previously been asked for their opinion; thus they 
were generally pleased to discuss their views. At the end o f each interview, I asked 
if  there were any points or issues that I missed, and occasionally something else 
would be revealed. Before leaving, I would also ask if  there was anyone else with 
whom I should speak. Many of the same names were raised, though many new names 
came up in this process, in which case I then probed to find their direct connection 
to my project in order to qualify their relevance; otherwise my interviews could have 
continued indefinitely.
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I kept a running list of questions, both ‘general view* type questions which I 
asked o f everyone, and more specific ones which I raised as I got further into the 
specifics o f the case. Once a specific point was confirmed I crossed it o ff the list. To 
confirm a particular point, I either had two interviewees give the same information 
or an interviewee confirm information recorded in company or government documents 
or a newspaper article.
I began taping the interviews, which did not seem to inhibit BP or BNOC 
executives from talking freely. When I started interviewing civil servants and 
politicians, however, they were ill at ease with the recorder so I soon stopped trying, 
realizing that it was more important to get a detailed explanation rather than a 
recorded party line. When unable to tape the interview, I took notes during the 
meeting and then supplemented these immediately afterwards, adding additional 
recollections. In every case, I would type a full transcript that day as well as send a 
thank you note to the interviewee, with an eye to keeping communication lines open 
for possible further contact. In several cases, I did call back later to investigate a 
point or ask how to obtain further information, which was very useful.
Of 69 people I approached, 53 agreed to meet with me while 16 declined. For 
a break down by occupation, see Table A .I . ,  and for a list o f all interviewees, see 
List o f Interviewees in Appendix IV. Of those who declined, ten were civil servants, 
four were politicians and two were the BP directors appointed by the Government. 
The civil servants were either in high positions in the current government and too 
busy to meet, or felt that they were not closely enough involved in the oil asset sales 
to be useful to my research. The 4 politicians were Margaret Thatcher, Geoffrey 
Howe, Tony Benn and Alexander Eadie. Thatcher, in particular, would have been an
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important addition but despite two attempts to get her on record, she declined. (See 
Exhibit A .2.). The only other obstacle to interviewing was at Enterprise Oil, where 
only one executive agreed to speak as the representative o f the company: ‘I’m the 
person you will speak to here. I will represent us.’2
Table A.I.  Interviews by Category
Treasury civil servants 7
DEn civil servants 12
BP executives 10
BNOC executives 14
BGC executives 2
Politicians 7
CPRS officials 5
* Total Interviews 53
* While the total number o f interviews was 
53, the total number of categories is greater 
as several interviewees served in more than 
one category, i.e. a civil servants served in 
both the Department o f Energy and the 
Treasury.
Qualitative Computer Analysis
To aid in the collation of this information and to cross check sources, I used 
the qualitative computer analysis programme, Non-numerical Unstructured Data
2 Interview with Department of Energy civil servant and Enterprise Oil executive. (West)
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Indexing, Searching and Theorising (NUDIST).3 In the typed transcripts, I went back 
through and labelled each paragraph or point made in the interview with a key word, 
and then copied the transcript into a NUDIST raw-file. In addition, I added notes 
from other sources, primarily politicians* memoirs, detailed accounts o f the time 
period and notes from the Times, the Financial Times, the Economist, and the 
Petroleum Economist, again labelled with key words.
NUDIST works by building trees o f information. The trees I developed are 
shown in Figure A.I.  By sorting by these categories, I was able to gather together 
all the information on that topic and systematically compare facts and views. This was 
more efficient than note cards because the whole context o f the point could be 
included and a point could also be listed under several different categories.
While more efficient that manual collation, NUDIST is a slow and 
cumbersome programme. In part, this is because it was developed originally for 
Macintosh computers by a group o f academics in Australia and only later was adapted 
for a Windows/IBM environment, the version available at LSE, which made it 
considerably slower. I was able to write automatic command programmes to avoid 
waiting through the sorting process, though the input and retrieval o f information was 
still a very time consuming process. One glitch in the process was that the results 
files that NUDIST produced were not immediately compatible with Word Perfect, and 
had to be first transferred to another word processing programme for formatting.
3 Thomas Richards, Lyn Richards, Joan McGalliard and Boyd Sharrock at La Trobe 
University, Burndoora, Australia. References: NUDIST 2,3 User Manual; and NUDIST 2.3 
Reference Manual, 1992.
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Literature
The literature used in this research included annual reports, government 
publications, newspapers and journals, public opinion polls, and the memoirs o f some 
of the politicians at the time; I also relied on secondary sources, but primarily for 
background information for the many different levels that I have incorporated in this 
study. I was greatly aided by electronic information technology: The database o f the 
Financial Times’ Profile service enabled me to search systematically through the 
Times, the Economist, and the Financial Times from 1982 to 1990 using key words 
such as: BP, BNOC, Britoil, Enterprise Oil, Wytch Farm and privatization, 
assurances, golden share, KIO and BP. I realized the value o f this source after 
manually looking up these same key words in the Times index and then searching for 
the articles on microfilm from 1974 to 1981. I also searched manually through the 
Petroleum Economist from 1980 to 1988.1 was also able to use the file o f newspaper
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clippings kept by the Institute o f Petroleum on specific oil issues which included a 
wider range o f daily newspapers than I was able to search on my own.
Though current years of Hansard Parliamentary Debates are now on 
electronic data bases, the years with which I was concerned were not. Therefore, 
going back to 1911 ,1 surveyed all references to BP (including APOC and AIOC), 
BNOC, Britoil, Wytch Farm and Enterprise Oil, as cited in the annual index for the 
Commons and Lords debates and questions from 1911-1988. Similarly, I reviewed 
all the Parliamentary Select Committee meeting minutes and reports after 1976 that 
pertained to BP, BNOC and Britoil, BGC, Enterprise Oil and Wytch Farm; and the 
official Acts, including the Gas Act o f 1972 and the 1982 Oil and Gas (Enterprise) 
Act.
Company documents included annual reports, financial accounts, sale 
prospectuses and occasional publications. Some of those I interviewed also gave me 
references to articles in more specialist journals that reinforced the point they were 
making. I also had the great fortune o f being given access to confidential company 
and government documents early on in the research process. The information revealed 
discussions which most interviewees had denied. This event heightened my scepticism 
of what the interviewees said and also helped me to recognize that certain types of 
information were only known at certain levels.
The one source I was unable to examine was A Finding o f  Departmental 
Experience: A History o f Government Involvement in North Sea Oil written by John 
Liverman in 1982. Several o f those I interviewed referred to the book, but those with 
access claimed it was not available to the public, and I never was able to see it. The 
denial o f access became particularly frustrating when one civil servant actually looked
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up some information in it during my interview, but would not allow me to examine 
it. Daniel Yergin records in his notes on The Prize that he was able to read the 
document in the Department of Energy as long as he did not take notes; I was not 
afforded this same opportunity. Through my interviews as well as Yergin’s work, 
though, I doubt there is anything relevant to my project in Liverman’s study that I did 
not uncover.
The other types of existing literature that I used were public opinion polls. 
While they are used frequently by many academics, I found it useful to review them 
first hand to examine both what they recorded and what they did not; specifically 
when and whether public opinion polls were held on privatization or state ownership, 
and the intensity o f that opinion. This entailed searching systematically through MORI 
and Gallup Polls o f British Public Opinion from 1976 to 1988. Using the index o f  
British Opinion Polls 1960-19881 found all polls on privatization, nationalization and 
public ownership during the time period.4 I also recorded general public opinion 
trends on issues, leaders and parties every six months from 1976 to 1988. By looking 
systematically through these polls, I realized privatization seldom merited a single 
question or a mention on the list o f most important issues - indicating a very different 
image than the responses to the occasional poll revealed.
4 David Taylor, ed., British Opinion Polls 1960-1988, Volume I: Subjects and Names 
Index, alphabetical and Volume II: Subjects and Names Index, date order, (Reading: Research 
Publications, 1990).
Exhibit A .l
S
M a r g a r e t , T h e  L a d y  T h a t c h e r , O.M., F\C., F .R .S.
H o u se  of L o rds
L ondon  s w i a  o p w
7th March 1994
'Uocr (V-4 ttebpas-
Thank you for your letter o f 22nd February enclosing your 
further letter to Lady Thatcher.
I have discussed your request with Lady Thatcher and I am afraid 
the answer must remain negative. As I stated in my original 
letter she receives many requests sim ilar to yours and she is not 
able to accede to them all. Lady T hatcher's schedule for the next 
few months is immensely busy with overseas lecture tours, and 
work on the second volume o f her mem oirs, that she is simply 
not in a position to accept any more comm itm ents. She is sorry 
to have to send another disappointing response but hopes you will 
understand.
Yours sincerely
Nv Ovy
M IRANDA GRANGER 
Private Office
Ms S M Hoopes
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Appendix IV: List of Interviews
Interview with Robert Adam, 6 August 1992.
BP 1950-83; Director, BP Trading, 1973-75; Director, Sohio, 1972-76 and 
1978-83; Managing Director Finance, BP, 1975-83 and Deputy Chairman 
1981-83.
Telephone Interview with Sir Lawrence Airey, 3 February 1993.
H M G 1949-79, HM Treasury, 1958-79, Second Permanent Secretary 1977-79; 
Member, BNOC, 1976-77; Chairman, Board o f Inland Revenue, 1980-86.
Interview with Sir Fred Atkinson, 22 February 1993.
HMG 1949-79: Treasury, 1955-62 and 1963-69; Foreign Office, 1962-63; 
Ministry o f Technology, 1970; Chief Economic Advisor, DTI, 1970-73; 
Assistant Secretary General, OECD, 1973-75; Deputy Secretary and Chief 
Economic Adviser, Department of Energy, 1975-77; Chief Economic Adviser, 
Treasury, and Head of Government Economic Service, 1977-79; Co-author: 
Oil and the British Economy, 1983.
Interview with Dr. Leslie Atkinson, 7 October 1992.
Seconded from BP to CPRS October 1977 to August 1979.
Interview with Lord Joel Barnett, 4 March 1993.
MP (L) Heywood and Royton, 1964-83; Member Public Accounts Committee, 
1965-71, and Chairman, 1979-83; Opposition Spokesman on Treasury matters,
1970-74; Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 1974-79; Cabinet Member, 1977- 
79; House of Lords, 1983-; Opposition spokesman on the Treasury in House 
of Lords, 1983-86.
Telephone Interview with Ken Berrill, 15 July 1993.
Advisor to the Treasury, 1967-69 and 1973-74; Head o f CPRS, Cabinet 
Office, 1974-80; Chairman, Vickers de Costa, 1981-85; Chairman, SIB, 1985- 
88; Deputy then Chairman Robert Home Group, 1982-90; and Chairman, 
Commonwealth Equities Fund, 1990-.
Interview with Penny Boys, 11 June 1993.
HMG 1969-89: Department of Energy, 1973-78; seconded to BNOC 1978-80; 
Head o f International Unit, Department o f Energy 1981-85; seconded to 
Treasury, 1985-87; Director of Personal, Department o f Energy, 1987-89; 
Deputy Director General, Office o f Electricity Regulation, 1989-.
Interview with Dr. John Buchanan, 30 April 1993.
BP executive, seconded to CPRS 1976-77.
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Interview with Graham Campbell, 8 February 1993.
HMG 1949-84: Ministry o f Fuel and Power, 1949-65; Under Secretary, DTI, 
1973; Under Secretary, Department of Energy, 1974-84.
Interview with Ian Clark, 9 April 1992.
Member BNOC 1976-82, trading, participation, Joint Managing Director, 
Britoil 1982-85.
Letter from Gerry Corti, 11 May 1992.
Department of Energy, mid 1970s; executive, BNOC, early 1980s; Author, 
A N ation1s Oil.
Interview with Lord Croham, 29 April 1992.
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